Creditor- and debtor-oriented corporate bankruptcy regimes revisited

European Business Organization Law Review

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 645-676

  Franken, Sefa ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

bankruptcy policy; capital and ownership structure; corporate bankruptcy; liquidation; reorganization

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881851571     PISSN: 15667529     EISSN: 17416205     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1566752904006457     Document Type: Article

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