Beyond Consequentialism

Beyond Consequentialism

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-288

  Hurley, Paul ^a  

^a CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Consequentialism; Good Action; Impartiality; Impersonal Conception; Morality; Right Action; State Of Affairs

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876392845     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559305.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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