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Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 321-344

Phenomenal intentionality and content determinacy

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84881722950     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110216882     Document Type: Chapter
Times cited : (48)

References (29)
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    • Radical Interpretation
    • Reprinted in Davidson (2001)
    • Davidson, D. (1973). "Radical Interpretation," Dialectica 27, 313-28. Reprinted in Davidson (2001).
    • (1973) Dialectica , vol.27 , pp. 313-328
    • Davidson, D.1
  • 2
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    • The Inscrutability of Reference
    • Reprinted in Davidson (2001)
    • Davidson, D. (1979). "The Inscrutability of Reference," The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10, 7-19. Reprinted in Davidson (2001).
    • (1979) The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy , vol.10 , pp. 7-19
    • Davidson, D.1
  • 6
    • 85066661138 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind
    • B. McLaughlin, A. Beckerman and S. Walter, eds., Oxford University Press
    • Graham, G., Horgan, T., and Tienson, J. (2009). "Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind," in B. McLaughlin, A. Beckerman and S. Walter, eds., The Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press.
    • (2009) The Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind
    • Graham, G.1    Horgan, T.2    Tienson, J.3
  • 7
    • 84881682993 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed
    • T. Bayne and M. Montague, eds., Oxford University Press
    • Horgan, T. (2011). "From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed," in T. Bayne and M. Montague, eds., Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford University Press, 57-78.
    • (2011) Cognitive Phenomenology , pp. 57-78
    • Horgan, T.1
  • 8
    • 84881762084 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence
    • (forthcoming), D. Smythies and D. Stoljar, eds., Oxford University Press
    • Horgan, T. (forthcoming). "Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence," in D. Smythies and D. Stoljar, eds., Introspection and Consciousness, Oxford University Press.
    • Introspection and Consciousness
    • Horgan, T.1
  • 9
    • 77950013645 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know it So Well?
    • Horgan, T. and Kriegel, U. (2007). "Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness that We May Know it So Well?" Philosophical Issues 17, 123-144.
    • (2007) Philosophical Issues , vol.17 , pp. 123-144
    • Horgan, T.1    Kriegel, U.2
  • 10
    • 54449085600 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology
    • D. Chalmers, ed., Oxford University Press
    • Horgan T. and Tienson, J. (2002). "The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology," in D. Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press.
    • (2002) Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings
    • Horgan, T.1    Tienson, J.2
  • 13
    • 60949510597 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness
    • U. Kriegel and K. Williford, eds., MIT Press
    • Horgan, T., Tienson, J., and Graham, G. (2006). "Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness," in U. Kriegel and K. Williford, eds., Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, MIT Press.
    • (2006) Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
    • Horgan, T.1    Tienson, J.2    Graham, G.3
  • 19
    • 84937304724 scopus 로고
    • Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it Makes Sense to Say
    • Noë, R.A. (1994). "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it Makes Sense to Say," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1-42.
    • (1994) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol.54 , pp. 1-42
    • Noë, R.A.1
  • 20
    • 14744283107 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What is It Like to Think that P?
    • Pitt, D. (2004). "The Phenomenology of Cognition: Or What is It Like to Think that P?", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69, 1-36.
    • (2004) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , vol.69 , pp. 1-36
    • Pitt, D.1
  • 24
    • 24944471542 scopus 로고
    • Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person
    • Searle, J. (1987). "Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person," The Journal of Philosophy 84, 123-146.
    • (1987) The Journal of Philosophy , vol.84 , pp. 123-146
    • Searle, J.1
  • 27
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    • Stich S. and Warfield, T., eds., Blackwell
    • Stich, S. and Warfield, T., eds. (1994). Mental Representation: A Reader, Blackwell.
    • (1994) Mental Representation: A Reader
  • 29
    • 0004251932 scopus 로고
    • Second Edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell
    • Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations, Second Edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell.
    • (1958) Philosophical Investigations
    • Wittgenstein, L.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.