Empirical Literature on Financial Crises: Fundamentals vs. Panic

The Evidence and Impact of Financial Globalization

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 523-534

  Goldstein, I ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884010520     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-0-12-397874-5.00038-5     Document Type: Chapter

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