Emergent individuals

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 53, Issue 213, 2003, Pages 540-555

  O'Connor, Timothy ^a   Jacobs, Jonathan D ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 57349107973     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9213.00330     Document Type: Article

References (25)

1. See T. O'Connor, 'Emergent Properties', American Philosophical Quarterly, 31 (1994), pp. 91-104;
2. Persons and Causes (Oxford UP, 2000), ch. 6 ('Agency, Mind, and Reductionism');
3. 'Causality, Mind, and Free Will', in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 14: Action and Freedom (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 105-17.
4. See, e.g., F. Jackson, 'Epiphenomenal Qualia', The Philosophical Quarterly, 32 (1982), pp. 127-36;
5. D. Lewis, 'What Experience Teaches', in W. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 499-519.
6. More recent discussions include D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford UP, 1996);
7. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness (MIT Press, 1995).
8. David Armstrong, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. 1 (Cambridge UP, 1976), ch. 7, heavily influences what we say in this section.
9. M. Loux, Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 1998).
10. See M. Black, 'The Identity of Indiscernibles', Mind, 61 (1952), pp. 152-64;
11. R. Adams, 'Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity', Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1979), pp. 5-26;
12. a more recent exchange between J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, 'The Bundle Theory of Substance and the Identity of Indiscernibles', Analysis, 55 (1995), pp. 191-6,
13. D. Zimmerman, 'Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory', Mind, 106 (1997), pp. 305-9.
14. See Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge UP, 1997), ch. 1.
15. See Monadology �17, in Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, ed. and tr. P. and A.M. Schrecker (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
16. W. Hasker, in The Emergent Self (Cornell UP, 1999), advocates this view.
17. It is discussed favourably by Peter Unger in 'Free Will and Scientiphicalism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, forthcoming.
18. For fuller discussion of this whole matter, see O'Connor, 'Causality, Mind and Free Will'.
19. K. Campbell, Abstract Particulars (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
20. See C.B. Martin, 'Substance Substantiated', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1980), pp. 3-10, who develops a view of this sort, which he sees as implicit in Locke.
21. Nowadays, philosophers often take the indispensability of certain concepts for human investigation of the world as a sufficient justification for ascribing the corresponding property to the world: see, e.g., J. Fodor, 'Special Sciences', Synthese, 28 (1974), pp. 97-115;
22. L. Antony, 'Making Room for the Mental', Philosophical Studies, 95 (1999), pp. 37-44. We take this to be dubious, but cannot argue against it here.
23. P. Simons, 'Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54 (1994), pp. 553-75.
24. P. van Inwagen, Material Beings (Cornell UP, 1990).
25. L.R. Baker, Persons and Bodies: a Constitution View (Cambridge UP, 2000).