The "Matthew effect" in R and D public subsidies: The Italian evidence

Technological Forecasting and Social Change

Volumn 80, Issue 8, 2013, Pages 1523-1534

  Antonelli, Cristiano ^a   Crespi, Francesco ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURIN   (Italy)

^b ROMA TRE UNIVERSITY   (Italy)

Author keywords

H25; H32; L52; Matthew effects; Persistence; RandD subsidies; Technology policy

Indexed keywords

H25; H32; L52; MATTHEW EFFECTS; PERSISTENCE; RANDD SUBSIDIES; TECHNOLOGY POLICY;

INDUSTRY;

CIVIL AVIATION;

ECONOMETRICS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; LEARNING; PROBABILITY; RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT; SUBSIDY SYSTEM; TECHNOLOGY POLICY;

ITALY;

EID: 84883463329     PISSN: 00401625     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2013.03.008     Document Type: Article

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