When private set intersection meets big data: An efficient and scalable protocol

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 789-800

  Dong, Changyu ^a   Chen, Liqun ^b   Wen, Zikai ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE   (United Kingdom)

^b HEWLETT PACKARD LABORATORIES   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

bloom filters; private set intersection

Indexed keywords

BLOOM FILTERS; HIGH SCALABILITIES; LARGE-SCALE DATA PROCESSING; MODERN APPLICATIONS; ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE; PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS; SCALABLE PROTOCOLS; SET INTERSECTION;

DATA PROCESSING; SCALABILITY;

DATA PRIVACY;

EID: 84888990465     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2508859.2516701     Document Type: Conference Paper

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