Toward a positive theory of disclosure regulation: In search of institutional foundations

Accounting Review

Volumn 88, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 789-824

  Bertomeu, Jeremy ^a   Cheynel, Edwige ^b  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b Columbia University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Accounting standards; Capital market; Disclosures; Standard setting; Theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880113921     PISSN: 00014826     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2308/accr-50388     Document Type: Article

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