From causal models to counterfactual structures

Review of Symbolic Logic

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 305-322

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878339479     PISSN: 17550203     EISSN: 17550211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1755020312000305     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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