Knowledge and assertion

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 81, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 549-566

  Brown, Jessica ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649563678     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00369.x     Document Type: Article

References (32)

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