Belief revision and argumentation theory

Argumentation in Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 341-360

  Falappa, Marcelo Alejandro ^a   Kern Isberner, Gabriele ^b   Simari, Guillermo Ricardo ^a  

^a UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DEL SUR   (Argentina)

^b TU DORTMUND UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84885701057     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1007/978-0-387-98197-0_17     Document Type: Chapter

References (47)

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