A Brief History of Truth

Philosophy of Logic

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 227-323

  Candlish, Stewart ^a   Damnjanovic, Nic ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

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EID: 84882898745     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-044451541-4/50012-9     Document Type: Chapter

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