Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs

Annals of Applied Probability

Volumn 23, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 637-664

  Chen, Yu Ting ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

Author keywords

Coalescing random walks; Evolution of cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Interacting particle systems; Perturbations of Markov chains; Voter model; Voter model perturbations

Indexed keywords

EID: 84879774661     PISSN: 10505164     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1214/12-AAP849     Document Type: Article

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