Institutions, ownership structures, and distress resolution in China

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 23, Issue , 2013, Pages 71-87

  Fan, Joseph P H ^a   Huang, Jun ^b   Zhu, Ning ^c,d  

^a The Chinese University of Hong Kong   (Hong Kong)

^b SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS   (China)

^c Shanghai Jiao Tong University 211 West Huaihai Road   (China)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Emerging market; Financial distress; Firm performance; Institution

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882934446     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2013.07.005     Document Type: Article

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