Do voluntary pollution reduction programs (VPRs) spur or deter environmental innovation? Evidence from 33/50

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 66, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 444-459

  Carrión Flores, Carmen E ^a   Innes, Robert ^b   Sam, Abdoul G ^c  

^a STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Count panel models; Environmental innovation; Regulatory enforcement; Voluntary environmental programs

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATIONS; ENVIRONMENTAL PATENT; GOVERNMENT REGULATORS; MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES; PANEL MODEL; PROGRAM PARTICIPATION; REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT; VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS;

APPLICATION PROGRAMS; EMISSION CONTROL; INDUSTRY;

PATENTS AND INVENTIONS;

ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY; FUTURE PROSPECT; INNOVATION; PANEL DATA; PARTICIPATORY APPROACH; POLLUTION CONTROL; REGULATORY APPROACH; TEMPORAL PERIOD;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84888206184     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: 10960449     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.05.002     Document Type: Article

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