How new and assertive is china's new assertiveness?

International Security

Volumn 37, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 7-48

  Johnston, Alastair Iain ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878944943     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00115     Document Type: Article

References (187)

1. Michael Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," China Leadership Monitor, No. 32 (May 2010), p. 10 n 1.
2. Daniel Twining described China's diplomacy as "militant assertiveness."
3. Twining, "Were U.S.-India Relations Oversold? Part II," Shadow Government, Foreign Policy, blog, June 12, 2012, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com.
4. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
5. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation, and Trust in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
6. William R. Thompson, "Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4 (December 2001), pp. 557- 586.
7. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)
8. Richard M. Weiss, Managerial Ideology and the Social Control of Deviance in Organizations (New York: Praeger, 1986)
9. Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words That Succeed and Policies That Fail (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1977)
10. Karin Fierke, "Links across the Abyss: Language and Logic in International Relations," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 3 (September 2002), pp. 331-354
11. Ted Hopf, "The Logic of Habit in International Relations," European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 539-561.
12. Over the past few years, Chinese analysts have increasingly used the term "containment" to characterize U.S. strategy toward China. These analysts claim that the United States wants to prevent China's rise, a view that resonates with deeply held beliefs about the humiliations that China suffered at the hands of stronger modern states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet it is hard to find any evidence from official U.S. documents, policymakers' memoirs, or journalist exposés published after 1972 that the containment of China is the national security strategy as determined by U.S. presidents. Thus this particular claim is even more problematic empirically than the newly assertive China meme.
13. Swaine, "Perceptions of an Assertive China," pp. 2-4.
14. Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil and the New Global Order," Current History, February 2010, pp. 60-66
15. Marco Overhaus, "German Foreign Policy and the Shadow of the Past," SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2005), pp. 27-41
16. Henry Laurence, "Japan's Proactive Foreign Policy and the Rise of the BRICS," Asian Perspective, Vol. 31, No. 4 (2007), pp. 177-203.
17. Michael Cox, "Is the United States in Decline-Again? An Essay," International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 4 (July 2007), pp. 643-653
18. Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Russia's International Assertiveness: What Does It Mean for the West? Problems of Post-Communism," Vol. 55, No. 2 (March/April 2008), pp. 38-55
19. Carol Migdalovitz, "AKP's Domestically-Driven Foreign Policy," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 2010), pp. 37-45.
20. Guanchajia [Observer], "Fengquan dangjin baquanzhuyi zhao yi zhao lishi zhe mian jinzi" [May we advise today's hegemonism to look in history's mirror], Renmin ribao [People's daily], June 22, 1999..
21. For a similar point about the history of China's rhetorical assertiveness, Jeffrey A. Bader, Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012), p. 80
22. Alan Wachman, "Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Commission: Hearing on China's Current and Emerging Foreign Policy Priorities," Washington, D.C., April 13, 2011.
23. The lowess (locally weighted least squares) curve is a smoothing technique that fits a regression line to a specified fraction of time-series data. I thank Robert Lee, who graciously allowed me to use the data he collected for his master's thesis. Lee, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in the People's Republic of China: An Econometric Analysis," master's thesis, Harvard University, 2012.
24. On China's response to these events, M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 33, No. 3 (December 2011), pp. 292-319.
25. On the importance of understanding the hierarchy of authoritative statements in the Chinese system, Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice Miller, "China's Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation," China Security Perspectives, No. 6 (March 2013).
26. Anthony Faiola, Juliet Eilperin, and John Pomfret, "Copenhagen Talks Show U.S., China May Shape Future," Washington Post, December 20, 2009
27. John Pomfret, "Strident Tone from China Raises Concerns in West," Washington Post, January 31, 2010.
28. On the absence of change in China's global warming policy, Gloria Jean Gong, "What China Wants: China's Climate Change Priorities in a Post-Copenhagen World," Global Change, Peace, & Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 159-175. wan: Is Beijing Testing Obama's Mettle?" East Asia Forum, blog, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research, February 24, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/02/24/taiwan-isbeijing-testing-obamas-mettle
29. John Pomfret, "Obama Meeting with Dalai Lama Complicates China Ties," Washington Post, February 19, 2010
30. Peh Shing Huei, "China Chafes at 'Tough' Label," Straits Times, March 8, 2010.
31. Alan Romberg, "2010: The Winter of PRC Discontent," China Leadership Monitor, No. 31 (February 2010).
32. "Waijiaobu fayanren Jiang Yu jiu Mei dui Tai junshou da jizhe wen" [Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu answers journalists' questions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan] (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, January 7, 2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa=chn/wjdt=611265/fyrbt=611275/t649080.shtml.
33. Comments by Chinese government foreign policy analysts at the time also indicated that the announcements were not seen as Obama administration sales. Author interviews with Chinese government foreign policy analysts, Beijing, January 2010.
34. "Waijiaobu fubuzhang He Yafei jiu Mei shou Tai wuqi wenti xiang Mei zhu Hua dashi tichu yanzheng jiaoshe" [Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei raises solemn representations to the U.S. ambassador to China on the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan] (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, January 30, 2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa=chn/zyxw =602251/t654807.shtml.
35. Michael Wines, "U.S. and China Revive Military Talks," New York Times, February 28, 2009.
36. Interestingly, the sanctions language was not used in Beijing's response to the U.S. decision in November 2011 to offer upgrades for Taiwan's F16A/Bs, perhaps because the Chinese government wanted to signal its preference for this outcome over the sale of more advanced F16C/Ds. The rest of the MFAlanguage in November 2011 was standard. See the statement by MFAVice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun, "Waijiaobu fubuzhang Zhang Zhijun jiu Mei xuanbu dui Tai junshou jihua zhaojian Mei zhu Hua dashi tichu qianglie kangyi" [Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun lodges a strong protest with the U.S. ambassador to China for the U.S. announcement of plans to sell arms to Taiwan] (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, September 21, 2011).
37. Unlike the 2010 U.S. arms sales case, China imposed real economic costs on France for arms sales to Taiwan in the 1990s. China retaliated against French sales of Mirage fighters in 1993 by dropping plans to buy Airbus aircraft and by prohibiting French companies from bidding for the Guangzhou subway project. I thank Alison Kaufman for reminding me of this case.
38. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, pp. 49-50.
39. John Pomfret cites "analysts and US officials" who claim that China's response to the visit was "tougher than in the past."
40. Pomfret, "Obama Meeting with Dalai Lama Complicates China Ties," Washington Post, February 19, 2010.
41. Helena Cooper's ahistorical account of the Chinese response, "Obama Meets Dalai Lama, and China Is Quick to Protest," New York Times, February 18, 2010.
42. Edward Wong, "Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power," New York Times, April 23, 2010.
43. China's Xinhua news agency repeated the claim in Wong's New York Times story a few days later.
44. "Mei mei jianyi Meijun dingqi zai Nanhai yanxi fangzhi Zhongguo kongzhi" [U.S. media proposes that the U.S. military will regularly exercise in the South Sea to prevent China's control], Xinhua news agency, April 28, 2010. Many in the Chinese media and a number of Chinese analysts also assumed the claim to be true, as did pundits throughout East Asia. Anumber of Asian participants in the PLA organized Xiangshan Forum in October 2010, for instance, prefaced their remarks and questions by noting that China had declared the South China Sea to be a core interest.
45. These figures are based on a search of articles in LexisNexis and of blogs in Google that explicitly used language unique to the New York Times article, the phrase "on par with" in particular. Thus, these are conservative figures because they do not include what is likely a large number of articles and blogs that relied on the article but did not use language specific to it.
46. Two slightly different articles (one from Kyodo and one in the Washington Post) later reported a similar story, though their impact on the U.S. public discourse was more limited.
47. "China Told US South China Sea Is 'Core Interest'-Kyodo," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, July 3, 2010
48. John Pomfret, "U.S. Takes Tougher Stance with China; Strategy Acknowledges Beijing's Rise in Power but Lays Down Markers," Washington Post, July 30, 2010.
49. Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part One: On 'Core Interests,'" China Leadership Monitor, No. 34 (2011), p. 8. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated publicly that Dai Bingguo told her at the May 2010 Strategic and Economic Dialogue that the South China Sea was a core interest, but Swaine claims there is no evidence of this. Sources I have asked also suggest there is no evidence in the State Department record of such a comment by Dai to Clinton. It is possible Clinton is misremembering, or perhaps remembers a memo about the alleged Chinese claim.
50. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 77.
51. Author interviews, Beijing, 2010.
52. The first public doubts about the credibility of the "core interest" story were raised by Peking University professor Zhu Feng to the Singaporean newspaper Lianhe zaobao [United morning news] in August 2010. "Jiaoshou: Jiang Nanhai shengji wei hexin liyi de tifa bu mingzhi" [Professor: Raising the South China Sea to the level of a core interest is unwise], Lianhe zaobao, August 23, 2010. The first major figure to categorically claim that senior leaders had never officially declared the South China Sea to be a core interest was retired Adm. Wang Haiyun, in "'Nanhai shi Zhongguo hexinliyi' bing fei guanfang biaotai" ["The South Sea is China's core interest" is not an official expression], Dongfang pinglun [Oriental commentary], October 13, 2010.
53. Xue Li, a researcher at the government think tank the China Academy of Social Sciences, also stated that no Chinese leader had openly called the South China Sea a core interest. "Nanhai shi Zhongguo nei ge cengmian de liyi" [What level of China's national interest is the South Sea?], Huanqiu shibao [Global times], October 26, 2010.
54. Wen Jiabao zai di 65 jie Lianda yibanxing bianlun shang de jianghua [Wen Jiabao's speech at the 65th UN General Assembly general debate] (Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, September 23, 2010).
55. Author interview with a senior Chinese official involved in foreign policy making, Beijing, June 2011.
56. China's diplomatic and military response to Japan's 2012 purchase of some of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands from private owners would also meet the criteria for a new assertiveness in its policy toward maritime disputes.
57. Fravel, "China's Strategy in the South China Sea"
58. Michael D. Swaine and M. Taylor Fravel, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part Two: The Maritime Periphery," China Leadership Monitor, No. 35 (Summer 2011).
59. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 87.
60. Jung Sung-ki, "Korea-US Naval Drills to Begin in Late June," Korea Times, June 6, 2010.
61. "South Korea, US to Hold Naval Drills 7-10 June," Yonhap, June 3, 2010.
62. Michael Sainsbury and Rick Wallace, "China's Navy to Match S Korea-US War Games," Australian, June 30, 2010.
63. "Jiefangjun gongkai biaotai fandui Mei Han Huanghai jun yan" [PLA publicly expresses opposition to U.S.-ROK military exercises in the Yellow Sea], Huanqiu shibao, July 3, 2010.
64. Waijiaobu fayanren Qing Gang juxing lixing jizhehui [Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang holds regular press meeting], July 6, 2010.
65. "Waijiaobu: Zhong fang fandui renhe yifang wei jing yunxu zai Zhonagguo zhuanshu jingjiqu caiqu renhe junshi xingdong" [Foreign Ministry: The Chinese side opposes any side engaging in any military exercises in China's exclusive economic zone], Xinhua, November 26, 2010.
66. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, pp. 37-38.
67. The islands are called the Senkaku by Japan and the Diaoyu by China. Both countries claim sovereignty over them.
68. Calum MacLeod, "China's Aggressive Posture Stuns Japan; Nation Dishes Out 'Shock and Awe' in Territorial Disputes," USA Today, September 28, 2010
69. Michael Richardson, "Beijing's Arm-Twisting Poses a New Challenge," Australian Financial Review, November 24, 2010.
70. "Is Obama Ready for a Stare-Down with China? China's Provocation of Japan over the Senkaku Islands Shows a Need for Obama to Be Ready for a Crisis in Asia," Christian Science Monitor, October 1, 2010
71. Mark McKinnon, "China's Chance: How 9/11 Played into Beijing's Plans in Asia," Globe and Mail, September 9, 2011.
72. Even Obama's top Asia specialist at the time, Ambassador Jeffrey Bader, noted in his analysis of the event that the Japanese did not follow their "usual practice" of sending the boats out of the area
73. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 106
74. Martin Fackler, "Japan to Release Chinese Captain: Detention Near Islands Claimed by Both Nations Had Prompted Standoff," International Herald Tribune, September 25, 2010.
75. Author interview with a senior Chinese official involved in foreign policy making, Beijing, June 2011. Past practice also included the quick release of Chinese nationalist activists who were arrested in 2004 while trying to land on the Senkaku/Diaoyudao shortly after Japan started legal proceedings against them
76. James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 145-146.
77. Author conversations with Chinese international relations specialists, Beijing, 2010.
78. In fact, this term was rarely used to describe the Diaoyudao-it had last been used in the People's Daily in the early 1970s.
79. Paul Krugman wrote that China's embargo "shows a Chinese government that is dangerously trigger-happy, willing to wage economic warfare on the slightest provocation."
80. Krugman, "Rare and Foolish," New York Times, October 17, 2010.
81. Author conversations with Chinese international relations specialists and with a senior Chinese foreign policy official, Beijing, 2010-11.
82. Keith Bradsher, "China Restarts Rare Earth Shipments to Japan," New York Times, November 20, 2010.
83. "Rare-Earth Furor Overlooks China's 2006 Industrial Policy Signal," Bloomberg News, October 21, 2010.
84. These data and rare earth categories are from the Japanese Ministry of Finance.
85. Keith Bradsher, "China Still Bans Rare Earths for Japan, Executives Say," New York Times, November 11, 2010.
86. One possibility is that Chinese rare earths were essentially smuggled out of China and shipped to Japan via a third country. The New York Times reported that Chinese government of-ficials warned Chinese exporters not to do this, but perhaps many chose to ignore the warning. It is unclear, however, whether Japanese customs would count imports as coming from China if the shipment information did not clearly indicate this.
87. Gareth Hatch, "On Rare-Earths, Quotas, and Embargoes," Technology Metals Research, blog, October 24, 2010, http://www.techmetalsresearch.com.
88. "Zhongguo bu shi yi nu jiu shitai de xiangbalao" [China isn't a bumpkin who in a fit of anger loses control], Huanqiu shibao, September 16, 2010.
89. Based on an analysis of more than 600 blog posts, op-eds, and media quotes by four of the most prominent PLA commentators (Dai Xu, Han Xudong, Luo Yuan, and Zhang Zhaozhong) between 2007 and 2011, it appears that none of them made any public comments about the Diaoyudao issue during September 2010, whereas they had mentioned it relatively frequently in previous and in subsequent months.
90. Donna Miles, "Mullen: Trilateral Cooperation Best Response to North Korea" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense American Forces Press Service, December 9, 2010).
91. "Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Waijiaobu shengming" [Statement by the People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs], October 9, 2006; and "Zhongfang xiwang Chaofang zai heshiyan wenti shang wubi baochi lengjing he kezhi" [The Chinese side hopes the North Korean side will be sure to maintain a cool head and self control on the question of nuclear testing], Xinhua news agency, October 4, 2006. For an account that sees China's DPRK policy as essentially constant, notwithstanding the initial reaction to the 2006 test.
92. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), pp. 329-334.
93. Waijiaobu fayanren Mao Chaoxu jiu Zhong-Han, Zhong-Ri waizhang huiwu youguan qingkuang da jizhe wen [Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Chaoxu answers journalists' ques-tions about issues related to the Sino-ROK and Sino-Japanese Foreign Ministers meeting], May 15, 2010; and Waijiaobu fayanren Hong Lei juxing lixing jizhehui [Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei holds regular press meeting], November 25, 2010.
94. Li Xiaodong, Wang Yisheng, and Li Rui, Chaoxian bandao weiji guanli yanjiu [Research on Korean Peninsula crisis management] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2010), p. 85.
95. Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 201-203
96. Bonnie Glaser, "China's Policy in the Wake of the Second DPRK Nuclear Test," China Security, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2009), pp. 1-11.
97. Some Chinese analysts even make a credibility of commitment argument. That is, if China dropped the DPRK as an ally, then it might be harder to play for support from other smaller powers in the developing world
98. Lin Jianyi, "Zhong Mei guanxizhongde Chaoxian wenti" [The North Korea issue in Sino-U.S. relations], Jianbao [Briefing], No. 22 (Beijing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Regional Security Research Center: October/November 2010), p. 2.
99. Interlocutors from Northeast China who specialize in Korean issues noted that the credibility of commitment issue gave the DPRK more leverage over China. This, they said, was a similar phenomenon to the relationship between the United States and its small allies, such as Israel, so the United States ought to understand China's predicament. Author conversations with
100. Yang Xiyu, "Chao he wenti yu Chaoxian bandao heping tizhi wenti" [The North Korean nuclear problem and the question of a peace system on the Korean Peninsula], Shijie fazhan yanjiu [Research in world development], No. 8 (2010). Yang was an important player in the Chinese sixparty talks team.
101. Andrew Scobell, "The View from China," in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Asia at a Tipping Point: Korea, the Rise of China, and the Impact of Leadership Transitions (Washington, D.C.: Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, 2012), pp. 70-81
102. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, pp. 37-39.
103. China and the United States voted together 98 percent of the time in 2010 and 97 percent of the time in 2011, continuing the trend toward convergence in voting among the permanent members from previous years.
104. For pre-2010 data, Joel Wuthnow, "Discord and Collaboration in UN Security Council Negotiations: The Case of China, 1971-2009," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2-5, 2010, p. 35.
105. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 117.
106. Similarly, Thomas Christensen, a former Bush administration official in charge of China policy, also thought that China's policy on this score did not fit with the standard "new assertiveness" narrative. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 2 (March/April 2011), pp. 54-67.
107. Indeed, on this American "core interest," the State Department cables distributed by Wikileaks reveal evidence of common purpose with China, though some differences in tactics. Wikileaks, "Deputy Secretary Steinberg's September 29, 2009 Conversation with State Councilor Dai Bingguo," http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09BEIJING2965.html
108. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 78.
109. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, pp. 74-75. As in the past, the PRC conceded nothing to the Dalai Lama about greater Tibetan autonomy, but an assertive China could have easily broken its commitment on this issue.
110. Author interview with a Chinese environmental policy specialist, Beijing, 2011. For a subtle analysis of the diplomatic problems China faced at the Copenhagen conference.
111. Zhang Haibin, "2010 nian Moxige qihou bianhua tanpan dahui qianjing yu Zhongguo duice sikao" [Prospects for the Mexico climate change assembly, and thoughts about China's responses], Zhongguo guoji zhanlue pinglun [China international strategic review], No. 3 (2010), pp. 302-309.
112. Wang Dong and Li Kan, "Eying the Crippled Hegemon: China's Grand Strategy Thinking in theWake of the Global Financial Crisis," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2-5, 2010.
113. Comments by a senior PLA officer at the Xiangshan Forum, October 2010; CASS Regional Security Research Center, "Meiguo chongfan Yazhou xueshu yanjiuhui" [Academic research meeting on the U.S. return to Asia], Jianbao, No. 21 (Beijing: CASS, October 2010), p. 6; and comments by a senior analyst at the Central Party University, June 2011.
114. Author interviews with academics, think tank analysts, and government officials, Beijing, 2010
115. Christensen, "The Advantages of an Assertive China," p. 60.
116. Cui Liru, "Xin shiqi de Zhong Mei guangxi xunqiu gongchu zhidao" [Sino-U.S. relations in the new era seek the way to coexistence], Zhanlue yu guanli [Strategy and management], Vol. 3, No. 4 (2010), pp. 66-67. Even the more hard-line newspaper, the Global Times, published articles in 2010 that warned readers not to exaggerate U.S. decline or to underestimate the United States' ability to revive its power and purpose in the face of strategic setbacks
117. Liu Mingfu, "Xuexi Meiguoren de weiji yishi" [Study the sense of crisis of Americans], Huanqiu shibao, February 22, 2010
118. Zhou Fangyin, "Bie wei 'Zhongguo di yi zixun fannao" [Don't let China become the first to ask for trouble], Huanqiu shibao, April 27, 2010
119. Huang Renwei, "Xuexi Meiguo cai neng he Meiguo da jiaodao" [Study the U.S. and only then can we deal with the U.S.], Huanqiu shibao, August 26, 2010.
120. Bader, Obama and China's Rise, p. 123
121. Dai Bingguo, "Jianchi zou heping fazhan daolu" [Adhere to the path of peaceful development], December 7, 2010, www.chinanews.com/gn/2010/ 12-7/2704984.shtml.
122. Author conversation with a senior PRC government think tank official, Beijing, June 2012.
123. On the persistence of Deng's axioms and guidelines, Shin Kawashima, "The Development of the Debate over 'Hiding One's Talents and Biding One's Time,'" Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (December 2011), p. 25
124. Feng Zhang "Rethinking China's Grand Strategy: Beijing's Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era," International Politics, Vol. 49 No. 3 (May 2012), pp. 318-345.
125. The Beijing Area Study (BAS), a random sample of people living in the Beijing municipality, includes questions that measure Chinese respondents' perceptions of the warlikeness of Chinese, American, and Japanese as people, and the warlikeness of China, the United States, and Japan as major powers. I define anti-Americans and anti-Japanese as those respondents who believe that the Chinese are maximally different from Americans and Japanese and who also believe there is no difference between Americans and Japanese and their countries. In other words, anti-Americans and anti-Japanese believe Americans and Japanese are, like their countries, maximally warlike. In 2007, 41 percent of respondents could be classified as anti-Japanese; in 2009 this figure increased to 52 percent. In contrast, at 34 percent of the sample, the proportion that fit this definition of anti-American did not change between 2007 and 2009.
126. In 2007, 74 percent of BAS respondents agreed with the statement that "in general China is better than most other countries." In 2009, this figure jumped to 93 percent.
127. According to BAS data, in 2007, 35 percent of respondents agreed that one should support his or her government even if it is wrong; in 2009, this increased to 46 percent, though a majority still disagreed with this statement.
128. Alastair Iain Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, "Chinese Attitudes toward the United States and Americans," in Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 157-195.
129. For recent research on public opinion and foreign policy in China, Jessica Chen Weiss, "Autocratic Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China," International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 1-35
130. Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State; and Wang Jun, Wangluo minzuzhuyi yu Zhongguo waijiao [Cybernationalism and China's diplomacy] (Beijing: China Social Science Press, 2011).
131. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 47, No. 4 (August 2003), pp. 443-467.
132. Alice Miller, "Splits in the Politburo Leadership?" China Leadership Monitor, No. 34 (February 2011).
133. Victor Shih, Wei Shan, and Mingxing Liu, "Gauging the Elite Political Equilibrium in the CCP: A Quantitative Approach Using Biographical Data," China Quarterly, Vol. 201 (March 2010), pp. 89
134. Zhengxu Wang, "Hu Jintao's Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China's Elite Politics," Issues & Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2006), pp. 97-136
135. the confidential analysis of elite politics from the U.S. embassy in Beijing, "Top Leadership Dynamics Driven by Consensus, Interests, Contacts Say," Wikileaks, July 9, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09BEIJING2112.html.
136. "Contacts Assess Hu Jintao's Strength after the Party Congress," Wikileaks, November 7, 2007, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07BEIJING7004.html.
137. Cheng Li "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012," China Leadership Monitor, No. 33 (June 2010), p. 3.
138. For the claim that the PLA is in control of Chinese foreign policy
139. Willy Lam, "China's Hawks in Command," Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2012. For a careful discussion of this problem.
140. Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy," China Leadership Monitor, No. 36 (January 2012)
141. Dennis Blasko, "The Role of the PLA," in Chris Ogden, ed., Handbook of China's Governance and Domestic Politics (New York: Routledge, 2012).
142. Author conversations with PLA officers, Beijing, October 2010.
143. Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu, "Nanhai zhengduan, Zhongguo keyi zuode geng duo" [South Sea disputes, China could do more], Huanqiu shibao, July 1, 2011. It is possible that Zhu's essay reflects a plan to increase China's presence in the South China Sea that began implementation in 2008-09.
144. Author conversations with senior PLA officers, Beijing, 2009-11.
145. Author interview with well-connected PRC academic, Beijing, 2010.
146. Author interviews, Beijing, 2010-11
147. Nan Li, "Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era: Implications for Crisis Management and Naval Modernization," China Maritime Studies, No. 4 (Newport, R.I.: U.S. Naval War College, 2010), pp. 13, 16.
148. See the discussion of Hu's "historical missions" for the PLA in Li, "Chinese Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Deng Era," p. 18.
149. As of this writing, there is, apparently, an informal coordinating mechanism headed by Dai Bingguo that brings together vice ministerial-level officials from relevant ministries and agencies on the South China Sea issues. Dai is in close contact with top leaders on such issues when they flare up diplomatically.
150. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part Three," pp. 8-9.
151. M. Taylor Fravel, "The PLA and the South China Sea," China Power, Diplomat, blog, June 17, 2012, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/pla-and-the-south-china-sea/.
152. Lam, "China's Hawks in Command"; and Lam, "Military Hawks Push Beijing to Take Harder Line," Oxford Analytica, July 27, 2012.
153. Support for increasing the PLA budget is the one obvious exception. Even a hawk such as Luo Yuan has argued, however, that China cannot sustain double-digit increases in military spending
154. Kou Liyan and Liang Hui, "Zhonguo 2010 guofang yusuan an chutai muhou" [Behind the scenes of the public launch of China's 2010 national defense budget], Guoji xianqu dabao [International herald leader], March 12-18, 2010.
155. "Jiefangjun shaojiang Luo Yuan: Ma Yingjiu san bu zhengce shi heping fenlie" [PLA Maj.Gen. Luo Yuan: Ma Yingjiu's "three no's" policy is peaceful separation], Lianhe zaobao, November 23, 2009.
156. Michael D. Swaine, "China's Assertive Behavior, Part Four: The Role of the Military in Foreign Crises," China Leadership Monitor, No. 37 (April 2012), pp. 13-14 n. 22.
157. Author interviews, Beijing, 2010-11. It is perhaps for this reason that in December 2010 Luo publicly stated that defining national interest was the purview of the uppermost civilian leadership
158. "Luo Yuan shaojiang: Jiefangjun wanquan you nengli baowei guojia liyi" [Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan: The PLA is completely capable of defending the national interest], December 20, 2010, http://military.people.com.cn/GB/13533185.html.
159. Luo's views were also criticized by a number of PRC Taiwan specialists as unrepresentative of PRC views and unfair to Ma
160. Meng Jian and Li Junfeng, "Wo shaojiang pi 'heping fenlie' yin zhendong" [A China major general criticizes "peaceful separation," creates a great shock], Huanqiu shiye [Global horizon], November 23, 2009.
161. Author interview with senior Chinese official involved in foreign policy making, Beijing, June 2011.
162. Ng Tze-wei, "Louder Military Voice Raises Concerns; Neighbouring Countries and US See China Becoming Tougher When Engaging the World," South China Morning Post, January 18, 2011; and Chris Buckley, "PLA Researcher Says U.S. Aims to Encircle China," Reuters, November 28, 2011
163. Zhang Jianfeng, "Yinpai Luo Yuan" [Luo Yuan the hawk], Nanfeng chuan [South reviews], April 9, 2012. I thank Dennis Blasko for finding this article.
164. Indeed, on average, Dai Xu's commentary is more critical of the United States than Zhang Zhaozhong's or Han Xudong's, or even Luo Yuan's. Using a computer-aided text analysis program, Yoshikoder, I analyzed all the blogs and op-eds written by the more high-profile and more prolific PLA authors-Dai Xu (N = 247), Zhang Zhaozhong (N = 196), Han Xudong (N = 76), and Luo Yuan (N = 85) between 2007 and 2011-that mention the United States. I determined the relative number of positive terms per reference to the United States in each text using the following formula: (N of positive terms = N of negative terms) / total N of references to the United States. A simple difference of means t-test (unpaired, unequal variances) shows statistically significant differences, with Dai Xu's texts being significantly more negative than Zhang Zhaozhong's (t = 2.08, p = 0.02), Han Xudong's (t = 1.68, p = 0.05), and Luo Yuan's (t = 1.45, p = 0.075). I also used an alternative measure (positive references to the United States as a percentage of total positive and negative references) and, again, Dai Xu was significantly less positive about the United States.
165. Dai Xu, C-xing baowei [C-shaped encirclement] (Shanghai: Wenhui Press, 2010), p. 21
166. Li, Li, and Wang, Chaoxian bandao weiji guanli yanjiu, p. 85.
167. "Guofang Daxue jiaoshou zhuzhang Zhongguo zheng zuo shijie di yi junshi qiangguo yin reyi" [National Defense University professor advocates China strive to be the world's no. 1 mili tary power, raises heated debate], Xinlang boke [Sina blog], March 2, 2010, http://blog.sina.com.cn/ s/blog=4c604c2f0100gwed.html.
168. Comments by a senior Academy of Military Sciences analyst at the Xiangshan Forum, Beijing, October 2010.
169. "Shaojiang Luo Yuan zai lianghui ti an: Zhongguo haijun yinggai pai junjian xunshi Diaoyudao" [Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan's proposal at the "two Congresses": China's navy should deploy a navy vessel to inspect the Diaoyu Islands], Zhonghua wang luntan [Zhonghua net forum], blog, March 5, 2011, http://www.fxingw.com/wwjx/2011-03-05/3010.html.
170. Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, "The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas," Journal of Communication, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 62
171. Maxwell McCombs, "A Look at Agenda-Setting: Past, Present, and Future," Journalism Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (August 2005), pp. 543-557
172. Shanto Iyengar and Adam Simon, "News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public Opinion: A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing," Communication Research, Vol. 20 (June 1993), pp. 365-384.
173. This is similar to the definition of media framing offered by Robert Entman, ''Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm," Journal of Communication, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), p. 52.
174. Kevin Wallsten, "Agenda Setting and the Blogosphere: An Analysis of the Relationship between Mainstream Media and Political Blogs," Review of Policy Research, Vol. 24, No. 6 (November 2007), pp. 567-587. I also benefited from a conversation with Steve Clemons on this issue.
175. Tanni Haas, "From 'Public Journalism' to the 'Public's Journalism'? Rhetoric and Reality in the Discourse on Weblogs," Journalism Studies, Vol. 6, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 387-396.
176. Marcus Messner and MarciaWatson DiStaso, "The Source Cycle: How Traditional Media and Weblogs Use Each Other as Sources," Journalism Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (April 2008), p. 447.
177. Kevin Wallsten, "'Yes We Can': How Online Viewership, Blog Discussion, Campaign Statements, and Mainstream Media Coverage Produced a Viral Video Phenomenon," research paper presented at the Journal of Information Technology and Politics annual conference, "YouTube and the 2008 Election Cycle," University of Massachusetts, Amherst, April 2009, pp. 43-44
178. Stefaan Walgrave, Stuart Soroka, and Michiel Nuytemans, "The Mass Media's Political Agenda-Setting Power: A Longitudinal Analysis of Media, Parliament, and Government in Belgium (1993 to 2000)," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 41, No. 6 (June 2008), pp. 814-836.
179. Interestingly, this cyclical sourcing is not practiced by all blogger types. One study shows that science bloggers are more likely to link to original academic research and data than are political bloggers
180. Gina Walejko and Thomas Ksiazek, "Blogging from the Niches," Journalism Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (June 2010), pp. 412-427.
181. I am unaware, however, of any study that looks at the sourcing cycle between the internet-based news media and foreign policy bloggers. Anecdotally, many high-profile Asia- or international relations-related blogs in the United States seem to rely heavily on mainstream media sources and do not often engage in original research or incorporate the original research of other scholars.
182. For empirical examples that show how perception of difference with outgroups helps to explain competitive or conflictual foreign policy preferences,
183. Edward Mansfield and Diana Mutz, "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety," International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 425-457
184. Donald R. Kinder and Cindy D. Kam, Us against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)
185. David L. Rousseau and Rocio Garcia-Retamero, "Identity, Power, and Threat Perception: A Cross-National Experimental Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 5 (October 2007), pp. 744-771
186. Paul Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior, "Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 35-49
187. Tang Shiping, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," Security Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 587-623.