State of the Field: Why novel prediction matters

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 44, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 580-589

  Douglas, Heather ^a   Magnus, P D ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888637611     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.04.001     Document Type: Review

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