Using earnings conference calls to identify analysts with superior private information

Review of Accounting Studies

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 386-413

  Mayew, William J ^a   Sharp, Nathan Y ^b   Venkatachalam, Mohan ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Conference calls; Financial analysts; Forecast accuracy; Forecast timeliness; Private information benefits; Regulation FD

Indexed keywords

EID: 84878106500     PISSN: 13806653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11142-012-9210-y     Document Type: Article

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