Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Consciousness and Cognition

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 810-815

  Vinding, Mikkel C ^a   Pedersen, Michael N ^a   Overgaard, Morten ^a,b  

^a AARHUS UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

^b AALBORG UNIVERSITY   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Distal intention; Free will; Intentional binding; Proximal intention; Sense of agency

Indexed keywords

ADULT; ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; CONDITIONING; CONSCIOUSNESS; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; DISTAL INTENTION; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; FEMALE; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; MALE; NORMAL HUMAN; PROXIMAL INTENTION; SENSE OF AGENCY;

EID: 84879427515     PISSN: 10538100     EISSN: 10902376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2013.05.003     Document Type: Article

References (33)

1. Aarts H., Custers R., Wegner D.M. On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness and Cognition 2005, 14(3):439-458. 10.1016/j.concog.2004.11.001.
2. Banks W.P., Isham E.A. We infer rather than perceive the moment we decided to act. Psychological Science 2009, 20(1):17-21.
3. Blakemore S.J., Wolpert D., Frith C. Why can't you tickle yourself?. NeuroReport 2000, 11(11):R11.
4. Block R.A., Hancock P.A., Zakay D. How cognitive load affects duration judgments: A meta-analytic review. Acta Psychologica 2010, 134(3):330-343. 10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.03.006.
5. Brass M., Haggard P. The what, when, whether model of intentional action. The Neuroscientist 2008, 14(4):319-325. 10.1177/1073858408317417.
6. Brown S.W. Attentional resources in timing: Interference effects in concurrent temporal and nontemporal working memory tasks. Perception & Psychophysics 1997, 59(7):1118-1140. 10.3758/BF03205526.
7. Desantis A., Roussel C., Waszak F. On the influence of causal beliefs on the feeling of agency. Consciousness and Cognition 2011, 20(4):1211-1220. 10.1016/j.concog.2011.02.012.
8. Engbert K., Wohlschläger A. Intentions and expectations in temporal binding. Consciousness and Cognition 2007, 16(2):255-264. 10.1016/j.concog.2006.09.010.
9. Engbert K., Wohlschläger A., Haggard P. Who is causing what? The sense of agency is relational and efferent-triggered. Cognition 2008, 107(2):693-704. 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.07.021.
10. Haggard P., Clark S. Intentional action: Conscious experience and neural prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 2003, 12(4):695-707. 10.1016/S1053-8100(03)00052-7.
11. Haggard P., Clark S., Kalogeras J. Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience 2002, 5(4):382-385. 10.1038/nn827.
12. Hon N., Poh J.-H., Soon C.-S. Preoccupied minds feel less control: Sense of agency is modulated by cognitive load. Consciousness and Cognition 2013, 22(2):556-561. 10.1016/j.concog.2013.03.004.
13. Knill D.C., Pouget A. The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. Trends in Neurosciences 2004, 27(12):712-719. 10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007.
14. Körding K.P., Wolpert D.M. Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning. Nature 2004, 427(6971):244-247. 10.1038/nature02169.
15. Kühn S., Brass M. Retrospective construction of the judgement of free choice. Consciousness and Cognition 2009, 18(1):12-21. 10.1016/j.concog.2008.09.007.
16. Libet B., Wright E.W., Gleason C.A. Readiness-potentials preceding unrestricted «spontaneous» vs. pre-planned voluntary acts. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 1982, 54(3):322-335.
17. Matsuhashi M., Hallett M. The timing of the conscious intention to move. European Journal of Neuroscience 2008, 28(11):2344-2351. 10.1111/j.1460-9568.2008.06525.x.
18. Mele A.R. Testing free will. Neuroethics 2010, 3(2):161-172. 10.1007/s12152-008-9027-3.
19. Moore J.W., Haggard P. Awareness of action: Inference and prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 2008, 17(1):136-144. 10.1016/j.concog.2006.12.004.
20. Moore J.W., Lagnado D., Deal D.C., Haggard P. Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action. Cognition 2009, 110(2):279-283. 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.006.
21. Moore J.W., Obhi S.S. Intentional binding and the sense of agency: A review. Consciousness and Cognition 2012, 21(1):546-561. 10.1016/j.concog.2011.12.002.
22. Moore J.W., Wegner D.M., Haggard P. Modulating the sense of agency with external cues. Consciousness and Cognition 2009, 18(4):1056-1064. 10.1016/j.concog.2009.05.004.
23. Moretto G., Walsh E., Haggard P. Experience of agency and sense of responsibility. Consciousness and Cognition 2011, 20(4):1847-1854. 10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.014.
24. Pacherie E. The phenomenology of action: A conceptual framework. Cognition 2008, 107(1):179-217.
25. Pacherie E., Haggard P. What are intentions? I.L. Nadel & W. Sinnott-Armstrong (Red.), Conscious will and responsibility. A tribute to Benjamin Libet 2010, Oxford University Press.
26. Scott S.H. The computational and neural basis of voluntary motor control and planning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2012, 16(11):541-549. 10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.008.
27. Searle J.R. The intentionality of intention and action. Cognitive Science 1980, 4(1):47-70. 10.1016/S0364-0213(81)80004-3.
28. Stevenson I.H., Fernandes H.L., Vilares I., Wei K., Körding K.P. Bayesian integration and non-linear feedback control in a full-body motor task (K.J. Friston, Red.). PLoS Computational Biology 2009, 5(12):e1000629. 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000629.
29. Todorov E., Jordan M.I. Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination. Nature Neuroscience 2002, 5(11):1226-1235. 10.1038/nn963.
30. Wegner D.M. The illusion of conscious will 2002, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass.
31. Wegner D.M., Wheatley T. Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will. American Psychologist 1999, 54(7):480-492. 10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480.
32. Wenke D., Haggard P. How voluntary actions modulate time perception. Experimental Brain Research 2009, 196(3):311-318. 10.1007/s00221-009-1848-8.
33. Wolpert D.M., Flanagan J.R. Motor prediction. Current Biology 2001, 11(18):729.