Merleau-ponty and emergent perception

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 290-304

  Simpson, Zachary ^a  

^a University of Science and Arts of Oklahoma   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84883553423     PISSN: 00071773     EISSN: 23320486     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00071773.2011.11006748     Document Type: Review

References (50)

1. See Robert Laughlin, A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down (New York: Basic Books, 2005).
2. see Terence Deacon, "Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence, eds., Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 132f.
3. see, for example, Michael Silberstein, "In Defense of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence, eds., Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 204-226
4. Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
5. The following three points are similar to those posited by Philip Clayton in his introduction to The Re-Emergence of Emergence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 1-34
6. James Salmon, "Emergence in Evolution," Foundations in Chemistry 11 (2009): 21-32
7. See Bedau, "Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind?," Minds and Machines 18 (2008): 443-459.
8. Daniel Heard, "A New Problem for Ontological Emergence," Philosophical Quarterly 56.222 (2006): 56.
9. Jeremy Sherman and Terence Deacon, "Teleology for the Perplexed: How Matter Began to Matter," Zygon 42.4 (2007): 878.
10. Harold Morowitz in The Emergence of Everything: How the World became Complex (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
11. Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, "Scale-Free Networks: A Decade and Beyond," Science 325 (July 24, 2009): 412
12. see Adrian Cho, "Ourselves and Our Interactions: The Ultimate Physics Problem?," Science 325 (July 24, 2009): 406
13. See Bedau, "Is Weak Emergence Just in the Mind?," and Philip Clayton's introduction to The Re-Emergence of Emergence, pp. 7-10 and 21-27, and Heard, p. 56.
14. See Timothy O'Connor and Jonathan Jacobs, "Emergent Individuals," Philosophical Quarterly 53.213 (2003): 543.
15. see Clayton, Mind and Emergence, Ch. 5, Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything
16. Richard Campbell, "A Process-Based Model for an Interactive Ontology," Synthese 166 (2009)
17. Stuart Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
18. See Heard, p. 57, as well as Jaegwon Kim, "Being Realistic About Emergence," in The Re-Emergence of Emergence, eds., Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 189-202.
19. See, for example, Evan Thompson and Francisco Varela, "Radical Embodiment: Neural Dynamics and Consciousness," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5.10 (October 2001): 418-425
20. Giovanna Colombetti and Evan Thompson, "The Feeling Body: Toward an Enactive Approach to Emotion," in Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness, eds., W. F. Overton, U. Mueller, and J. Newman, pp. 54f
21. Silberstein, "In Defence of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation," Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence and Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2008), esp. Ch. 5, and Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred, Chs. 12-13.
22. See, especially, David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 4.
23. Merleau-Ponty, for example, speaks of a "totality of emergence" in relation to Driesch's attempt to describe life in his Nature: Course Notes from the College de France [hereafter referred to in the text as N], trans., Robert Vallier (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2003), p. 235
24. See, for example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception [hereafter referred to in the text as PP], trans., Colin Smith (New York: Routledge Classics, 2005), p. 4.
25. See PP, pp. 9-10, 18, and 327 as well as Paul Crowther, "Merleau-Ponty: Perception into Art," British Journal of Aesthetics 22 (1982): 139f
26. Charles Taylor, "Embodied Agency," in Merleau-Ponty: Critical Essays, ed., Henry Pietersma (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1990), p. 12.
27. see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible [hereafter referred to in the text as VI], trans., Alphonso Lingis, ed., Claude Lefort (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 22.
28. See, for example, PP, p. 50. Also see the work of Renaud Barbaras, who makes this point clearly in his Desire and Distance: Introduction to a Phenomenology of Perception, trans., Paul B. Milan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
29. Evan Thompson and Mog Stapleton, "Making Sense of Sense-Making: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories," Topoi 28 (2009): 25.
30. See Taylor Carman, "Sensation, Judgment, and the Phenomenal Field," in The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, eds., Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 71
31. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs, trans., Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 89.
32. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, trans., Hubert L. Dreyfus and Patricia Allen Dreyfus (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 50.
33. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, ed., Galen Johnson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 103-104.
34. Mark Hansen, "The Embryology of the (in)Visible," The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty, eds., Taylor Carman and Mark Hansen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 251.
35. See Martin Dillon, Merleau-Ponty's Ontology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 207.
36. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Prose of the World [hereafter referred to in the text as PW], trans., John O'Neill, ed., Claude Lefort (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971), p. 10.
37. The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, pp. 79-80.
38. Also see The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, p. 78
39. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, trans., Leonard Lawlor, eds., Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002), p. 38.
40. Or, as Martin Dillon notes, "The concepts of language provide the means of thinking. Thought is thus founded on perception through the mediation of expression, specifically, the bodily acts of gesture and speech" (Dillon, 194).
41. "The body is to be compared, not to a physical object but rather to a work of art. In a picture or a piece of music the idea is incommunicable by means other than the display of colours and sounds."
42. see Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005).
43. See, for example, Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007), pp. 256-7
44. See Stuart Kauffman and Philip Clayton, "On Emergence, Agency, and Organization," Biology and Philosophy 21 (2006): 501-21
45. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1984).
46. see Evan Thompson, Mind in Life and "Radical Embodiment;" Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1991)
47. Maria Talero, "The Experiential Workspace and the Limits of Empirical Investigation," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16.3 (2008): 453-472; and Gallagher, p. 37.
48. see Steven Kosslyn, "On the Evolution of Human Motivation: The Role of Social Prosthetic Systems," in Evolutionary Cognitive Neuroscience, eds., S.M. Platek, T.K. Shackelford, and J.P. Keenan (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).
49. Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty's Ontology, trans., Ted Toadvine and Leonard Lawlor (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 166.
50. See Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 110, and Barbaras, p. 265.