Economic consequences of regulated changes in disclosure: The case of executive compensation

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 285-314

  Lo, Kin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Disclosure; Executive compensation; Securities regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041426725     PISSN: 01654101     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(03)00035-1     Document Type: Article

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