On the historical forms of knowledge production and curation: Modernity entailed disciplinarity, postmodernity entails antidisciplinarity

Osiris

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 56-97

  Forman, Paul ^a  

^a SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION   (United States)

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EID: 84878407626     PISSN: 03697827     EISSN: 19338287     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/667823     Document Type: Article

References (485)

1. Aristides Baltas, Kostas Gavroglu, and Vassiliki Kindi, "A Discussion with Thomas S. Kuhn," i.e., the "autobiographical interview" referred to in the title of Kuhn, The Road since "Structure": Philosophical Essays, 1970-1993, with an Autobiographical Interview, ed. James Conant and John Haugeland (Chicago, 2000), 253-323, 308.
2. The exclamation point is present only in the original publication: Neusis 6 (1997): 145-200, 187-188.
3. Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity (New York, 1998), 61
4. "The Fate of the Disciplines," ed. James Chandler and Arnold I. Davidson, special issue, Crit. Inq. 35, no. 4 (2009).
5. The lead article provides an introduction to the literature: Robert C. Post, "Debating Disciplinarity," 749-770.
6. Measured by the amount of literature cited, Post's is, to my knowledge, the closest approach to a scholarly discussion of the fate of the disciplines. However, law professor Post, innocent of historical sensibility, considers that literature without regard to its date of publication. Moreover, like most writers on disciplines and disciplinarity in the past thirty to forty years, Post combines hostility to disciplinarity with a presumption that disciplines are here to stay. Similar to Post is Louis Menand, who for years has enjoyed heavy funding to do better, but has produced little The Marketplace of Ideas (New York, 2010).
7. Peter Novick's That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession (New York, 1988), an impressive accomplishment, comes closest to being such an account of the breakdown of disciplinarity for one discipline, but suffers from Novick's refusal explicitly to treat historians as moving with their wider cultural milieu, albeit he provides much evidence of this
8. John Ziman's Real Science: What It Is, and What It Means (New York, 2000) is an informed, insightful account of the transformation of scientific life that postmodernity has brought about, and specifically in its discipline-disregarding aspects.
9. Peter Weingart's Die Stunde der Wahrheit? Zum Verhältnis der Wissenschaft zu Politik, Wirtschaft und Medien in der Wissensgesellschaft (Weilerswist, 2001) also provides an overview of the manifold antidisciplinary forces at work on and in the sciences at the end of the twentieth century. The ever more widespread and implicitly antidisciplinary rhetoric of interdisciplinarity, and its vast literature, I leave entirely aside.
10. Hollinger, "Faculty Governance, the University of California, and the Future of Academe," Academe 87, no. 3 (2001): 30-33, on 33, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/academe/2001/MJ/ (accessed May 2008).
11. Outside the professorial ranks advocates are plentiful-above them in the ranks of university administrators (most prominently, Michael Crowe), and below them among the providers of remedial instruction e.g., Randi Gray Kristensen and Ryan M. Claycomb, eds., Writing against the Curriculum: Anti-disciplinarity in the Writing and Cultural Studies Classroom (Lanham, Md., 2010).
12. Within the professorial ranks, most prominent is Mark C. Taylor, "End the University as We Know It," op-ed, New York Times, April 27, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27taylor.html
13. Taylor, Crisis on Campus: A Bold Plan for Reforming Our Colleges and Universities (New York, 2010).
14. Exemplary are Allan Kulikoff, "A Modest Proposal to Resolve the Crisis in History," Journal of the Historical Society 11 (d): 239-263
15. Menand, Marketplace of Ideas (cit. n. 2), 55, 80, 102-105.
16. As the natural scientists require outside support, they have no choice but to go with the flow, and thus have all the less reason to overcome their disinclination to such discussion.
17. Clearing up that confusion of postmodernity with postmodernism would be a hard job. Even Anderson (Origins of Postmodernity, cit. n. 2), whose knowledge is broad enough to have allowed him to avoid that confusion, fell into it, placing postmodernity in his title but devoting his text to postmodernism. Early on, Zygmunt Bauman sought to maintain a distinction between the ideological -ism and the historicality. But facing the difficulty of bringing this distinction home to his ever-wider, historically uninterested, audience, and fearing that any use of any form of the word would inevitably tar him as a postmodernist, Bauman abandoned postmodernity
18. Michael Hviid Jacobsen, Sophia Marshman, and Keith Tester, Bauman beyond Postmodernity: Critical Appraisals, Conversations and Annotated Bibliography, 1989-2005 (Aalborg, 2007), 12-13.
19. I, having much less to lose, and having a stronger commitment to clarity and consistency, have stuck to that distinction
20. Paul Forman, "Recent Science: Late-Modern and Post-modern," in Science Bought and Sold: Rethinking the Economics of Science, ed. Philip Mirowski and E.-M. Sent (Chicago, 2002), 109-48
21. Forman, "(Re)cognizing Postmodernity: Helps for Historians-of Science Especially," Ber. Wissenschaftsgesch. 33 (2010): 157-75.
22. "What If They Gave a Science War and Only One Side Came? Ask the American Anthropological Association," Chronicle of Higher Education, January 14, 2011, sec. B: Chronicle Review, B10-B11, available at http://chronicle.com/article/What-if-They-Had-a-Science-War/125828/ (accessed January 2011)
23. Hugh Gusterson evinces such a confusion of postmodernity with postmodernism, combined with a dismissal of postmodernism as passé, all in the service of disciplinary damage control. It is also an example of the phobia toward all forms of the word postmodern that is common to scholars in science and technology studies (STS), stemming in large part from the science wars of the late 1990s
24. Forman, "Recognizing Postmodernity" (cit. n. 5), 159, 168. 8-9, 175 n. 52.
25. Paul Forman, "The Primacy of Science in Modernity, of Technology in Postmodernity, and of Ideology in the History of Technology," Hist. & Tech. 23 (2007): 1-152.
26. As the method and claims of that article have not always been understood, I emphasize here that it does not consider the actual, factual relations between science and technology, but only the putative, culturally presumed relations. If this rigorous restriction to cultural description is understood, then it is less likely that I be misunderstood as sharing the wide scholarly prejudice in favor of economic explanations of such cultural transformations as are described in that article and this. Thus Robert Kohler ("Lab History: Reflections," Isis 99 [2008]: 761-8, on 765), in placing his considerable authority behind the view that modern, disciplinary science was "an interlude" in world history, intimates that I am with him in thinking that the proper explanation of the inception of that interlude, the content of that interlude, and the ending of that interlude "is more economic than cultural." I, however, do not think that the rise of disciplinary science can be explained economically. I am quite certain that the world-historical transformation from modernity to postmodernity that caused the Icarian fall of disciplinarity was too broad, too fast, and involved too radical a reversal of modern perspectives to be explained by economic circumstances.
27. I welcome the recent work of Philip Mirowski, Science-Mart: Privatizing American Science (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), in which this historian of economic thought assigns the determinative role not to economic realities but to an economistic ideology.
28. Transcendence is the most important aspiration or illusion of modernity neglected in this exposition of those determinative of disciplinarity. My warrant for here neglecting the aspiration to transcendence is that although characteristic of modernity, it is not distinctive of modernity. That aspiration is also characteristic of significant sectors of knowledge production and curation throughout the length and breadth of premodernity. The preposterousness yet strange durability of this aspiration or illusion of transcendence was the theme of all of David F. Noble's scholarly books from the mid-1980s to the untimely end of his life: A World without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of Western Science (New York, 1992)
29. The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New York, 1997)
30. Beyond the Promised Land: The Movement and the Myth (Toronto, 2005).
31. Writing this last, it seemed to Noble that contemporary global environmental justice activists, but so far they only, had "come to the understanding that beyond the promised land is the here and now" (1). This under-standing might, however, be seen as presumed by postdisciplinary knowledge production-which is to say most postmodern knowledge production. Meanwhile, elsewhere in postmodern life and thought we cling to transcendence in ever more preposterous forms.
32. one of these terms (method, disinterestedness, autonomy, solidarity, or discipline) appears among Raymond Williams's approximately 150 keywords of modern culture-neither in Williams's 1973, 1983, and 1985 editions, nor in the 2005 edition Tony Bennett, Lawrence Grossberg, and Meaghan Morris, eds., New Keywords: A Revised Vocabulary of Culture and Society (Malden, Mass., 2005).
33. Long ago, Dorinda Outram ("Politics and Vocation: French Science, 1793-1830," Brit. J. Hist. Sci. 13 [1980]: 27-43, on 28), Introducing her critique of the imposition of the concept of professionalization upon the scientific "vocation," observed that professions "assume an applied component, an ideal of service.
34. In The natural sciences, however, it is difficult to identify the client served or the service provided." This pertinent point has been rather consistently ignored in the past thirty years. Of particular value as a review of the history of the preoccupation with professionalization in a closely related historical discipline is John C. Burnham, How the Idea of Profession Changed the Writing of Medical History (London, 1998).
35. Circa 1980 the need for clarification of the difference between professionalization of science and discipline formation in science was widely felt; Dictionary of the History of Science, ed. W. F. Bynum et al. (Princeton, N.J., 1981), s.v. "discipline history," by Robert E. Kohler
36. Karl Hufbauer, The Formation of the German Chemical Community, 1720-1795 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982), 2-5, 150
37. Outram, "Politics and Vocation" (cit. n. 10).
38. Recently, G. Matthew Adkins, in "The Renaissance of Peiresc: Aubin-Louis Millin and the Postrevolutionary Republic of Letters," Isis 99 (2008): 675-700
39. has noted that the large body of scholarship on that classic phase of French science suggests not a conjunction but an opposition between those two processes. The antithesis between profession and discipline, as well as the confused and inconsistent usage in the history of science literature, was stressed by Yves Gingras, Physics and the Rise of Scientific Research in Canada, trans. Peter Keating (Buffalo, N.Y., 1991), 4-8, 117-119.
40. Alone, to my knowledge, Gingras's "L'institutionnalisation de la recherche en milieu universitaire et ses effets," Sociologie et sociétés 23 (1991): 41-54+41-43, made a suggestion for a consistent distinction.
41. The antithesis between a profession and a discipline seemed clear among the late nineteenth century American cultural elite, as has recently been emphasized by Paul Lucier, "The Professional and the Scientist in Nineteenth-Century America," Isis 100 (2009): 699-732.
42. It can be seen in the highly favorable connotations of discipline and the unfavorable connotations of profession in Herbert Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York, 1909; reprinted four times in the following five years and now available at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Promise_of_American_Life [accessed May 2010]), where one finds "professionalmillionaires," "professional bankrupt," "professional revolutionists and reformers," and "professional socialists." This, presumably, is what Charles Rosenberg had in mind when insisting on (but not stating or elaborating) that difference
43. "Toward an Ecology of Knowledge: On Discipline, Context, and History," in The Organization of Knowledge in Modern America, 1860-1920, ed. Alexandra Oleson and John Voss (Baltimore, 1979), 440-455.
44. But by then insistence on that difference had been rendered passé by the onset of postmodernity, as reflected in Thomas L. Haskell's "Are Professors Professional?" J. Soc. Hist. 14 (1981): 485-493
45. an unsympathetic review of that volume largely devoted to Rosenberg's contribution. Although Rosenberg's commentary remains one of the most frequently cited articles in the history of science literature, postmodernity has ensured that we have heard almost nothing more of the discipline-profession distinction in the past two decades.
46. So, e.g., The otherwise intellectually rigorous M. H. Abrams, in "The Transformation of English Studies: 1930-1995," Daedalus 126, no. 1, "American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines" (1997): 105-31, moves back and forth, indiscriminately, between "the profession of literature," "the literary discipline," "English Studies," and "English... as an established academic discipline."
47. Jerry Z. Muller's "Discontent in the Historical Profession," Society 36, no. 2 (1999): 12-18, an account of the formation of the Historical Society in consequence of discontents in which, implicitly, the distinction between discipline and profession is central, has eleven appearances of a d word and eighteen of a p word, with not a word on the difference.
48. Similarly, Steven Shapin has packed into the first two pages of "Hyperprofessionalism and the Crisis of Readership in the History of Science," Isis 96 (2005): 238-243, some twenty-three appearances of a d word, and eighteen of a p word, with, again, not a word on the difference.
49. Sarton, "Introduction to the History and Philosophy of Science (Preliminary Note)," Isis 4 (1921): 23-31+23
50. quoted by Arnold Thackray and Robert K. Merton, "On Discipline Building: The Paradoxes of George Sarton," Isis 63 (1972): 472-495, 473
51. Sarton, "Review of Charles Singer, Studies in the History and Method of Science," Science 47 (1918): 316-319, 318, quoted by John L. Heilbron in his lecture at the opening ceremony of the Max Planck Institut für Wissenschaftsgeschichte (MPIWG), March 31, 1995, published in MPIWG's Annual Report (1995), 183-201, on 188. Morey
52. D. Rothberg, "'To Set a Standard of Workmanship and Compel Men to Conform to It': John Franklin Jameson as Editor of the American Historical Review," Amer. Hist. Rev. 89 (1984): 957-975, quoting Jameson, "The Influence of Universities upon Historical Writing" (1902).
53. Jameson was then writing as head of the history department at the University of Chicago, from where he went, shortly after, to the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Likewise, Novick, That Noble Dream (cit. n. 2), 52
54. Lewis Pyenson, The Passion of George Sarton: A Modern Marriage and Its Discipline, Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 260 (Philadelphia, 2007), 317-8.
55. Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, 2nd ed., rev., 2 vols. in one (Malden, Mass., 2000), 182, 190, 387
56. Philip S. Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe (Chicago, 2003).
57. P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (New York, 1979), on 273: "Englishmen were taught selfdiscipline by every possible means." (Thomas L. Haskell's writings drew my attention to Atiyah's important book.)
58. William James, The Moral Equivalent of War [1906], and Other Essays (New York, 1971), 14. (By "moral equivalent" James meant "an equivalent discipline.") "Socialist discipline" was central to socialist thinking and practice from Comte forward
59. see n. 77 below. Freud's translators' liking for "self-discipline" is attested by The Concordance to the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. Samuel A. Guttman, Randall L. Jones, and Stephen M. Parrish (Boston, 1980), 2:170.
60. Novick (That Noble Dream, cit. n. 2, on 270) equates objectivity to work that is "inhibited by an objectivist superego."
61. On the evidence of those catalogs, throughout the four centuries prior to the 1930s disciplines was used almost exclusively in the sense of religious disciplines. In its singular form, the noun discipline appears in many more titles, but the relative probability of finding it used in the sense of a scientific or scholarly discipline is even smaller. (The number of such titles is so great that I have not undertaken to examine each.) The shift in the predominant meaning of disciplines in the titles of works in the Harvard and Library of Congress catalogs began only around 1940. Over the following decades, those works treating of scientific and scholarly disciplines outnumbered those using that word in some other (usually religious) sense by ever-increasing factors. Doubtless a positive feedback effect contributed to this shift from the religious to the secular meaning.
62. Of the 1,284 works in the catalog of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France published between 1500 and 1900 having discipline in their title, Anduaga found that not one uses the word in the sense of a learned discipline. Titles containing the plural form, disciplines, number only ten, and, again, not one uses the word in the sense of a learned discipline. Searching the catalogs of the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, the Biblioteca Nacional de España, and the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Roma for works published between 1500 and 1900 having disciplina (the singular form in Latin, Portuguese, Spanish, and Italian) in their titles, he found that, in the first, among 634 works, only three use the word in the sense of a learned discipline; in the second, among 320 works, only four; in the third, among 262 works in Latin, only ten, and among 71 works in Italian, none. Again in every case, as in English, the plural form appears in titles far less frequently, but nonetheless there are within those much smaller numbers more pertinent uses of the word. Personal communication from Anduaga, August 15, 2011.
63. Croly, Promise of American Life (cit. n. 11). This book "immediately established Croly as the most important theorist of American progressivism": James T. Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York, 1986), 313-4.
64. For the ambivalence that romanticism introduced into the valuation of discipline in these decades, see my examination of Lewis Mumford's attitudes, "Appendix: Mumford's 'Discipline,'" in Paul Forman, "How Lewis Mumford Saw Science, and Art, and Himself," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 38 (2007): 271-336+323-326.
65. Veblen, The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men (New York, 1918).
66. The closest Veblen comes to our use of disciplines is the following: "The university of medieval and early modern times, that is to say the barbarian university, was necessarily given over to the pragmatic, utilitarian disciplines, since that is the nature of barbarism" (34).
67. Beyond this comic example there is only this: "The attention given to scholarship and the nonutilitarian sciences in these establishments has come far to exceed that given to the practical disciplines for which the several faculties were originally installed" (37) and several more references to "these utilitarian disciplines" in the following few pages.
68. For utilitarian and practical as depreciative in Veblen's mind-and for the common misrepresentation of Veblen in this regard-see my discussion in "Primacy of Science in Modernity" (cit. n. 7), 86 n. 99.
69. Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., "Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books," Science 331 (2011): 176-182. (Readers may construct their own graphical displays of these data at http://books.google.com/ngrams [accessed September 2011].)
70. The graphs arising from the same searches over Google's American English database are essentially identical, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The graphs arising from the same searches over Google's English Fiction database are qualitatively very similar, except that the frequency of appearance of both terms is about one-third lower.
71. This near equality of frequency of appearance of disciplined and disciplines should not be construed to imply equality of frequency of characterological usages of discipline and references to fields of inquiry. On the contrary, the appearances of discipline are far more frequent, and they are overwhelmingly characterological.
72. One need only recall the pervasive departures from the demands of disciplinarity underscored by Weber in "Wissenschaft als Beruf" (1919). The surprisingly slow and incomplete development of the physics discipline in Germany and the sociology discipline in the United States are main themes of Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach, Intellectual Mastery of Nature, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1986), and Andrew Abbott, Department and Discipline: Chicago Sociology at One Hundred (Chicago, 1999), 84-87.
73. Novick (That Noble Dream, cit. n. 2, on 47-9) noted, and Robert Townsend has documented the fact, that until after World War II the American Historical Association (AHA) remained far from realizing the ideal characteristics of a disciplinary association Townsend, "The Social Shape of the AHA, 1884-1945," Perspectives on History (2009): 36-40, available on the AHA website at http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2009/0912/0912tim1.cfm (accessed 24 October 2011)
74. Townsend, "Making History: Scholarship and Professionalization in the Discipline, 1880-1940" (PhD Odiss., George Mason Univ., 2009), esp. chap. 2, "Rethinking Assumptions: The Academic as Professional." Where I see a culturally driven, hence more or less inevitable, disciplinarization of knowledge production and curation, Townsend sees an arbitrary narrowing and preemption of the doing of history by one sector of a multifaceted "historical enterprise."
75. Paul Hartman, The Cornell Physics Department: Recollections and a History of Sorts, rev. ed. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1993), 332-334.
76. Roger L. Geiger, in To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of American Research Universities, 1900-1940 (1986; repr., New Brunswick, N.J., 2004), 223-227, describes the inbreeding of US university faculties in this period-50 percent or more of senior faculty being typical of the best universities, reaching 70 percent in some cases. In some fields and institutions (e.g., the Harvard Business School) such inbreeding was maintained well into the post-World War II decades
77. Rakesh Khurana, From Higher Aims to Hired Hands: The Social Transformation of American Business Schools and the Unfulfilled Promise of Management as a Profession (Princeton, N.J., 2007), 306-8.
78. The discoverer of both these circumstances was Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, Deutsche Wissenschaft und internationale Zusammenarbeit, 1914-1928 (Geneva, 1966).
79. Her most recent review of the literature is "Probing the Master Narrative of Scientific Internationalism: Nationals and Neutrals in the 1920s," in Neutrality in Twentieth-Century Europe: Intersections of Science, Culture and Politics after the First World War, ed. Rebecka Lettevall, Geert Somsen, and Sven Widmalm (New York, forthcoming), where she also draws attention to Sarton's contribution to repressing memory of that fracture of scientific solidarity. One would think that in the face of the large literature of the past four decades detailing and analyzing this failure of scientific internationalism, retrogression in historical interpretation to the amnesiac state that preceded Schroeder-Gudehus's 1966 publication would be impossible-and certainly impossible for a sometime president of the AHA, such as Akira Iriye, when writing a book titled Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore, 1997). But as the demise of disciplinarity in postmodernity has freed the historian to ignore the literature and indulge in wishful thinking, such retrogression is now an option.
80. It is important, especially here, to emphasize that though the wider impact was almost entirely Kuhn's, the disciplinary perspective on modern science was common to all forward-looking historians in the sixties and early seventies. An especially striking example of this programmatic conviction is in the editor's foreword to volumes 4 and 5 of Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, prepared by Russell McCormmach in 1974.
81. In his long list of questions needing investigation (quoted at length by Lewis Pyenson in "Editor's Foreword," Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 37 [2007]: 189-204, on 198-9) every one of them sprang from, and fed into, the disciplinary conception. McCorm-mach was himself then close to completing the manuscript of what remains still today the longest history of a discipline (Intellectual Mastery of Nature, cit. n. 21), and may thus be excused from failing to see the handwriting that, by the time of his writing, had been on the wall for several years.
82. Several years later still, Robert Kohler, opening From Medical Chemistry to Biochemistry: The Making of a Biomedical Discipline (New York, 1982), observed that "it is surprising, in view of its promise, how little discipline history has been done in the past 15 years" (2-3). He too, in view of his own investment, may be excused for believing that he could see positive "signs of change" in this regard. Kathryn
83. M. Olesko, in Physics as a Calling: Discipline and Practice in the Königsberg Seminar for Physics (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), is not with that program. On the decline of interest in the sociology of professions during the 1970s
84. see Burnham, How the Idea of Profession (cit. n. 10), 119.
85. Kuhn's conception that disciplinarity equals professionality equals the end of the prehistory and the beginning of the true history of a science-never clearly articulated in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962; hereafter, SSR), but always understood by its readers-is explicit in the opening sentence of Kuhn, "The History of Science," in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), 14:74-83
86. as reprinted in a Kuhn, The Essential Tension (Chicago, 1977), 103-26, on 103: "As an independent professional discipline, the history of science is a new field still emerging from a long and varied prehistory." In his "Postscript-1969" to the second edition, enlarged, of SSR (Chicago, 1970; 174-210, on 176), Kuhn said, "If this book were being rewritten, it would... open with a discussion of the community structure of science"-i.e., what everyone read into it. By 1974, in "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," reprinted in Essential Tension (293-319, on 297), Kuhn was ready to say that "less confusion will result if I instead replace it [paradigm] with the phrase 'disciplinary matrix'-'disciplinary' because it is the common possession of the practitioners of a professional discipline." Gad Freudenthal ("General Introduction," in Joseph Ben-David, Scientific Growth: Essays on the Social Organization and Ethos of Science, ed. Freudenthal [Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991], 1-25, on 17-8) alleged that Kuhn, taking the paradigm as determining everything, made the social dimensions of a mature science likewise a function of its ever-changing paradigm. This would indeed have been the logical position for Kuhn to take, but, for all that Kuhn's scheme was mainly an exercise in logic, he never took it. It is absent exactly where one would expect to find it, namely, in Kuhn's essay review "Scientific Growth: Reflections on Ben-David's 'Scientific Role,'" Minerva 10 (1972): 166-178.
87. As Kuhn himself always insisted, a serious thinker's failure to follow the logic of his scheme is an indication of a blinding cultural commitment.
88. The intensity of Kuhn's concern as a teacher with the crime of whiggery in respect of scientific ideas (but, I emphasize, ideas only) is dramatically conveyed in Errol Morris's reconstruction of his experience during his year as a graduate student with Kuhn at Princeton in the early 1970s, which he supports with the recollections of Norton Wise, included with his own
89. "The Ashtray: This Contest of Interpretation, part 5," Opinionator blog, New York Times, March 10, 2011, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/incommensurability/ (accessed March 2011).
90. From this perspective it is easy to understand why the internal-external distinction-deplored by Steven Shapin ("Discipline and Bounding: History and Sociology of Science as Seen through the Externalism-Internalism Debate," Hist. Sci. 30 [1992]: 333-69, on 357) as the cardinal sin of "the founding fathers"-dominated methodological reflection in the history of science in those late modern decades. The history of science was faced more squarely than was any other historical discipline by the incompatibility between history's presupposition of a more or less seamless web and disciplinarity's presupposition of disciplinary autonomy, hence a boundary, a "skin" enclosing the "innards" of a discipline, in the vivid image of Thomas F. Gieryn, Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line (Chicago, 1999), 21.
91. In Professionalism: The Third Logic (Chicago, 2001)
92. Eliot Freidson, who turned advocate in his old age, put it more drastically: "Without closure there can be no disciplines" (199; emphasis in the original). Considering the irresolvable cognitive dissonance created by this incompatibility between the demands of history and those of the disciplinary conception of science, it is not surprising that, as Shapin observed, "much of what passed as debate was both diffuse and incoherent" (345).
93. Thomas F. Gieryn, "Distancing Science from Religion in Seventeenth-Century England," Isis 79 (1988): 582-593, 583
94. Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford, Calif., 1978), 13-5
95. Guenther Roth, reviewing Poggi, in Contemporary Sociology 8 (1979): 362-368.
96. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England (New York, 1970), 60 n. 10.
97. Gieryn ("Distancing Science from Religion," cit. n. 28) says that Merton did not mention Durkheim, but he did not then have Google Books at his disposal to ferret out Merton's well-buried reference
98. Merton, "Preface 1970," in Science, Technology and Society (cit. n. 29), vii-xxix, xix. There is of course a third alternative; namely, that the writer is simply avoiding acknowledging the sources of his ideas. This was to no small degree the case with Merton. Thus his far more famous 1938 publication on anomie is a far more egregious failure properly to credit Durkheim.
99. I have previously emphasized ("Independence, Not Transcendence, for the Historian of Science," Isis 82 [1991]: 71-86) that it is a mistake to suppose that what is good for disciplinary science is good for the discipline of the history of science. Lorraine Daston ("Science Studies and the History of Science," Crit. Inq. 35 [2009]: 798-813), in her contribution to the special issue "The Fate of the Disciplines" (cit. n. 2), makes that mistake (among several others): "Inexorably, immersion in the scientific practices that eventually created scientific disciplines led-by a kind of mimesis-to historical practices that turned the history of science into a discipline" (809). Inconsistently, but again mistakenly, Daston there also has this as the result of historians of science submitting themselves to the discipline of history, and that only recently. On this latter mistake, see n. 106 below and the concluding section generally.
100. There is some irony in the fact that it seemed to sociologist Barry Barnes (Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory [London, 1974]) that the conception of science as a closed and bounded social-cultural system "is near enough taken for granted among sociologists... mainly due to the work of the historian of science T.S. Kuhn" (48). But so it was, and so it has remained: SSR, which simply reflected back to the sociologists their own presuppositions, is widely mistaken for an innovative work of sociological theory and discovery-so much so that Andrew Abbott, an undergraduate at Harvard in the later 1960s and entering graduate school at the University of Chicago at the end of that decade, could recall: "I grew up on the Cassirer-Langer-Mead philosophy of knowledge, the Kuhnian sociology of science..."
101. Abbott, The Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago, 2001), 4 n. 2.
102. That what SSR offered was not sociology at all, but epistemology pretending to be sociology, ought to have been obvious, at least to sociologists, but was not, and still is not.
103. David A. Hollinger, "The Defense of Democracy and Robert K. Merton's Formulation of the Scientific Ethos," Knowl. & Soc. 4 (1983): 1-15
104. Hollinger, "Science as a Weapon in Kulturkämpfe in the United States during and after World War II" (1995), repr., with introductory notes, as chaps. 5 and 8 of Hollinger, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture (Princeton, N.J., 1998).
105. The general thrust of the latter paper, first presented as a lecture to the History of Science Society, is entirely consistent with that of this article: that historians of science have been historically very shortsighted, projecting back into the early twentieth century cultural valuations of science that had become established in the United States only in the decade following World War II. In the former paper Hollinger (on 82) reviews the diverse titles under which Merton's original publication, "A Note on Science and Democracy" (1942), was reprinted, as indicative of the process whereby this short, unfocused, occasional essay was transmogrified into "theoretical foundations for a sociology of science." (I quote Nico Stehr, "The Ethos of Science Revisited: Social and Cognitive Norms," Sociological Inquiry 48 [1978]:172-96, on 173.)
106. Stephen Cole, in "Merton's Contribution to the Sociology of Science," Soc. Stud. Sci. 34 (2004): 829-844, makes it clear that Merton's own theorization of CUDOS amounts to nothing more than that original essay.
107. It is not out of place here to take issue with the "maxim of method" that Steven Shapin ("Hyperprofessionalism," cit. n. 12) avows as being that of his oeuvre, the more so as, on the one hand, it is the antithesis of the method pursued in this article and in my own work generally and, on the other hand, it has implicitly been the predominant perspective among historians of science in the past generation, to no small extent because of the influence of Shapin's works. "In my own line of work," Shapin explains, "a maxim of method-not an epistemological evaluation-has been to treat science as a typical form of culture. Whatever can be learned from the detailed, naturalistic study of a particular scientific practice may be applied to our overall understandings of knowledge and the conditions of its making" (242). It should be obvious, however, that Shapin's approach (supposing that it were indeed ever actually followed) is almost certain to lead the historian astray, for it provides no guidance in discriminating what is peculiar to "a particular scientific practice" and what is general in the culture of the period. That this is not perceived to be a problem is due to the presupposition-half denied in Shapin's interjection, "not an epistemological evaluation"-that science is in no way different. (To adapt his famous opener, "There's no such thing as science, and this is a history of it.") In articulating this anti-differentiationist maxim of method, Shapin identifies Barry Barnes as being the originator of it, citing Barnes's books in the 1970s. I think that Shapin misrepresents what was then, or is now, Barnes's point of view.
108. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason (1958; repr., with a foreword by Adrian Johns, Chicago, 2004), 225, 229.
109. Likewise noting the absence in the medieval literature of method in the sense of wissenschaftliche Vorgehen or Verfahren: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, ed. Joachim Ritter (Basel, 1971-; henceforth, HWP), s.v. "Methode III: Mittelalter-2," by Ludger Oening-Hanhoff. On Ramus, method, and Calvinistic Protestantism, see Perry Miller, The New England Mind in the Seventeenth Century (1939; repr., Cambridge, Mass., 1983).
110. David Simpson, in Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt against Theory (Chicago, 1993), almost grasped that the regard of method is what distinguishes modernity. In the early modern period, the matter of method demanded attention not simply as concomitant to the general problem of replacing one scientific system by another, but equally because of the specific character of Aristotelian philosophizing, which gave primacy and centrality to ends. Thus the revolt against Aristotelianism almost inevitably, however gradually, carried with it the repudiation of the primacy of ends and the elevation of means, of method.
111. Among the many voids in the literature of the cultural history of science, the lack of works on this subject is one of the largest. I know only Richard Yeo, Defining Science: William Whewell, Natural Knowledge, and Public Debate in Early Victorian Britain (1993; repr., New York, 2003)
112. followed by Laura J. Snyder, Reforming Philosophy: A Victorian Debate on Science and Society (Chicago, 2006)
113. and The Philosophical Breakfast Club: Four Remarkable Friends Who Transformed Science and Changed the World (New York, 2011)
114. this latter a cross between Menand and Dava Sobel achieving just that sort of success of which historians of science are now most desirous. Yeo recognized that those engaged in discussions of scientific method in Victorian Britain understood them as having implications wider than the production of reliable knowledge of nature, but he did not explore those implications. Still less did Snyder-less and less, from her scholarly work to her less scholarly work.
115. Dewey's The Quest for Certainty (New York, 1929) contains his Gifford Lectures and is his most important epistemological statement to that date, with "The Supremacy of Method" its keystone chapter. The book contains no clear articulation, let alone examination, but only repeated postulations, of "the method" of the physical sciences. Dewey's Logic, the Theory of Inquiry (New York, 1938) is more technical-and more tautologously proceduralist. Opening his chapter there titled "Scientific Method and Scientific Subject-Matter," Dewey says that "since this body of subject-matter attains scientific standing only because of the methods that are used in arriving at them [sic], the systems of facts and principles of which science materially consists should disclose properties that conform to conditions imposed by the methods" (458). But what exactly the methods are, Dewey does not say.
116. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World: Lowell Lectures, 1925 (New York, 1925), 141.
117. In Primacy of Science in Modernity (cit. n. 7), and again in (Re)cognizing Postmodernity (cit. n. 5), I used methodism and, occasionally, procedurism as monikers for this mind-set. Walter J. Ong, in "Peter Ramus and the Naming of Methodism," J. Hist. Ideas 14 (1953): 235-248, shows the close association of method with discipline in the early eighteenth century.
118. For orientation, see Amanda Anderson, The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory (Princeton, N.J., 2006), 161
119. "Proceduralism is a normative model for the justification of specific political practices and institutions." In the literature that I have encountered, Michael J. Sandel comes closest to taking proceduralism as a general cultural value "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-96
120. Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass., 1996). And yet, although Sandel connects proceduralism with, and at times comes close to deriving it from, the culturally dominant conception of personhood, he remains a philosopher, unable to affirm a culturalist interpretation and unwilling to acknowledge the historical prevalence of a perspective-proceduralism-that he himself, as a romantic-postmodern, rejects.
121. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 73.
122. Rawls viewed his theory "as a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative" (256)
123. i.e., he understood, as did virtually all Kant's modern interpreters, that he should not be misled by Kant's unfortunate formulations reflecting lingering scholastic prejudices that suggested elevation of ends over means-such as "the kingdom of ends" and the imperative to treat men as ends and not as means. See Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 2nd ed. (1786)
124. translated and analyzed by H. J. Paton as The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (1948; repr., New York, 2009), 66, 69-71, 82-83.
125. Now, however, in postmodernity, it has become philosophically respectable to take such formulations literally and to maintain that Kant's view was "precisely the same" as Aristotle's
126. Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), and Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (New York, 2009), 10.
127. Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, 1994), 106.
128. This is not Shapin's "gentlemen are not supposed to lie" thesis, but it is the truth. Repeatedly, Shapin adduces snippets from Shakespeare in support of that thesis, but nowhere does he confront the plain fact that deceit, deception, disguise, or dissimulation is central to the plot structure of most of Shakespeare's plays. Lionel Trilling (Sincerity and Authenticity [Cambridge, Mass., 1972]), in his C. E. Norton Lectures dedicated "to my cousin, I. Bernard Cohen," pointed out that "a multitude of Shakespeare's virtuous characters" engaged in such practices some of the time, and that there is good historical reason for thinking that lying was then common (13-5). Shakespeare affirms that the end justifies the means most clearly in Measure for Measure and Much Ado about Nothing
129. Inga-Stina Ewbank, "Shakespeare's Liars," Proc. Brit. Acad. 69 (1984): 137-68
130. see 141-3, 164-165. Thus Shakespeare's corpus comports well with the findings of Perez Zagorin (Ways of Lying: Dissimulation, Persecution, and Conformity in Early Modern Europe [Cambridge, Mass., 1990], vii, 17, 256) that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries "the legitimation and practice of dissimulation were major factors in the lives of religious bodies, intellectuals, philosophers, and men of letters," while "courtier became a byword for dishonesty and faithlessness." In particular, "regarding both the literature and politics of Restoration England," Zagorin cited a body of scholarship emphasizing their "exceptional preoccupation with the use of deception and disguise."
131. On Kant and Weems, see Martin Jay, The Virtues of Mendacity: On Lying in Politics (Charlottesville, Va., 2010), 7-8, 65-69. In Die Zauberflöte (Emanuel Schikaneder and W. A. Mozart [1791; New York, 1985], 36-7, 47-50), the bird-man Papageno is "tamed" and made a suitable sidekick for the hero Tamino through the imposition of an absolute prohibition of lying. By contrast, early in the eighteenth century Jonathan Swift, satirizing his contemporaries as the untamable Yahoos, created as their antitheses the horse-men Houyhnhnms, for whom lying was inconceivable.
132. This is T. H. Huxley's frequently quoted phrase, as found in David A. Hollinger, "Inquiry and Uplift: Late Nineteenth-Century American Academics and the Moral Efficacy of Scientific Practice," in The Authority of Experts: Studies in History and Theory, ed. Thomas L. Haskell (Bloomington, Ind., 1984), 142-156, 145.
133. Jacob Bronowski, Science and Human Values, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), 58
134. the original publication took the form of an entire double issue of The Nation at the end of 1957.
135. Charles Thorpe, "Capitalism, Audit, and the Demise of the Humanistic Academy," Workplace 15 (2008): 103-25
136. see 105, 107, 121 n. 25
137. Thorpe, "Participation as Post-Fordist Politics: Demos, New Labour, and Science Policy," Minerva 48 (2010): 389-411
138. Forman, "(Re)cognizing Postmodernity" (cit. n. 5), 163-164, 172 n. 36.
139. The large number of books on lie-detection techniques and technologies have a Library of Congress subject category all their own; as expressions of the intolerability of lying, they are evidence of the presupposition of the obligation to truth telling in modernity. This literature and its cultural context has been addressed in a hyper-Shapinesque mode by Ken Alder, "A Social History of Untruth: Lie Detection and Trust in Twentieth-Century America," Representations 80 (2002): 1-33
140. see 3, 25 n. 7.
141. Alder there makes a brief, cynical, radically antihistorical case for lying as a temporal and cultural invariant only the accepted means for detecting lying are historically variable. In his book on the subject (for that much-sought-after nonscholarly audience), The Lie Detectors: The History of an American Obsession (New York, 2007), Alder devotes just ten (self-contradictory) lines in his last few pages to the cultural foundations of his subject (see 270).
142. Typical are Philip Kerr, ed., The Penguin Book of Lies (London, 1990)
143. Gini Graham Scott, The Truth about Lying: Why We All Do It, How We Do It and Can We Live without It? (Petaluma, Calif., 1994). Recently the chief judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit opined that indeed we cannot live without it: "For mortals living means lying" (see the full text of the opinion at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/usvalvarez2011.html , accessed September 2011).
144. I pointed to the new cultural legitimacy of lying in reviewing Shapin, Social History of Truth (cit. n. 42), in Science 269 (1995): 707-710.
145. On disinterestedness and credibility in the seventeenth century, one can believe Shapin, Social History of Truth (cit. n. 42), 237-238.
146. On disinterestedness as the virtue presupposed by late eighteenthcentury republicanism, see Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York, 1992), esp. 103-107, where Wood notes that we can no longer "quite conceive of the characteristic that disinterestedness describes" (103).
147. On Adam Smith as opposing early eighteenth-century interest based explanations, see Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science (New York, 2003), 4, 14
148. incorporating and extending the findings of Albert O. Hirschman. See also Kant, Grundlegung (cit. n. 41), 71, 85
149. Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time," in Essays in Criticism (London, 1865), 1-41, on 18-19, 37-39
150. George L. Levine, Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian England (Chicago, 2002)
151. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis [1917] (New York, 1977), 377
152. William James, "The Will to Believe" (1896), as quoted in Forman, "Primacy of Science in Modernity" (cit. n. 7, on 86 n. 95), where the importance of disinterestedness to Marx, Sombart, Veblen, Dewey, and Mumford is also evidenced (16-22, 25-7, 43-5).
153. The English-language literature generally holds thoughtlessly to a parochial Anglo-Saxon view in which only free professions are counted as professions. So, e.g., Harold L. Wilensky, in "The Professionalization of Everyone?" Amer. J. Sociol. 70 (1964):137-158, listed eighteen professions and wannabe professions, but, without a word of explanation, included no professional civil services among them, whereas Durkheim, in Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (New York, 1992), 8, placed civil servants at the top of his list of professions.
154. Robert Adcock, in "The Emergence of Political Science as a Discipline: History and the Study of Politics in America, 1875-1910," Hist. Pol. Thought 24 (2003): 481-508, 499-500, observes that in the 1890s "scholars of history and politics rededicated themselves to the goal of non-partisanship The goal was seen as requiring a heightened degree of scholarly self-discipline."
155. The centrality for the nascent social sciences of this ambition to be useful in a redirection of society widely agreed to be needful has been emphasized and extensively documented by Henrika Kuklick, "Professional Status and the Moral Order," in Disciplinarity at the Fin de Siècle, ed. Amanda Anderson and Joseph Valente (Princeton, N.J., 2002), 126-152.
156. This is also effectively evidenced, though taken largely as a matter of course, by Thomas L. Haskell, The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority (1977; repr. with additional preface, Baltimore, 2000).
157. To be sure, Weber's stance in "Wissenschaft als Beruf" was for social-scientific purity, but this was, in large measure, a tactic to prevent his political opponents, the holders of the overwhelming majority of German university chairs in history, politics, and economics, from using their lecterns for political speech.
158. American Association of University Professors, Committee of Fifteen on Academic Freedom and Tenure, report, pt. 1, "General Declaration of Principles" [subsequently commonly referred to as above], AAUP Bulletin 1, pt. 1 (1915): 17-39 (and frequently reprinted); as made available on the AAUP website at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1915.htm (accessed April 2010).
159. Thomas L. Haskell, in Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Baltimore, 1998), 174-185, made the important point that in the minds of these fifteen academics the freedom requiring recognition was not that of the individual scholar qua individual, but that of the individual scholar qua member, and authoritative voice, of a discipline.
160. This distinction was lost sight of over the course of the twentieth century with the ever more exclusive understanding of rights as individual, on which see Sandel, Democracy's Discontent (cit. n. 40). Therewith one of the most important cultural supports for disciplinarity has gone by the board.
161. Alexander Gode-von Aesch, Natural Science in German Romanticism (New York, 1941), 24-31
162. Perry Miller, "The Romantic Dilemma in American Nationalism and the Concept of Nature" (1955), as reprinted in Miller, Nature's Nation (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 197-207
163. Cathryn Carson, Alexei Kojevnikov, and Helmuth Trischler, eds., Weimar Culture and Quantum Mechanics: Selected Papers by Paul Forman and Contemporary Perspectives on the Forman Thesis (London, 2011), 126-30
164. Forman, "Primacy of Science in Modernity" (cit. n. 7), 7, 75. 24-76 n. 27.
165. A notable example-the title says it all-came from one of America's most up-and-coming scholars in English literature: David Bromwich, "The Genealogy of Disinterestedness," Raritan 1, no. 4 (1982): 62-92.
166. This Nietzsche-invoking, across-the-board assault on Matthew Arnold holds up for admiration in his stead Oscar Wilde, specifically, Wilde's radically romantic, subjectivist nihilism, and his praise of lying.
167. Forman, "Recognizing Postmodernity" (cit. n. 5), 163, 171 n. 33.
168. Gerald Holton has long emphasized romanticism as the problematic element in contemporary culture
169. Holton, "The Rise of Postmodernisms and the 'End of Science,'" J. Hist. Ideas 61 (2000): 327-341, and earlier publications cited there. Wrongly, I long resisted that understanding.
170. Steven Lukes, "New Introduction by the Author," in Individualism (1973; repr., Colchester, 2006), 1-16
171. Forman, "Recognizing Postmodernity" (cit. n. 5), 164-165.
172. Lukes (Individualism, cit. n. 56, on 49) quotes Weber, Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus (1905): "The term 'individualism' embraces the utmost heterogeneity of meanings."
173. J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, 2nd ed. with a new afterword by the author (Princeton, N.J., 2003), has, to be sure, no critique of the concept of Renaissance individualism, but the word is almost absent in his more than 600 pages. On the contrary, the book can most reasonably be said to be about autonomy, more especially in light of the new afterword.
174. HWP, s.v. "Autonomie," by Rosemarie Pohlmann, citing as exceptional Sophocles's use of the word to describe Antigone's inner state. On the autonomy of the work of art, see n. 67 below.
175. Lukes (Individualism, cit. n. 56, on 55, 58) quotes Luther: "Each and all of us are priests Why then should we not be entitled to taste or test, and to judge what is right or wrong in the faith?"
176. Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2nd ed. (New York, 1992)
177. John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New York, 1999). Although Isaiah Berlin disclaimed the title historian, the role of romanticism was better appreciated by him.
178. As J. L. Heilbron has long emphasized, the Roman Catholic Church was the exception
179. Heilbron, The Sun in the Church: Cathedrals as Solar Observatories (Cambridge, Mass., 1999).
180. M. H. Abrams, "Kant and the Theology of Art," Notre Dame English Journal 13 (1981): 75-106
181. Abrams, "Art-as-Such: The Sociology of Modern Aesthetics," in Doing Things with Texts: Essays in Criticism and Critical Theory (New York, 1989), 135-158, 400-402.
182. Several other essays in this collection recur to that point. Similarly, Martha Woodmansee, The Author, Art, and the Market: Rereading the History of Aesthetics (New York, 1994), chap. 1. The concluding chapter of Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans.
183. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton, N.J., 1951), originally published in 1932, is perhaps the first place where the high importance of aesthetics to eighteenth-century philosophy was emphasized.
184. John H. Zammito, in The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment (Chicago, 1992), emphasizes the central importance of aesthetics in Kant's intellectual development away from mere philosopher of science. Logically, it is by no means necessary for the artist to be autonomous in order that the work of art be autonomous, but under the presuppositions regarding autonomy prevailing in modernity, conflation was the only possible conclusion. Conversely, "the anxiety of influence" could hardly arise before the eighteenth century, i.e., before the autonomy of the artist had become a prized presupposition.
185. Harold Bloom, in The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry, 2nd ed. (New York, 1997), acknowledges that the word influence "in our sense-that of poetic influence... is very late. In English it is not one of Dryden's critical terms, and is never used in our sense by Pope But," Bloom maintains, "the anxiety had long preceded the usage" (27; emphasis in the original). This contention is contradicted by Bloom's own evidence-to which he himself remains impervious, doubtless because of his belief that absence of influence is the true difference between great and second-rate art, wherefore no serious artist could fail to feel such anxiety.
186. Thus, as I pointed out in "Primacy of Science in Modernity" (cit. n. 7, on 59-60, 66, 71-2), and again in "(Re)cognizing Postmodernity" (cit. n. 5, on 162, 168 nn. 22-4), a principal basis for the subordinate cultural rank of technology in modernity, and specifically its subordination to science, was technology's lack of autonomy; more exactly, the nonsensicality of a claim of autonomy for technology: just as "without closure there can be no disciplines," so also could the discipline have no closure, if its purposes were technologic. Consequently, the subject-matter fields staked out as scientific disciplines were circumscribed by a boundary within which lay good, true, pure discipline-directed science and beyond which lay applied science. Conversely, the disdain today of pure, basic, curiosity driven research, and the insistence that research have a technological orientation, is inseparable from the ideological bankruptcy and de facto disintegration of disciplinarity in recent decades.
187. Associated especially with Foucault, an ostensible rejection of autonomy was generally characteristic of postmodernist theory
188. Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?" Ethics 96 (1985): 165-84
189. John McGowan, Postmodernism and Its Critics (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), 2, 4-5, 20-21, 24-25
190. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (New York, 1991), esp. 289
191. Novick, That Noble Dream (cit. n. 2), 543, on Barthes. One need not take such theory seriously in order to take that rejection seriously-as a rejection of that which was recognized to be characteristically modern.
192. This specifically postmodern expansion-cum-restriction of autonomy is aptly expressed by the title of Stanley Fish's Save the World on Your Own Time (New York, 2008).
193. Here "save the world" implies no obligation; it is, rather, permission to do as you damn please on, but only on, your own time.
194. On the loss of workplace autonomy in postmodernity, see Freidson, Professionalism (cit. n. 27)
195. Elliott A. Krause, Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930 to the Present (New Haven, Conn., 1996), 280.
196. The quoted statement is as transcribed by me from the broadcast on WCSP, Washington, D.C., of the prime minister's monthly press conference, May 19, 2009. This statement, as quoted, was not to be found in the official transcript posted at http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page19365 (accessed 20 May 2009).
197. However, that transcript contained a less graphic but more discursive statement by Prime Minister Brown to the same effect: "There has to be transparency, there has to be proper audit, and now I am saying you have to move-like almost every other public organisation has done in the past few decades-from being self-regulated-in other words you make your own rules, you make your own judgements, you make your own discipline-to being independently and statutorily regulated." (With the change in government, that transcript has been removed from the official website of the British Prime Minister's Office. As of November 26, 2011, it appears to be available on the internet only through the DeHaviland "political intelligence" service, at http://www.dehavilland.co.uk/.)
198. Needless to say, if the House of Commons is to be denied self-regulation, no other British public institution can demand it. In this connection, see Thorpe, "Capitalism, Audit, and the Demise of the Humanistic Academy" (cit. n. 46), 113-116.
199. Werner Sombart could ask, "Why is there no socialism in the United States?"-Warum gibt es in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Sozialismus? (Tübingen, 1906). But in fact there was in the Progressive-Era United States lots of support for the sort of socialism to which, underneath, Sombart himself really inclined
200. Friedrich Lenger, Werner Sombart, 1863-1941: Eine Biographie (Munich, 1994).
201. Such quasi-fascistic socialism underlies Croly's Promise of American Life (cit. n. 11) and is flagrant in the opinion of Morris L. Cooke, Anti-labor-union advocate of scientific management he could quote Nietzsche in support of the autonomy of the individual worker: "In the Great State production will be made a part of the responsibility of labor." Cooke, "Who Is Boss in Your Shop?" Ann. Amer. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci. 71 (1917): 167-85
202. see 175, 180.
203. See also Howard Brick, Transcending Capitalism: Visions of a New Society in Modern American Thought (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006).
204. Even Keynes, who did his best to save capitalism from itself, thought that in some important respects "anything would be better than the present system"
205. Roger E. Backhouse and Bradley W. Bateman, "Keynes and Capitalism," History of Political Economy 41 (2009): 645-671, 662.
206. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom [1944]: Text and Documents, ed. Bruce Caldwell (Chicago, 2007), 17, 36, 39.
207. All the American commercial publishers approached on Hayek's behalf refused to undertake an American edition on the grounds that Hayek's thesis was very contrary to public sentiment and that sales would therefore be slight.
208. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1950)
209. on 61, 63. Schumpeter reaffirmed these views in December 1949, addressing the American Economic Association, on which occasion he referred sarcastically to the Mont Pélerin Society as being completely negligible from the point of view of public opinion
210. ibid., 417-418.
211. Indicative is that Rawls (Theory of Justice, cit. n. 41, on 272, 359-61) was ambivalent about regarding capitalism as proceduralist-partly out of ambivalence toward capitalism, and partly because of the limits of the political theorist's conception of proceduralism. Jürgen Kocka, in "Writing the History of Capitalism," Bulletin of the German Historical Institute 47 (2010): 7-24, 10, surveying the scholarly literature on capitalism since the late nineteenth century, noted that, prior to the late twentieth century, the word and the concept always had, to some extent, "critical, polemical, pejorative connotations."
212. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (1944; repr., Boston, 2001), 259-260.
213. Note the past tense in the quotation: Polanyi saw the world situation at that time just as did Hayek and Schumpeter, only he applauded the irresistible tide of socialism. On Ruskin, see Roger B. Stein, John Ruskin and Aesthetic Thought in America, 1840-1900 (Cambridge, 1967)
214. Martin J. Wiener, "Introduction" (2004), in English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (1981; repr., New York, 2004), xiii-xviii
215. Donald Winch, Wealth and Life: Essays on the Intellectual History of Political Economy in Britain, 1848-1914 (New York, 2009).
216. On Durkheim and his French contemporaries, see J. E. S. Hayward, "'Solidarity' and the Reformist Sociology of Alfred Fouillée, I & II," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 22 (1963): 205-22, 303-312
217. Michael C. Behrent, "The Mystical Body of Society: Religion and Association in Nineteenth-Century French Political Thought," J. Hist. Ideas 69 (2008): 219-43.
218. On Germany, see Kocka, "Writing the History of Capitalism" (cit. n. 75)
219. Lenger, Werner Sombart (cit. n. 72)
220. Lukes, Individualism (cit. n. 56), 33-34.
221. "From Each According to His Ability, to Each According to His Need," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=From_each_according_to_his_abi lity,_to_each_according_to_his_need&oldid=451812464 (accessed 24 September 2011). The ideal collective that Marx envisioned was a universally inclusive, classless, stateless world society-a humanity perfected also in being freed from conflicts between less catholic solidarities
222. Arthur E. Bestor Jr., "The Evolution of the Socialist Vocabulary," J. Hist. Ideas 9 (1948): 259-302, 273
223. HWP, s.v. "Solidarität," by Andreas Wildt
224. Wildt, "Solidarity: Its History and Contemporary Definition," in Solidarity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Boston, 1999), 209-220, 214, where Liebknecht and Bernstein are quoted.
225. See also Steinar Stjernø (Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea [New York, 2005]), who, however, admits only socialist and social democratic solidarity.
226. Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals (cit. n. 50), 10-13
227. Stjernø, Solidarity in Europe, 31, 56, 267, 279
228. Wildt, "Solidarität," 1007, 1012
229. Wildt, "Solidarity" (All cit. n. 77), 215
230. quoting, in translation, Kurt Eisner (1908): "The cold, steely word solidarity... provides the whole of society with an iron foundation for the transformation and renewal of all human relations."
231. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment (cit. n. 67), 330.
232. On Habermas as envisaging "a self conscious practice in which solidarity and autonomy can be reconciled,"
233. see Peter Dews, "Editor's Introduction" to Jürgen Habermas, Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews (London, 1992), on 29.
234. See also Jerrold Seigel, "Autonomy and Personality in Durkheim: An Essay on Content and Method," J. Hist. Ideas 48 (1987): 483-507.
235. Randall Collins, "The Durkheimian Movement in France and in World Sociology," in The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith (New York, 2005), 101-35, 108: "Sociology was finding its distinctive turf as the science of social solidarity." Searching this collective volume for solidarity via Google Books shows it to appear on 100 pages, or almost one in four. Editor Jeffrey Alexander opines that "people keep reading Durkheim, and arguing about him, to find out whether the determinateness of social structures must involve the sacrifice of autonomy" (136).
236. Robert H. Wiebe's The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967) may stand as representative, as it is still the standard reference and is by no means the most obviously romantic-declensionist. The quotation is from Keith Tribe (Strategies of Economic Order: German Economic Discourse, 1750-1950 [New York, 2007], on xiii), who was seemingly little aware of how largely he was speaking for the body of scholars.
237. Mill, "On Liberty" (1859), chap. 1, available at http://www.utilitarianism.com/ol/one.html (accessed September 2011).
238. Winch, Wealth and Life (cit. n. 76), 6, 10
239. Atiyah, Rise and Fall (cit. n. 14), 234
240. "It is emphatically not true that any influential body of persons ever believed in laissez-faire as a system" (emphasis in the original). Liberalism's ideal, Atiyah points out, was the "man of principle," who, by definition, acted according to rules of universal applicability and ultimate social beneficence.
241. James T. Kloppenberg's Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1870-1920 (New York, 1986) is an admirable exposition of the new and stronger claims of society on the individual asserted by a dozen systematic thinkers, German, French, British, and American, in the decades before the First World War. Although generally Kloppenberg restricted the word and concept solidarity to the doctrines of Fouillée and Bourgeois, his sources warrant a much wider use.
242. Thus he quotes (289) University of Wisconsin economist Richard T. Ely putting "social solidarity" front and center, most prominently in The Social Law of Service (1896).
243. And had he been willing to cast a wider net he would have quoted Edward Bellamy, Looking Backward, 2000-1887 (1887)
244. where, toward the end of chap. 12, Dr. Leete, seeking to enlighten Mr. West, who has awaked after a century-long sleep, says, "If I were to give you, in one sentence, a key to what may seem the mysteries of our civilization as compared with that of your age, I should say that it is the fact that the solidarity of the race and the brotherhood of man, which to you were but fine phrases, are, to our thinking and feeling, ties as real and as vital as physical fraternity." (The quotation appears on p. 134 of the Houghton Mifflin Riverside Library edition first published in 1917 and made available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/25439/25439-h/25439-h.htm [accessed September 2011].
245. I am indebted to John Burnham for drawing my attention to Bellamy's affirmation of solidarity.) A wide range of turn-of-the-century metaphysical positions, Machian positivism among them, enabled Einstein, lying gravely ill in the winter of 1917/8, to take a step beyond Bellamy and say, "Ich fühle mich so solidarisch mit allem Lebenden, dass es mir einerlei ist, wo der Einzelne anfängt und aufhört"
246. Carson, Kojevnikov, and Trischler, Weimar Culture and Quantum Mechanics (cit. n. 53), 132-133, 237-239.
247. Haskell, "Professionalism versus Capitalism: Tawney, Durkheim, and C.S. Peirce on the Disinterestedness of Professional Communities," in Objectivity Is Not Neutrality (cit. n. 52), 78-114, on
248. Haskell took the scientific and scholarly disciplines as the model, the template, for the professions. To this he was misled partly by his enthusiasm for Kuhn, and partly by sitting and writing in a period no longer able to credit the idea/ideal of disinterestedness. Thus he conflated self-seeking that is confined within the disciplinary reward system with self-seeking that looks beyond disciplinary boundaries. Consequently he was unable to recognize the predominance of service over competitive self-promotion, which differentiates the professions from the knowledge-producing disciplines, and which is the principal basis for the affinity between professionalism and socialism. Otherwise stated, he failed to appreciate the difference, pointed out above (nn. 51 and 68), between the inner-directed disinterestedness in the natural science disciplines, on the one side, and the other-directed disinterestedness of the applied social sciences and the professions, on the other side.
249. Beck, "Vom Verschwinden der Solidarität" (1993), translated as "The Withering Away of Solidarity," in Democracy without Enemies, trans. Mark Ritter (Cambridge, 1998), 32-38.
250. The fact that solidarity appears nowhere except in the title of this essay only augments its suitability to function as a straw in the wind. Daniel T. Rodgers, in Age of Fracture (Cambridge, Mass., 2011), describes the continuing fracture of social solidarities in the United States from the sixties through the eighties.
251. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," Journal of Democracy 6, no. 1 (1995): 65-78
252. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, 2000). The "revival" is Putnam's wishful thinking
253. only the collapse is evident. Widespread hopes for revival are unquestionably a large factor in the meteoric uptake of the nonconcept of "social capital" and the translation of Putnam's book into nine languages. For critique, see Margaret R. Somers, "Beware Trojan Horses Bearing Social Capital: How Privatization Turned Solidarity into a Bowling Team," in The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences, ed. George Steinmetz (Durham, N.C., 2005), 346-411.
254. Solidarity is a key concept for Sandel (Democracy's Discontent, cit. n. 40), even though it is not in his index. He understands it, however, in an early postmodern, now-passé, communitarian sense, denying categorically that Marx's universal solidarity is solidarity at all.
255. David A. Hollinger, in "From Identity to Solidarity," Daedalus 135, no. 4 (2006): 23-31, 23, though he does not clarify the definitional issue, is nonetheless right that "the problem of solidarity is shaping up as the problem of the twenty-first century."
256. Scott Adams, The Dilbert Principle: A Cubicle's-Eye View of Bosses, Meetings, Management Fads and Other Workplace Afflictions (New York, 1996), 2.
257. This was Adams's twelfth book based on the strip; there would be forty-three more by 2009.
258. For critique, see Norman Solomon, The Trouble with Dilbert: How Corporate Culture Gets the Last Laugh (Monroe, Maine, 1997).
259. To date, the only cartoon strip of postmodernity that in any way rivals the success of Dilbert is Garfield. Garfield's theme-ostensive and blatant-is a purely domestic version of Dilbert's theme: the multifarious ways in which the title character, a fat and lazy cat, manifests a malicious lack of solidarity with his owner. The contrast with Peanuts, modernity's most popular cartoon strip, is total.
260. A Hollinger ("Faculty Governance," cit. n. 3) Lays out the ways in which the research university today suffers from that lack of solidarity.
261. Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All Politics (New York, 2010), 96-8.
262. Lynn, "Introduction," Daedalus 92, no. 4, "The Professions" (1963): 649-654.
263. Having, in the spirit of disinterested service, given up his Harvard professorship for one at Federal City College in Washington, D.C., Lynn would face there in the late 1960s attitudes unimaginable anywhere in the early 1960s.
264. International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David Sills and Robert Merton (New York, 1968), s.v. "professions," by Parsons.
265. Virtually identical is the future foreseen by Daniel Bell in The Coming of Postindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (New York, 1973), whose theses go back to the mid-1960s-on which see my discussion in "Primacy of Science in Modernity" (cit. n. 7), 50-51, 107-109.
266. Similarly, Paul Halmos (The Personal Service Society [London, 1970], 25, 117), one of Britain's foremost sociologists, saw professionalism remaking society in yet other, more humanistic, directions.
267. Freidson, "Are Professions Necessary?" in Haskell, Authority of Experts (cit. n. 44), 3-27, on 4.
268. Gerald L. Geison ("Introduction," in Professions and Professional Ideologies in America, ed. Geison [Chapel Hill, N.C., 1983], 3-11 and 111-2, on 7) noted "the current fashion for dismissing professional claims as mere self-serving verbiage-as deliberately deceitful smoke screens behind which professional groups can comfortably pursue their monopolistic goals." A fully developed case for social reform through abolition of the professions is made by Randall Collins (The Credential Society: An Historical Sociology of Education and Stratification [New York, 1979]), who proposed to prohibit an employer's imposing any formal qualification as a condition of employment.
269. Marie R. Haug and Marvin B. Sussman, "Professional Autonomy and the Revolt of the Client," Social Problems 17 (1969): 153-161.
270. The authors appear to lay claim to the phrase. (Note the feature of professionality that the authors conceive to be jeopardized by that revolt.)
271. Julie Stephens, in Anti-disciplinary Protest: Sixties Radicalism and Postmodernism (Cambridge, 1998), rescues the sixties from political failure by stressing hippie and yippie hostility to every form of discipline and arguing that both postmodernism and the antipathetic attitude toward politics and government emerging in the eighties are its authentic heritors.
272. A somewhat similar thesis, without, however, highlighting discipline, is advanced by David Kaiser, How the Hippies Saved Physics: Science, Counterculture, and the Quantum Revival (New York, 2011).
273. Jeremi Suri et al. ("AHR Forum: The International 1968," Amer. Hist. Rev. 114 [2009]: 42-96) proceed from the world revolution perspective, perhaps first strongly emphasized by Immanuel Wallerstein.
274. Terence Halliday, "Introduction: Sociology's Fragile Professionalism," in Sociology and Its Publics: The Forms and Fates of Disciplinary Organization, ed. Halliday and Morris Janowitz (Chicago, 1992), 3-42
275. see 4.
276. Stanley Fish, "Profession Despise Thyself: Fear and Self-Loathing in Literary Studies," Crit. Inq. 10 (1983): 349-64
277. Novick, That Noble Dream (cit. n. 2), 578.
278. Townsend ("Making History," cit. n. 21, on 21) cites disciplinary histories of anthropology, history, literature, political science, and sociology-all structured by crisis. The history of science is, admittedly, something of an exception, and hence especially in need of this exposition.
279. See n. 106 below.
280. Weingart, "Interdisciplinarity: The Paradoxical Discourse," in Practising Interdisciplinarity, ed. Weingart and Nico Stehr (Toronto, 2000), 25-41, 29
281. Allan Megill, "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography," Amer. Hist. Rev. 94 (1989): 627-653, 631.
282. Sclerotic has lost no currency as an epithet attached to disciplinarity
283. Anthony Grafton [qua president of the AHA], History under Attack, Perspectives on History (2011): 5-7, on 5: Critics inside and outside the academy have leveled a rich and seemingly plausible indictment at us We professors are imprisoned in sclerotic disciplines. Some further indications of the breadth of the hostility to disciplinarity are in Paul Forman, "In the Era of the Earmark: The Recent Pejoration of Meritocracy-and of Peer Review," Recent Science Newsletter 2, no. 3 (2001): 1, 10-12.
284. Foucault, Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris, 1975)
285. translated as Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1978). Sheridan says in his translator's note that "in the end Foucault himself suggested Discipline and Punish." Michael C. Behrent, "Accidents Happen: François Ewald, the 'Antirevolutionary' Foucault, and the Intellectual Politics of the French Welfare State," J. Mod. Hist. 82 (2010): 585-634, 599.
286. Jan Goldstein, "Foucault among the Sociologists: The 'Disciplines' and the History of the Professions," Hist. & Theory 23 (1984): 170-192, 176-178.
287. Regarding discipline in French before 1900, see n. 16 above.
288. Ziman, Real Science (cit. n. 2), xi, xii, 11.
289. Muller ("Discontent in the Historical Profession," cit. n. 12, on 13) found that "among the most distressing trends in academic history is the tendency for scholars to publish and publicize their work in contexts where it is unlikely to be exposed to skeptical scrutiny and intense criticism." But that was more than ten years ago; meanwhile it has ceased to be found distressing-and still less a matter to be treated jokingly, as did David Philip Miller, "The 'Sobel Effect': The Amazing Tale of How Multitudes of Popular Writers Pinched All the Best Stories in the History of Science and Became Rich and Famous while Historians Languished in Accustomed Poverty and Obscurity, and How This Transformed the World
290. A Reflection on a Publishing Phenomenon," Metascience 11 (2002): 185-200. Today we all want to go that way. So, e.g., Shapin, "Hyperprofessionalism" (cit. n. 12), which in the six years since publication has received numerous affirmative citations by leading historians.
291. Ziman, "Science Is Social," The Listener, August 18, 1960, as cited by Ziman, Public Knowledge: An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science (New York, 1968), x. Between this volume and Real Science (cit. n. 2), Ziman published half a dozen others
292. John Enderby, "John Michael Ziman," Phys. Today 58 (November 2005): 74
293. Michael Berry and John F. Nye, "John Michael Ziman: 16 May 1925-2 January 2005," Biogr. Mem. Fellows Royal Soc. 52 (2006): 479-491.
294. I emphasized the inescapability of postmodernity in "Assailing the Seasons," Science 276 (1997): 750-753
295. review of P. R. Gross, N. Levitt, and M. W. Lewis, eds., The Flight from Science and Reason.
296. SSR, 24. The text remained unaltered here in the subsequent editions of 1970 and 1996. It is somewhat unfair to Kuhn to apply, as is often done, his more depreciative characterization-"hack work" (30)-to normal science generally. He applied that term only to such work as could "be relegated to engineers and technicians." However, his poorly chosen examples of work that could be so relegated reveal the same bias.
297. "The new orthodoxy" is Terry Shinn's apt phrase
298. Shinn and Bernward Joerges, "The Transverse Science and Technology Culture: Dynamics and Roles of Research-Technology," Soc. Sci. Inform. 41 (2002): 207-251, 237-238
299. Shinn and Pascal Ragouet, Controverses sur la science: Pour une sociologie transversaliste de l'activité scientifique (Paris, 2005), 130-134.
300. Andrew Pickering is the most prominent among those giving prominence to antidisciplinarity
301. Pickering, "Anti-discipline, or Narratives of Illusion," in Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, ed. E. Messer-Davidow, D. R. Shumway, and D. J. Sylvan (Charlottesville, Va., 1993), 103-22
302. Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science (Chicago, 1995), 214-217, 224 (a section titled "Antidisciplinarity: A New Synthesis")
303. Pickering, "Culture: Science Studies and Technoscience," in The Sage Handbook of Cultural Analysis, ed. Tony Bennett and John Frow (London, 2008), 291-310, 294.
304. If Latour was not very explicit about this, Pickering (Mangle of Practice, 217) was: "I think that antidisciplinarity is what is being recommended in Callon and Latour's frequent attacks on 'sociology' and the 'social sciences.'" No explicit notice of this programmatic antidisciplinarity is taken by John Zammito in A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour (Chicago, 2004).
305. Perhaps he finds it too horrifying: he gives, in discussing normal science, a categorical affirmation of disciplinarity as "the soundest vehicle for cultural creativity to which humans have attained" (295 n. 43).
306. Shinn, "The Triple Helix and New Production of Knowledge: Prepackaged Thinking on Science and Technology," Soc. Stud. Sci. 32 (2002): 599-614, 604
307. see also Shinn's publications cited in the previous note. Shinn, drawing attention to the antisociological character of the new orthodoxy, declines to admit dedifferentiation thinkable as a social reality, regarding it rather as a characteristic conceptual pathology of contemporary sociology. I have offered an appreciation of Shinn's endeavors to rescue disciplinarity in postmodernity in a foreword to Shinn, Research-Technology and Cultural Change: Instrumentation, Genericity, Transversality (Oxford, 2008), vii-xiii.
308. Early on, Gieryn ("Distancing Science from Religion," cit. n. 28, on 588) underscored "the gulf that separates constructivism from the postulate of institutional differentiation," but, there avowing his conversion to constructivism, he took no notice of the skewness of that label from a sociologic perspective.
309. Gary A. Abraham, "Misunderstanding the Merton Thesis: A Boundary Dispute between History and Sociology," Isis 74 (1983): 368-387, 383, stating positively, affirmatively, sociology's concept of social institutions.
310. Regarding postmodernity's "radically unsociological sociology," Barry Barnes ("Thomas Kuhn and the Problem of Social Order in Science," in Thomas Kuhn, ed. Thomas Nickles [New York, 2003], 122-41, on 134-5) observed that since the late 1980s-"the reception of the work of Bruno Latour will serve as mark and symbol"-sociologists have "looked to fantasies of individual agency," for "anything that detracts from an imagined individual autonomy is found embarrassing." My essay "From the Social to the Moral to the Spiritual: The Postmodern Exaltation of the History of Science," in Positioning the History of Science [Festschrift for S. S. Schweber], Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 248, ed. Jürgen Renn and Kostas Gavroglu (New York, 2007), 49-55, offers bibliometric evidence of our flight from the social.
311. Daston, "Science Studies" (cit. n. 31), 808, 811.
312. Peter Dear and Sheila Jasanoff, in "Dismantling Boundaries in Science and Technology Studies," Isis 101 (2010): 759-774, take Daston to task for disrespecting STS. Nonetheless, they are right in step with her affirmation of the vitality of disciplinarity-while, postmodernly yet impossibly, attributing that vitality to the dismantling of boundaries.
313. Heilbron, lecture (cit. n. 13), 189, quoting Sarton's inaugural lecture as professor of the history of science at Harvard.
314. Kathryn M. Olesko, ed., "Focus Section: History of Science and Historical Novels," Isis 98 (2007): 755-795.
315. See also nn. 36, 47, 100 above. Cf. Horace Engdahl, permanent secretary of the Swedish Academy, the body that awards the Nobel Prize for literature, as quoted by Christopher Brown-Humes in "The Nobel Century," Financial Times, September 29-30, 2001, Weekend sec., on 1: "The borderline between the literature of fact and the literature of fiction will gradually weaken."
316. The literature is extensive. I can only cite a few examples here (more will be found in notes below): Eric H. Ash, ed., Expertise and the Early Modern State, vol. 25 of Osiris (2010)
317. Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton, N.J., 1996)
318. Maurice Crosland, Science under Control: The French Academy of Sciences, 1795-1914 (Cambridge, 2002)
319. Roy Porter, ed., The Cambridge History of Science, vol. 4, The Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 2003)
320. Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002)
321. Stuart McCook, States of Nature: Science, Agriculture, and Environment in the Spanish Caribbean, 1760-1940 (Austin, Tex., 2002)
322. Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War II (Cambridge, 1998).
323. I do not mean that works on science in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union have adopted the term or concept of totalitarianism to explain the problem of science and the state. Actually, most of them have rejected it. But still the two regimes are often paired together in teaching and research on science and the state, and for good reason. The publications on these examples are legion: e.g., Monika Renneberg and Mark Walker, eds., Science, Technology, and National Socialism (New York, 2003)
324. Walker M, Nazi Science: Myth, Truth, and the German Atomic Bomb (New York, 2001)
325. Paul Josephson, Totalitarian Science and Technology, 2nd ed. (Amherst, Mass., 2005)
326. Loren Graham, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History (New York, 1993)
327. Robert Proctor, Racial Hygiene (Cambridge, 1988)
328. Nikolai L. Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, N.J., 1996).
329. E.g., Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large Scale Research (Stanford, Calif., 1992)
330. Caroll Pursell, The Military-Industrial Complex (New York, 1972)
331. Walter A. McDougall,... The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York, 1985)
332. Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York, 1993).
333. In a different way, the new literature on Cold War science and on social science in twentieth-century America has also deepened our understanding of relationships between science, the state, and citizenship. See, e.g., the "Focus" section "New Perspectives on Science and the Cold War," Isis 101 (2010): 362-411
334. Sarah Igo, The Averaged American: Surveys, Citizens, and the Making of a Mass Public (Cambridge, 2007)
335. S. M. Amadae, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice Liberalism (Chicago, 2003).
336. E.g., James Fleming, Roger Launius, and David Devorkin, eds., Globalizing Polar Science: Reconsidering the International Polar and Geophysical Years (New York, 2010)
337. Elizabeth Crawford, Nationalism and Internationalism in Science, 1880-1939: Four Studies of the Nobel Population (New York, 2002)
338. Nikolai Krementsov, International Science between the World Wars: The Case of Genetics (London, 2005).
339. See also the Osiris volumes National Identity: The Role of Science and Technology, vol. 24 (2009)
340. Intelligentsia Science, vol. 23 (2008)
341. Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs, vol. 21 (2006).
342. I have generalized and simplified the existing literature on science and the state, though I hope I have not been unfair. I am certainly not alone in making this assessment of the literature. For a similar opinion, see, e.g., the introduction to a recent Osiris volume: Carol E. Harrison and Ann Johnson, eds., "Science and National Identity," Osiris 24 (2009): 1-14, on 8-9.
343. E.g., James Bartholomew, The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition (New Haven, Conn., 1989)
344. Hiromi Mizuno, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan (Stanford, Calif., 2008)
345. Morris Low, Science and the Building of a New Japan (New York, 2005)
346. Stuart Leslie and Dong-Won Kim, "Winning Markets or Winning Nobel Prizes: KAIST and the Challenges of Late Industrialization," Osiris 13 (1998): 154-85
347. Jahnavi Phalkey, "Science, State-Formation and Development: The Organization of Nuclear Research in India, 1938-1959" (PhD diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006)
348. Gyan Prakash, Another Reason: Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton, N.J., 1999). There are many studies of nuclear research and South Asian states, and the number is growing fast. A very recent example is Robert S. Anderson's Nucleus and Nation: Scientists, International Networks, and Power in India (Chicago, 2010), which is a conventional biographic and institutional history.
349. See also Julia Rodriguez, Civilizing Argentina: Science, Medicine, and the Modern State (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006)
350. Zuoyue Wang, "Science and the State in Modern China," Isis 98 (2007): 558-70;
351. Cong Cao, China's Scientific Elite (London, 2004)
352. H. Lyman Miller, Science and Dissent in Post-Mao China: The Politics of Knowledge (Seattle, 1996)
353. Laurence Schneider, Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China (Lanham, Md., 2005)
354. Susan Greenhalgh, Just One Child: Science and Policy in Deng's China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2008).
355. On the typology and evolution of modern states, we still often rely on works by historical sociologists, such as Perry Anderson, Michael Mann, Charles Tilly, and Theda Skocpol. For an introduction,
356. see John A. Hall and G. John Ikenberry, The State (Minneapolis, 1989)
357. The problem with this body of work is that it often leaves out certain vital components of the state, such as micropolitics, everyday life, social interactions, and cultural practice.
358. Nils Roll-Hansen, The Lysenko Effect: The Politics of Science (Amherst, Mass., 2004).
359. Nevertheless, it will become clear that my research into Mao's China has benefited from certain recent literature on Soviet history; e.g., Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995)
360. Michael Gordon, "Was There Ever a 'Stalinist Science'?" Kritika 9 (2008): 625-39
361. John Connelly, "Totalitarianism: Defunct Theory, Useful Word," Kritika 11 (2010): 819-35
362. Susan Gross Solomon, "Circulation of Knowledge and the Russian Locale," Kritika 5 (2008): 9-26
363. Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, N.Y., 2005).
364. I have also, in a different way, benefited from Loren Graham's What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from the Russian Experience? (Stanford, Calif., 1998).
365. E.g., David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in NineteenthCentury India (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1993)
366. Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, N.C., 2006)
367. Londa Schiebinger and Claudia Swain, Colonial Botany: Science, Commerce, and Politics in the Early Modern World (Philadelphia, 2004).
368. One of the most noted examples is the "public understanding of science" movement in Britain starting in the 1980s. It did not originate from the government, but the movement quickly involved a wide range of actors and venues, including state-owned or -sponsored institutions; see the Royal Society's report "The Public Understanding of Science," at http://royalsociety.org/Public-Understanding-of-Science/ (accessed 28 September 2011)
369. Wellcome Trust, "Science and the Public: A Review of Science Communication and Public Attitudes to Science in Britain," at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/corporatesite/@msh_peda/docume nts/web_document/wtd003419.pdf (accessed 5 October 2011).
370. See also the journals Science and Public Policy and Public Understanding of Science.
371. Cf. David Dickson, "Science and Its Public: The Need for a 'Third Way,'" Soc. Stud. Sci. 30 (2000): 917-23
372. Jane Gregory and Steve Miller, Science in Public: Communication, Culture, and Credibility (New York, 2000).
373. James Andrews, Science for the Masses: The Bolshevik State, Public Science, and the Popular Imagination in Soviet Russia, 1917-1934 (College Station, Tex., 2003)
374. Mizuno H, Science for the Empire (cit. n. 6).
375. It should be noted that the state was not always at the center of such enterprises. There were organizations in civil society that took it upon themselves to promote science, modernity, and citizenship as they defined them. Their ideas could resonate, complement, or compete with those of the state. In Republican China, scientists and intellectuals who were eager to promote science and modernize China and its citizens often complained about too much state and too little state at the same time; Zuoyue Wang, "Saving China through Science: The Science Society of China, Scientific Nationalism, and Civil Society in Republican China," Osiris 17 (2002): 291-322.
376. To be sure, the state does not exist other than through people and institutions, but the state cannot be reduced to its components, either. It would be like taking a car apart and calling the pile of parts on the ground a car.
377. Sheila Jasanoff, ed., States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order (London, 2004), uses the language of coproduction to capture this relationship. I should clarify that I am not saying that science and the state always work together and reinforce each other. In fact, there are always tensions, contestations, and conflicts. It is, however, useful to turn away from the old perspective of seeing the state as an outside influence-be it positive or negative-on science.
378. Robert Kohler, All Creatures: Naturalists, Collectors, and Biodiversity, 1850-1950 (Princeton, N.J., 2006)
379. Philip Pauly, Biologists and the Promise of American Life (Princeton, N.J., 2000)
380. William Goetzmann, Exploration and Empire: The Explorer and the Scientist in the Winning of the American West (New York, 1966)
381. Thomas Manning, Government in Science: The U.S. Geological Survey, 1867-1894 (Lexington, Ky., 1967).
382. Historians of scientific imperialism have shown similar instances of the coproduction of science and empire; Roy McLeod, ed., Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise, Osiris 15 (2000)
383. Fati Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter (Cambridge, 2004).
384. See also Suman Seth's historiographic essay "Putting Knowledge in Its Place: Science, Colonialism and the Postcolonial," Postcolon. Stud. 12 (2009): 373-88.
385. Tong Lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900-1949 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2011)
386. Grace Shen, Unearthing the Nation: Modern Geology and Nationalism in Republican China, 1911-1949 (Chicago, forthcoming)
387. Thomas Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Classification in Modern China (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2010)
388. Fa-ti Fan, "How Did the Chinese Become Native? Science and the Search for National Origins in the May Fourth Era," in Beyond the May Fourth Paradigm: In Search of Chinese Modernity, ed. Kai-wing Chow et al. (Lanham, Md., 2008), 183-208
389. Fan F.-t, "Nature and Nation in Chinese Political Thought: The National Essence Circle in Early Twentieth-Century China," in The Moral Authority of Nature, ed. Lorraine Daston and Fernando Vidal (Chicago, 2004), 409-37
390. Yuehtseng Juliette Chung, Struggle for National Survival in Sino-Japanese Context (London, 2002)
391. Sean Hsiang-lin Lei, "When Chinese Medicine Encountered the State, 1910-1949" (PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 1999).
392. Following the conventional political typology, they have been described, with varying degrees of accuracy, as the imperial dynastic state, the parliamentary republic, the constitutional monarchy, the warlord governments, the federalist state, the Leninist state, the Confucian-fascist state, the Stalinist state, the Maoist state, and so on. See, e.g., John Fitzgerald, Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution (Stanford, Calif., 1998)
393. Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago, 1997)
394. Frederick Wakeman, "A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism," China Quart. 150 (1997): 395-432.
395. For an interesting forum on the Chinese state, see the special issue "The Nature of the Chinese State," Modern China 34 (2008).
396. E.g., John Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif., 1991).
397. E.g., Laurence Schneider, Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China (Lanham, Md., 2005)
398. Cao Cong, China's Scientific Elite (London, 2004).
399. The "Focus" section "Science and Modern China" in Isis 98 (2007): 517-86 may serve as an introduction to the historiography of science in twentieth-century China.
400. Li Shanbang, Zhongguo dizhen [Earthquakes in China] (Beijing, 1981).
401. Barry Raleigh et al. (the Haicheng Earthquake Study Delegation), "Prediction of the Haicheng Earthquake," Eos 58 (1977): 236-72, on 237.
402. My discussion of earthquake monitoring and defense in China is based on my ongoing research on the topic. For a more detailed treatment, please see my article " Collective Monitoring, Collective Defense': Science, Earthquakes, and Politics in Communist China," Sci. Context 25 (2012): 127-54.
403. Here I simply use the case study to illustrate my general argument about the problem of science and the state.
404. The quotation about natural science is from Mao Zedong, Mao zhuxi yulu [Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung] (Tianjing, 1966), 175.
405. Stuart Schram, The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung (Cambridge, 1989)
406. Maurice Meisner, Marxism, Maoism, and Utopianism (Madison, Wisc., 1982).
407. Meisner's Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic (New York, 1999) provides a good overview of the Mao period.
408. See also Sigrid Schmalzer, "Labor Created Humanity: Cultural Revolution Science on Its Own Terms," in Cultural Revolution as History, ed. Joseph Esherick, Paul Pickowicz, and Andrew Walder (Stanford, Calif., 1977), 185-210.
409. Danian Hu, China and Albert Einstein: The Reception of the Physicist and His Theory in China, 1917-1979 (Cambridge, 2005)
410. Hu D, "The Reception of Relativity in China," Isis 98 (2007): 539-57.
411. This was a powerful idea and profoundly influenced the Science for the People group in Boston in the early 1970s. See Dan Connell and Dan Gover, China: Science Walks on Two Legs (New York, 1974)
412. Sigrid Schmalzer, "On the Appropriate Use of Rose-Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist China," Isis 98 (2007): 571-83.
413. For non-Chinese accounts, see John Fogarty, A Barefoot Doctor's Manual: The American Translation of the Official Chinese Paramedical Manual (Philadelphia, 1977)
414. Fang Xiaoping, "From Union Clinics to Barefoot Doctors: Village Healers, Medical Pluralism and State Medicine in a Chinese Village," Journal of Modern Chinese History 2 (2008): 221-37.
415. Wang Zheng, "State Feminism?' Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China," Feminist Stud. 31 (2005): 519-51.
416. On the issue of gender in modern China, with a helpful discussion on women and gender in the Mao era, see Gail Hershatter, Women in China's Long Twentieth Century (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2007).
417. On representations of women in propaganda posters during the Mao era, see Tina Mai Chen, "Female Icons, Feminist Iconography? Socialist Rhetoric and Women's Agency in 1950s China," Gend. & Hist. 15 (2003): 268-95.
418. I do not have space here to discuss the genre(s) of Cultural Revolution posters. See, e.g., Lincoln Cushing and Ann Tompkins, Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (San Francisco, 2007)
419. Stefan Landsberger and Marien van der Heijiden, Chinese Posters (London, 2009)
420. Melissa Chiu, Art and China's Revolution (New Haven, Conn., 2008).
421. These and other, similar methods are discussed in middle-school textbooks on earthquake monitoring; e.g., Shaonian dizhen huodong bianxie zu [Editorial team of Activities of Monitoring Earthquakes for Young People, ed.],
422. Shaonian dizhen cebao huodong [Activities of monitoring earthquakes for young people] (Shanghai, 1978).
423. Beijing shi Yanqin xian gewei hui, Yanqing xian Zhangshanying diqu dizhen lianhe diaocha zu [United Investigative Group, Yanqing County, Zhanghanying, the Revolutionary Committee of Yanqing County, Beijing], "Tu didian fangfa jieshao" [Introducing the telluric method], Dizhen zhanxian 4 (1969): 29-31.
424. Dizhen changshi [Common sense about earthquakes] (Beijing, 1975), unpaginated.
425. E.g., Dizhen wenda bianxiezu [Editorial team of Q&A's about Earthquakes], Dizhen wenda [Q&A's about earthquakes] (Beijing, 1977)
426. Guo Qinhua, Zhenqian qiguan [Unusual phenomena before earthquakes] (Beijing, 1982)
427. Shaanxi sheng geweihui dizhenju bian [Seismological Bureau of the Revolutionary Committee of Shaanxi Province], Dizhen yuce yufang zhishi [Knowledge about predicting and defending against earthquakes] (Xian, 1977).
428. Jiang Jinchang, Qiyi de benling: Qiantan dongwu yuzhi dizhen [Amazing abilities: Introduction to (the topic of) animals predicting earthquakes] (Beijing, 1980)
429. Jiang J. and Chen Deyu, Dizhen shengwuxue gailun [General treatise on seismological biology] (Beijing, 1993).
430. See also Helmut Tributsch, When the Snakes Awake: Animals and Earthquake Prediction (Cambridge, 1982).
431. Zhongguo Kexueyuan Shengwu Wuli Yanjiusuo Dizhenzu [Seismology Group, Institute of Physical Biology, Chinese Academy of Sciences], Dongwu yu dizhen [Animals and earthquakes] (Beijing, 1977), 66-7.
432. On lay expertise, see, e.g., Steven Epstein, "The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials," Sci. Tech. Hum. Val. 20 (1995): 408
433. The phrase is now widely used in studies on science, medicine, law, and the public. Harry Collins and Robert Evans's Controversial book Rethinking Expertise (Chicago, 2007) sounds the alarm on the possibility of too much public participation in science and defends science against unqualified interventions by charting a "periodic table of expertises."
434. The dynamic between the state and what the state regarded as folk knowledge was complex. The attempt of a Chinese state to control, contain, and appropriate folk knowledge was not new. In his study of the "popular hysteria" over the so-called soulstealers-evildoers who clipped people's hair and stole their souls-of eighteenth-century China, Philip Kuhn discusses how the emperor and the provincial bureaucrats approached the social disturbance. Kuhn's case study is relevant here because he contrasts the different attitudes of the emperor and the officials toward the popular fear of soulstealers. The emperor took it seriously and urged the officials to crush the soulstealers. In contrast, the officials preferred a less aggressive approach and were able to resist the emperor's demands by dragging their feet. Kuhn notes that the proud tradition of civil bureaucracy left enough room for the officials to balance, deflect, or even resist the emperor's demands. And he asserts that this tradition and its ability to check and balance the power of the court or its equivalent was lost in twentiethcentury China. Kuhn's conclusion reminds us that the state was not a coherent whole. It was a complex of different-sometimes competing, contending, or contradictory-ideas, traditions, forces, institutions, and actors. See Kuhn P, Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768 (Cambridge, 1990).
435. See also Kenneth Pomeranz, "Ritual Imitation and Political Identity in North China: The Late Imperial Legacy and the Chinese National State Revisited," Twentieth Century China 23 (1997): 1-30.
436. Chang-tai Hung, "The Anti-Unity Sect Campaign and Mass Mobilization in the Early People's Republic of China," China Quart. 202 (2010): 400-20
437. Steve A. Smith, "Local Cadres Confront the Supernatural: The Politics of Holy Water (Shenshui) in the PRC, 1949-1966," China Quart. 188 (2006): 999-1022
438. Smith SA, "Talking Toads and Chinless Ghosts: The Politics of 'Superstitious' Rumors in the People's Republic of China, 1961-1965," Amer. Hist. Rev. 111 (2006): 404-27.
439. Jacob Eyferth, in Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots: The Social History of a Community of Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000 (Cambridge, 2009), discusses how the Chinese communist state similarly tried to claim and utilize the traditional skill of papermaking in a rural community.
440. In his acclaimed book Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., 1998),
441. James C. Scott argues that the combination of an administrative ordering of nature and society, high modernism, an authoritarian state, and a weak civil society led to many disasters in the twentieth century. He is probably right, though his categories- state, civil society, etc.-are conventional and his argument is not strikingly new. (His examples are fascinating, though.) However, an auxiliary argument of his-about the power of practical knowledge or what he calls metis-raises interesting issues when we think of mass science in Mao's China. Maoist ideology pursued an unusual vision of modernity, and mass science drew heavily on the lore of practical knowledge. Unfortunately, Scott does not say much about how the state might have tried to appropriate this kind of knowledge. He simply calls attention to metis as an alternative and crucial body of knowledge.
442. On the authority of a friend of mine from the Hubei village. The interview took place in Beijing in 2007.
443. Zhongguo Kexueyuan Shengwu Wuli Yanjiusuo Dizhenzu, Dongwu yu dizhen (cit. n. 34), 72; translation mine.
444. Jiang Fan, Haicheng dizhen [Haicheng earthquake] (Beijing, 1978), 89.
445. Mass observation is not always led or imposed by the state. A project of mass observation can be in a complex relationship to the state. The mass observation movement in Britain that began in the 1930s provides an interesting example. The movement was conceived and organized by a group of left-leaning intellectuals. They recruited hundreds of untrained observers to record what they saw and heard in everyday life, which naturally means that they observed and recorded what their neighbors, colleagues, people they encountered on the street, etc., did and expressed. The assumption was that with enough information, an accurate picture of the everyday life and mood of the people would emerge. The results often raised questions about the picture the British government wanted to present to the people about itself and about the state of affairs. In this sense, by recruiting public participation, the mass observation movement challenged the image making of the state. See Nick Hubble, Mass Observation and Everyday Life: Culture, History, Theory (Basingstoke, 2010).
446. A somewhat comparable example from China is the "One Day in China" project. Led by the renowned writer Mao Dun, a group of leftist intellectuals called for submissions from ordinary people of their activities, thoughts, and observations during a single specific day, May 21, 1936. Their goal was to compile a book that would "reveal the entire face of China during one day." The editors hailed this project as a successful "general mobilization of minds." The final product reflected a leftist view of the masses, everyday life, and social realism. It was a view very different from that of the conservative Guomindang government. Parts of the book have been translated and reorganized in Sherman Cochran's One Day in China: May 21, 1936 (New Haven, Conn., 1985).
447. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals's Mao's Last Revolution (Cambridge, 2006) provides a detailed chronicle of the Cultural Revolution.
448. For a recent discussion on "popular science" and related concepts, see the "Focus" section "Historicizing 'Popular Science,'" Isis 100 (2009): 310-68.
449. Here it might be helpful to mention James Andrews's Science for the Masses (cit. n. 12), which relies on the notions of "public science" and "the popularization of science." It focuses on the role of print culture and public discourse in science popularization. This focus has to do with the author's approach and perspective, but it also has to do with the historical fact that even the Soviet Union did not go as far as Mao's China in pursuing the kind of mass science discussed in this article. On communist China,
450. see Sigrid Schmalzer, The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China (Chicago, 2008).
451. Alex Wright, "Managing Scientific Inquiry in a Laboratory the Size of the Web," New York Times, December 28, 2010, D3
452. Timothy Ferris, Seeing in the Dark: How Amateur Astronomers Are Discovering the Wonders of the Universe (New York, 2003).
453. Operation Moonwatch, however, has to be understood within the Cold War context; see W. Patrick McCray, Keep Watching the Skies! The Story of Operation Moonwatch and the Dawn of the Space Age (Princeton, N.J., 2003).
454. E.g., Mark V. Barrow, A Passion for Birds: American Ornithology after Audubon (Princeton, N.J., 1998), chap. 7.
455. The literature on this topic is growing fast; e.g., Alan Irwin, Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise, and Sustainable Development (London, 1995)
456. Melissa Leach, Ian Scoones, and Brian Wynne, eds., Science and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement (London, 2005)
457. Joseph Wachelder, "Democratizing Science: Various Routes and Visions of Dutch Science Shops," Sci. Tech. Hum. Val. 28 (2003): 244-73
458. Wiebe Bijker, Roland Bal, and Ruud Hendriks, The Paradox of Scientific Authority: The Role of Scientific Advice in Democracies (Cambridge, 2009). Generally speaking, historians of science have lagged seriously behind science studies scholars in thinking about issues concerning science, the state, and citizens.
459. F. Charvolin, A. Micoud, and L. Nyhart, eds., Des sciences citoyennes? La question de l'amateur dans les sciences naturalistes (La Tour d'Aigues, 2007), includes several excellent essays by historians of science.
460. It has been called "revolutionary citizenship," which befits the Maoist idea of perpetual revolution; see, e.g., Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State (Lanham, Md., 2006).
461. See, e.g., Adriana Petryna, Life Exposed: Biological Citizens after Chernobyl (Princeton, N.J., 2002)
462. Aihwa Ong and Stephen Collier, eds., Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Hoboken, N.J., 2004), esp.
463. Nikolas Rose and Carlos Novas, "Biological Citizenship," 439-63. But of course these ideas are all indebted to Michel Foucault's conception of biopolitics.
464. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago, 1991).
465. For a popular introduction to the concept of governmentality, see Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1999).
466. Prakash G. (Another Reason, cit. n. 6) uses the concept of governmentality extensively.
467. Scott JC, Seeing Like a State (cit. n. 39).
468. See also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1991), chap. 10
469. Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation (Honolulu, 1997).
470. Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2001)
471. Judith Shapiro, Mao's War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (New York, 2001), chap. 4.
472. Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of Thermal Nuclear War (Cambridge, 2005), 98-103
473. Tracy Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, N.C., 2007)
474. Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home (Princeton, N.J., 2000)
475. Guy Oakes, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York, 1995).
476. See also Matthew Grant, After the Bomb: Civil Defense and Nuclear War in Britain, 1945-68 (Basing-stoke, 2010).
477. There are possible pitfalls in "bringing the state back in"-e.g., squeezing the history of science into the tunnel-visioned perspective of national history, recycling the notions of national styles (without first problematizing the nation-state), returning to the history of political institutions with science mixed in, and reducing science to the terms of the state. In addition, there is also a particular risk in calling attention to the state in discussing China, as historians have already put too much emphasis on the state in explaining Chinese history (whether talking about the imperial bureaucratic state or the communist authoritarian state). For a classic example, see Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power (New Haven, Conn., 1957).
478. None of these pitfalls should prevent us from taking seriously the problem of science and the state, as long as we do not see history through the lens of the state or see it as a historical actor with coherent and autonomous subjectivity; Fa-ti Fan, "Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China," Isis 98 (2007): 524-38
479. Fan F.-t., "National Narrative and the Historiography of Chinese Science," Gujin lunheng 18 (2008): 199-210.
480. See Zuoyue Wang's illuminating essay "Transnational Science during the Cold War: The Case of Chinese/American Scientists," Isis 101 (2010): 367-77.
481. I do not mean to say that we should embrace the system as it is. James C. Scott, in The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven, Conn., 2009),
482. offers a case study and some reflections on this issue. But see also Sanjay Subrahmanyam's critical review of the book in London Review of Books, December 2, 2010, 25-6.
483. It is very encouraging that many recent Osiris volumes have tackled these big issues: vol. 25 (cit. n. 1); vols. 24, 23, and 21 (cit. n. 4); vol. 20 (2005),
484. Politics and Science in Wartime: Comparative International Perspectives on the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute; and vol. 17 (2002), Science and Civil Society.
485. On East Asia, see, e.g., the special issue "Public Participation in Science and Technology, East Asian STS 1, no. 1 (2007).