Defusing epistemic relativism

Synthese

Volumn 166, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 397-412

  Pritchard, Duncan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Disagreement; Epistemology; Relativism

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549092758     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9278-2     Document Type: Article

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