Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian Epistemology

A Companion to Relativism

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 266-285

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Adam's adversary, "Eve" acquiring her belief about the age of the earth from studying relevant areas of science at school; Distinctive problem, raised by epistemology of disagreement relevant to discussion of epistemic relativism; Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability and Wittgensteinian epistemology; Epistemology of disagreement disputes of the sort that concern us; From epistemology of disagreement to epistemic relativism; Specifically epistemic form of relativism; Wittgenstein's argument for hinge propositions entailing epistemic incommensurability thesis; Wittgenstein's writings on epistemology; Wittgensteinian epistemology and epistemic relativism; Wittgensteinian epistemology reconsidered

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876876150     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781444392494.ch14     Document Type: Chapter

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