Real metaphysics: Replies

Real Metaphysics

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 212-238

  Mellor, D H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 85069175324     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203164297-17     Document Type: Chapter

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