Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 227-258

  Espen Eckbo, B ^a   Thorburn, Karin S ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Asset substitution; Auctions; Bankruptcy; CEO turnover; Executive compensation; Liquidation; Managerial conservatism; Post bankruptcy performance; Restructuring; Risk shifting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038309552     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(03)00126-0     Document Type: Article

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