The deterrence of crime through private security efforts: Theory and evidence

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 37, Issue , 2014, Pages 66-75

  Zimmerman, Paul R ^a  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

Crime; Deterrence; Market model; Private Security; Self protection

Indexed keywords

EID: 84882656049     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2013.06.003     Document Type: Article

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