Agent-centered restrictions: Clearing the air of paradox

Ethics

Volumn 108, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 120-146

  Hurley, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0039415146     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233790     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. Thus, Stephen Darwall can accurately report "that agent-centered restrictions have the support of common sense is generally not in dispute. If there is a burden to be carried at the level of considered judgments about specific cases it certainly belongs to the consequentialist" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," Philosophical Studies 69 [1986]: 291-319, p. 299). Shelly Kagan (The Limits of Morality [Oxford: Clarendon, 1989], chap. 1) and Samuel Scheffler (The Rejection of Consequentialism [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], p. 243) are critics of restrictions who readily make such a concession. There is some disagreement as to what characterization of such restrictions as "agent-centered" involves, but it will be sufficient for our purposes to understand the appeal to agent-centered restrictions fairly broadly - simply as an appeal to moral constraints upon acting to bring about maximum impersonal value.
2. Thus, Stephen Darwall can accurately report "that agent-centered restrictions have the support of common sense is generally not in dispute. If there is a burden to be carried at the level of considered judgments about specific cases it certainly belongs to the consequentialist" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," Philosophical Studies 69 [1986]: 291-319, p. 299). Shelly Kagan (The Limits of Morality [Oxford: Clarendon, 1989], chap. 1) and Samuel Scheffler (The Rejection of Consequentialism [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], p. 243) are critics of restrictions who readily make such a concession. There is some disagreement as to what characterization of such restrictions as "agent-centered" involves, but it will be sufficient for our purposes to understand the appeal to agent-centered restrictions fairly broadly - simply as an appeal to moral constraints upon acting to bring about maximum impersonal value.
3. Thus, Stephen Darwall can accurately report "that agent-centered restrictions have the support of common sense is generally not in dispute. If there is a burden to be carried at the level of considered judgments about specific cases it certainly belongs to the consequentialist" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," Philosophical Studies 69 [1986]: 291-319, p. 299). Shelly Kagan (The Limits of Morality [Oxford: Clarendon, 1989], chap. 1) and Samuel Scheffler (The Rejection of Consequentialism [Oxford: Clarendon, 1982], p. 243) are critics of restrictions who readily make such a concession. There is some disagreement as to what characterization of such restrictions as "agent-centered" involves, but it will be sufficient for our purposes to understand the appeal to agent-centered restrictions fairly broadly - simply as an appeal to moral constraints upon acting to bring about maximum impersonal value.
4. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 103-4.
5. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 165; see also p. 178. Similarly, Darwall concedes that despite the intuitive appeal of restrictions, the burden of proof rests with their defenders to show how "any restriction on what a person may do to promote the best state of affairs [can] possibly be justified" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," p. 291).
6. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 165; see also p. 178. Similarly, Darwall concedes that despite the intuitive appeal of restrictions, the burden of proof rests with their defenders to show how "any restriction on what a person may do to promote the best state of affairs [can] possibly be justified" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," p. 291).
7. T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp. 103-28, p. 103. It is this pressure that accounts for Christine Korsgaard's characterization of twentieth-century ethics as a "struggle to escape from utilitarianism" ("The Reasons We Can Share," Social Philosophy and Public Policy 10 [1993]: 24-51, p. 24).
8. T. M. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. A. Sen and B. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) pp. 103-28, p. 103. It is this pressure that accounts for Christine Korsgaard's characterization of twentieth-century ethics as a "struggle to escape from utilitarianism" ("The Reasons We Can Share," Social Philosophy and Public Policy 10 [1993]: 24-51, p. 24).
9. Most notably, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. chap. 4; and Kagan, pp. 24 ff. David Cummisky advocates a version of this argument in his "Kantian Consequentialism," Ethics 100 (1990): 586-615, esp. pp. 590-94. Illuminating discussions of the argument can be found in Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," pp. 299-304; and Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.
10. Most notably, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. chap. 4; and Kagan, pp. 24 ff. David Cummisky advocates a version of this argument in his "Kantian Consequentialism," Ethics 100 (1990): 586-615, esp. pp. 590-94. Illuminating discussions of the argument can be found in Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," pp. 299-304; and Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.
11. Most notably, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. chap. 4; and Kagan, pp. 24 ff. David Cummisky advocates a version of this argument in his "Kantian Consequentialism," Ethics 100 (1990): 586-615, esp. pp. 590-94. Illuminating discussions of the argument can be found in Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," pp. 299-304; and Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.
12. Most notably, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. chap. 4; and Kagan, pp. 24 ff. David Cummisky advocates a version of this argument in his "Kantian Consequentialism," Ethics 100 (1990): 586-615, esp. pp. 590-94. Illuminating discussions of the argument can be found in Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," pp. 299-304; and Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.
13. Most notably, Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, esp. chap. 4; and Kagan, pp. 24 ff. David Cummisky advocates a version of this argument in his "Kantian Consequentialism," Ethics 100 (1990): 586-615, esp. pp. 590-94. Illuminating discussions of the argument can be found in Darwall, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out," pp. 299-304; and Michael Slote, From Morality to Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 37-39.
14. As does ev !uation of actions from such an impersonal standpoint augmented -as on Scheffler's account - by the agent's own personal standpoint. As Scheffler himself points out (The Rejection of Consequentialism, chaps. 1 and 4), augmentation of the traditional consequentialist impersonal moral standpoint by the agent's own personal standpoint cannot provide a rationale for traditional agent-centered restrictions - thus his own opposition to such restrictions.
15. See Scheffler's "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 243-60, p. 252. This argument is suggested at various points in Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, but it is in "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues" that Scheffler presents it clearly in its own right as a distinct argument. That essay is itself in part a response to Philippa Foot's "Utilitarianism and the Virtues" (Scheffler, ed., pp. 224-42), itself written in part as a response to certain arguments in Scheffler's book. In her essay, Foot focuses upon Scheffler's appeal to the impersonal standpoint in generating the paradoxicality of restrictions and challenges the legitimacy of such an appeal. My subsequent arguments follow Foot in these respects, although the substance of our respective challenges is quite different. I am indebted to an Ethics editor for comments that have led me to clarify significantly my arguments concerning Scheffler's argument.
16. See Scheffler's "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 243-60, p. 252. This argument is suggested at various points in Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, but it is in "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues" that Scheffler presents it clearly in its own right as a distinct argument. That essay is itself in part a response to Philippa Foot's "Utilitarianism and the Virtues" (Scheffler, ed., pp. 224-42), itself written in part as a response to certain arguments in Scheffler's book. In her essay, Foot focuses upon Scheffler's appeal to the impersonal standpoint in generating the paradoxicality of restrictions and challenges the legitimacy of such an appeal. My subsequent arguments follow Foot in these respects, although the substance of our respective challenges is quite different. I am indebted to an Ethics editor for comments that have led me to clarify significantly my arguments concerning Scheffler's argument.
17. See Scheffler's "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," in Consequentialism and Its Critics, ed. Samuel Scheffler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 243-60, p. 252. This argument is suggested at various points in Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, but it is in "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues" that Scheffler presents it clearly in its own right as a distinct argument. That essay is itself in part a response to Philippa Foot's "Utilitarianism and the Virtues" (Scheffler, ed., pp. 224-42), itself written in part as a response to certain arguments in Scheffler's book. In her essay, Foot focuses upon Scheffler's appeal to the impersonal standpoint in generating the paradoxicality of restrictions and challenges the legitimacy of such an appeal. My subsequent arguments follow Foot in these respects, although the substance of our respective challenges is quite different. I am indebted to an Ethics editor for comments that have led me to clarify significantly my arguments concerning Scheffler's argument.
18. Scheffler, "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," p. 252.
19. It will not do to respond on Scheffler's behalf that the goal of avoiding doing harm is not a "goal" properly understood. Since, ex hypothesi, commonsense rationality does give weight to this requirement in the generation of agent-centered restrictions, such a response, taken by itself, would not undermine the plausibility of the requirement, hence of restrictions, but the plausibility of the assumption that commonsense rationality weighs only "goals." Nor, as Barbara Herman has pointed out, is there anything puzzling about treating particular requirements or principles as goals or ends in reasoning ("Leaving Deontology Behind," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993], p. 216). To import more into the characterization of goals or ends would be to do precisely what Scheffler sets out to avoid: to "have conceded the truth of consequentialism in accepting the description of those views that is supposed to generate the difficulty" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," p. 251). One could, of course, adopt an argument that differs from Scheffler's precisely by attacking rather than appealing to what he presents as commonsense rationality. Such an argument could concede that commonsense rationality appears to countenance as goals agent-centered requirements of the sort necessary to generate restrictions but claim that rationality suitably explicated and refined (say, by decision theory) differs from commonsense rationality on precisely this point. Such arguments have been put forward; indeed, they could be characterized as comprising a second central argument against agent-centered restrictions. As will become apparent, however, neither Scheffler nor Kagan adopts such an argument. Nor will I take up such arguments here. For a fine critical discussion of such arguments, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 2 and 6.
20. It will not do to respond on Scheffler's behalf that the goal of avoiding doing harm is not a "goal" properly understood. Since, ex hypothesi, commonsense rationality does give weight to this requirement in the generation of agent-centered restrictions, such a response, taken by itself, would not undermine the plausibility of the requirement, hence of restrictions, but the plausibility of the assumption that commonsense rationality weighs only "goals." Nor, as Barbara Herman has pointed out, is there anything puzzling about treating particular requirements or principles as goals or ends in reasoning ("Leaving Deontology Behind," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993], p. 216). To import more into the characterization of goals or ends would be to do precisely what Scheffler sets out to avoid: to "have conceded the truth of consequentialism in accepting the description of those views that is supposed to generate the difficulty" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," p. 251). One could, of course, adopt an argument that differs from Scheffler's precisely by attacking rather than appealing to what he presents as commonsense rationality. Such an argument could concede that commonsense rationality appears to countenance as goals agent-centered requirements of the sort necessary to generate restrictions but claim that rationality suitably explicated and refined (say, by decision theory) differs from commonsense rationality on precisely this point. Such arguments have been put forward; indeed, they could be characterized as comprising a second central argument against agent-centered restrictions. As will become apparent, however, neither Scheffler nor Kagan adopts such an argument. Nor will I take up such arguments here. For a fine critical discussion of such arguments, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 2 and 6.
21. It will not do to respond on Scheffler's behalf that the goal of avoiding doing harm is not a "goal" properly understood. Since, ex hypothesi, commonsense rationality does give weight to this requirement in the generation of agent-centered restrictions, such a response, taken by itself, would not undermine the plausibility of the requirement, hence of restrictions, but the plausibility of the assumption that commonsense rationality weighs only "goals." Nor, as Barbara Herman has pointed out, is there anything puzzling about treating particular requirements or principles as goals or ends in reasoning ("Leaving Deontology Behind," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993], p. 216). To import more into the characterization of goals or ends would be to do precisely what Scheffler sets out to avoid: to "have conceded the truth of consequentialism in accepting the description of those views that is supposed to generate the difficulty" ("Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," p. 251). One could, of course, adopt an argument that differs from Scheffler's precisely by attacking rather than appealing to what he presents as commonsense rationality. Such an argument could concede that commonsense rationality appears to countenance as goals agent-centered requirements of the sort necessary to generate restrictions but claim that rationality suitably explicated and refined (say, by decision theory) differs from commonsense rationality on precisely this point. Such arguments have been put forward; indeed, they could be characterized as comprising a second central argument against agent-centered restrictions. As will become apparent, however, neither Scheffler nor Kagan adopts such an argument. Nor will I take up such arguments here. For a fine critical discussion of such arguments, see Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. chaps. 2 and 6.
22. The irony of Scheffler's argument is that although maximizing rationality poses no problems for the agent-centered restrictions he wishes to attack, it does present certain prima facie difficulties for the agent-centered options he wishes to defend. (This point has been made forcefully by Kagan, esp. chaps. 1 and 6-10.) One attempt to demonstrate that options can be successfully reconciled to a maximizing account can be found in my "Getting Our Options Clear: A Closer Look at Agent-Centered Options," Philosophical Studies 78 (1995): 163-88.
23. Scheffler, "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues," p. 253.
24. If Scheffler's second constraint is interpreted as meaning "preferable all things considered," then this Kantian alternative violates the second constraint. But Scheffler would surely reject such an interpretation, since such a constraint is no longer obviously plausible and would certainly no longer be accepted as plausible (as Scheffler maintains that this constraint is, properly interpreted) by defenders of agent-centered restrictions. Indeed, on such a reading, the constraint amounts to a bald stipulation that the moral standpoint is the impersonal standpoint. Such a stipulation would simply beg the question against the defender of restrictions.
25. Although I have focused upon Scheffler's peripheral arguments, Kagan also prefaces the presentation of his central argument with certain peripheral considerations that aim at least to shift the burden of proof onto defenders of restrictions. Thus, he points out that whereas the relevance of the agent-neutral requirement to prevent harm from happening is accepted by both defenders and critics of restrictions, the relevance of the agent-centered requirement to avoid doing harm is denied by critics of restrictions. Kagan suggests that this discord regarding support for the agent-centered requirement effectively shifts the burden of proof onto the defender of restrictions, making "more urgent the . . . need to find a justification for his belief in constraints and options" (p. 17). But although this feature of the debate may help explain why so much of the focus is now directed toward a demand for a supporting rationale for one of the requirements rather than the other, it in no way provides justification for shifting the burden of proof. The issue in shifting the burden of proof is not what defenders and opponents of agent-centered restrictions agree upon, it is what they have evidence for agreeing upon. Ex hypothesi, intuition suggests that there is both an agent-neutral and an agent-centered requirement. If there is a burden at all, it is on the critic of agent-centered restrictions, who concedes that what intuitive evidence there is supports both require-ments and has as of yet provided no evidence for his acceptance of one requirement and his rejection of the other.
26. At points Scheffler appears to suggest that for defenders of restrictions, the impersonal point of view is, in fact, the moral point of view. Scheffler (p. 88) suggests that it is natural to interpret Nozick's arguments for side constraints this way (Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974], pp. 28-33). But as Korsgaard has pointed out, it is only natural to interpret his arguments this way if one makes the assumption, not shared by Nozick himself, that "the business of morality is to bring something about" (p. 49). Although there may be deontologists who make the mistake of attempting to ground agent-centered requirements in an agent-neutral standpoint, Cummisky is surely right in arguing that such deontologists typically begin with the assumption that the agent-neutral standpoint is not the appropriate standpoint (p. 592; see also Kagan, p. 29). Indeed, many advocates of agent-centered restrictions not only reject the identification of the moral standpoint with the impersonal standpoint, they identify the moral standpoint with an alternative standpoint that contrasts sharply with the impersonal standpoint. See Sec. IV below.
27. At points Scheffler appears to suggest that for defenders of restrictions, the impersonal point of view is, in fact, the moral point of view. Scheffler (p. 88) suggests that it is natural to interpret Nozick's arguments for side constraints this way (Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974], pp. 28-33). But as Korsgaard has pointed out, it is only natural to interpret his arguments this way if one makes the assumption, not shared by Nozick himself, that "the business of morality is to bring something about" (p. 49). Although there may be deontologists who make the mistake of attempting to ground agent-centered requirements in an agent-neutral standpoint, Cummisky is surely right in arguing that such deontologists typically begin with the assumption that the agent-neutral standpoint is not the appropriate standpoint (p. 592; see also Kagan, p. 29). Indeed, many advocates of agent-centered restrictions not only reject the identification of the moral standpoint with the impersonal standpoint, they identify the moral standpoint with an alternative standpoint that contrasts sharply with the impersonal standpoint. See Sec. IV below.
28. At points Scheffler appears to suggest that for defenders of restrictions, the impersonal point of view is, in fact, the moral point of view. Scheffler (p. 88) suggests that it is natural to interpret Nozick's arguments for side constraints this way (Anarchy, State, and Utopia [New York: Basic Books, 1974], pp. 28-33). But as Korsgaard has pointed out, it is only natural to interpret his arguments this way if one makes the assumption, not shared by Nozick himself, that "the business of morality is to bring something about" (p. 49). Although there may be deontologists who make the mistake of attempting to ground agent-centered requirements in an agent-neutral standpoint, Cummisky is surely right in arguing that such deontologists typically begin with the assumption that the agent-neutral standpoint is not the appropriate standpoint (p. 592; see also Kagan, p. 29). Indeed, many advocates of agent-centered restrictions not only reject the identification of the moral standpoint with the impersonal standpoint, they identify the moral standpoint with an alternative standpoint that contrasts sharply with the impersonal standpoint. See Sec. IV below.
29. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 89. Scheffler generalizes the point to undermine other attempts to formulate any sort of countervailing requirement, arguing that "so long as the strategy is to single out some feature of violations of requirements as having high disvalue, no adequate defense of such restrictions will emerge" (p. 89). Kagan makes a similar point, p. 29.
30. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 90.
31. Kagan, p. 28.
32. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 101; Kagan, pp. 28-29.
33. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 101; Kagan, pp. 28-29.
34. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 103; Kagan, pp. 29-31.
35. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 103; Kagan, pp. 29-31.
36. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 107. See also Kagan, p. 32.
37. Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, p. 107. See also Kagan, p. 32.
38. Cummisky, p. 592.
39. Herman, "Leaving Deontology Behind," p. 209.
40. Much of the appeal of this argument against requirements is precisely that it does not rely upon the appeal to the plausibility of any particular indirect strategy or error theory. Some such strategy or theory may yet be appealed to by advocates of the argument to account for the initial intuitive appeal of agent-centered restrictions, but the irrationality and paradoxically of restrictions is established by the argument independently of such appeals and the problems they involve.
41. For such movement away from monism, see, e.g., Kagan, pp. 7, 59 ff.; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Scheffler, ed., pp. 109-10; and Scheffler's discussion of "pluralistic lexical Consequentialism," in The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 27-30.
42. For such movement away from monism, see, e.g., Kagan, pp. 7, 59 ff.; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Scheffler, ed., pp. 109-10; and Scheffler's discussion of "pluralistic lexical Consequentialism," in The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 27-30.
43. For such movement away from monism, see, e.g., Kagan, pp. 7, 59 ff.; Peter Railton, "Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality," in Scheffler, ed., pp. 109-10; and Scheffler's discussion of "pluralistic lexical Consequentialism," in The Rejection of Consequentialism, pp. 27-30.
44. Thus, Kagan makes it clear that although "examining whether there is indeed any kind of reason at all to perform an act simply by virtue of the fact that it will lead to a greater amount of good overall is . . . yet another essential task for moral philosophy," he does not consider whether such a reason "can, in fact, be successfully defended" (p. 18).
45. Ibid., p. 32.
46. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 111.
47. John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 515-72, p. 519.
48. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," p. 116.
49. Ibid., p. 117.
50. Korsgaard, pp. 25, 28.
51. Anderson, pp. 31, 17.
52. Ibid., p. 3.
53. Ibid., p. 79.
54. See Jean Hampton, "Feminist Contractarianism," in A Mind of One's Own, ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 227-56; Rawls, Political Liberalism, esp. lecture 3; and Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chaps. 1 and 2.
55. See Jean Hampton, "Feminist Contractarianism," in A Mind of One's Own, ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 227-56; Rawls, Political Liberalism, esp. lecture 3; and Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chaps. 1 and 2.
56. See Jean Hampton, "Feminist Contractarianism," in A Mind of One's Own, ed. Louise M. Antony and Charlotte Witt (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993), pp. 227-56; Rawls, Political Liberalism, esp. lecture 3; and Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. H. J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), chaps. 1 and 2.
57. Herman, "Leaving Deontology Behind," p. 213. Note that it need not even be the case that the evaluation of actions as right and wrong is the central moral notion on this alternative conception. Herman's account focuses upon goodness, albeit goodness as a property of the will rather than of states of affairs. (See also Stephen Darwall's sketch of the broadly Kantian position that he advocates in "Rational Agent, Rational Act," Philosophical Topics (14 [1986]: 33-57, esp. pp. 41 and 51-52.) What is characteristic of virtually all such advocates of this alternative conception is that they appeal to reason as providing an alternative evaluative standpoint that allows for a different account of the fundamental moral notions of goodness and tightness (and their interrelationships).
58. Herman, "Leaving Deontology Behind," p. 213. Note that it need not even be the case that the evaluation of actions as right and wrong is the central moral notion on this alternative conception. Herman's account focuses upon goodness, albeit goodness as a property of the will rather than of states of affairs. (See also Stephen Darwall's sketch of the broadly Kantian position that he advocates in "Rational Agent, Rational Act," Philosophical Topics (14 [1986]: 33-57, esp. pp. 41 and 51-52.) What is characteristic of virtually all such advocates of this alternative conception is that they appeal to reason as providing an alternative evaluative standpoint that allows for a different account of the fundamental moral notions of goodness and tightness (and their interrelationships).
59. Indeed, this is precisely Rawls's point in claiming that the principle of utility will not be chosen from the original position. See also Scanlon's claim that his "Losers" will reasonably reject a principle that yields higher utility (" Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 122-23).
60. Indeed, this is precisely Rawls's point in claiming that the principle of utility will not be chosen from the original position. See also Scanlon's claim that his "Losers" will reasonably reject a principle that yields higher utility (" Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 122-23).
61. For an extended discussion of this interpersonal dimension of the justification of beliefs, see Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), esp. chap. 3.
62. Kagan, p. 66.
63. Scanlon, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," p. 119.
64. Variants on this general argument strategy are used repeatedly by Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, chap. 4; Kagan, chap. 1. It is also adopted by Cummisky at various points in his "Kantian Consequentialism."
65. Variants on this general argument strategy are used repeatedly by Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, chap. 4; Kagan, chap. 1. It is also adopted by Cummisky at various points in his "Kantian Consequentialism."
66. Variants on this general argument strategy are used repeatedly by Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, chap. 4; Kagan, chap. 1. It is also adopted by Cummisky at various points in his "Kantian Consequentialism."
67. Kagan, p. 32.
68. Anderson explicitly argues that the more global standpoint of value shows "how maximizing value can play a local role" (p. 45). Scanlon discusses the relationship between what I have termed the impartial standpoint and considerations of well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-20), allowing that "some moral questions may be properly settled by appeal to maximum aggregate well-being, even though this is not the sole or ultimate justification" (p. 120). Rawls suggests that Kant is appropriately read as appealing to a distinct conception of the good that is generated in the process of giving objective content to certain imperfect duties, duties to prevent and promote the happening of certain states of affairs ("Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckard Forster [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989], esp. pp. 90-95). On all such accounts, the point is not to deny that the impersonal evaluation of states of affairs plays a role in the determination of right actions but to demonstrate that within the framework of a conception of value that correctly captures the relationship between the evaluation of actions and the evaluation of states of affairs, this appeal to the value of states of affairs can readily be reconciled with the legitimacy of agent-centered restrictions.
69. Anderson explicitly argues that the more global standpoint of value shows "how maximizing value can play a local role" (p. 45). Scanlon discusses the relationship between what I have termed the impartial standpoint and considerations of well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-20), allowing that "some moral questions may be properly settled by appeal to maximum aggregate well-being, even though this is not the sole or ultimate justification" (p. 120). Rawls suggests that Kant is appropriately read as appealing to a distinct conception of the good that is generated in the process of giving objective content to certain imperfect duties, duties to prevent and promote the happening of certain states of affairs ("Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Kant's Transcendental Deductions, ed. Eckard Forster [Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989], esp. pp. 90-95). On all such accounts, the point is not to deny that the impersonal evaluation of states of affairs plays a role in the determination of right actions but to demonstrate that within the framework of a conception of value that correctly captures the relationship between the evaluation of actions and the evaluation of states of affairs, this appeal to the value of states of affairs can readily be reconciled with the legitimacy of agent-centered restrictions.
70. Rawls, "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," p. 91.
71. I am indebted to an anonymous Ethics referee for helpful suggestions that have allowed me to avoid certain errors in the account presented here. My account borrows heavily from the account of conflicting duties sketched by Barbara Herman in "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons" and "Obligation and Performance," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment, chaps. 3 and 8, respectively. For other accounts of the generation of agent-neutral requirements from the impartial standpoint, see also Anderson's discussion of benevolence (p. 23) and Scanlon's discussion of the role of appeals to well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-19, and "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], pp. 185-200, esp. pp. 195-99).
72. I am indebted to an anonymous Ethics referee for helpful suggestions that have allowed me to avoid certain errors in the account presented here. My account borrows heavily from the account of conflicting duties sketched by Barbara Herman in "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons" and "Obligation and Performance," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment, chaps. 3 and 8, respectively. For other accounts of the generation of agent-neutral requirements from the impartial standpoint, see also Anderson's discussion of benevolence (p. 23) and Scanlon's discussion of the role of appeals to well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-19, and "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], pp. 185-200, esp. pp. 195-99).
73. I am indebted to an anonymous Ethics referee for helpful suggestions that have allowed me to avoid certain errors in the account presented here. My account borrows heavily from the account of conflicting duties sketched by Barbara Herman in "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons" and "Obligation and Performance," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment, chaps. 3 and 8, respectively. For other accounts of the generation of agent-neutral requirements from the impartial standpoint, see also Anderson's discussion of benevolence (p. 23) and Scanlon's discussion of the role of appeals to well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-19, and "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], pp. 185-200, esp. pp. 195-99).
74. I am indebted to an anonymous Ethics referee for helpful suggestions that have allowed me to avoid certain errors in the account presented here. My account borrows heavily from the account of conflicting duties sketched by Barbara Herman in "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons" and "Obligation and Performance," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment, chaps. 3 and 8, respectively. For other accounts of the generation of agent-neutral requirements from the impartial standpoint, see also Anderson's discussion of benevolence (p. 23) and Scanlon's discussion of the role of appeals to well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-19, and "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], pp. 185-200, esp. pp. 195-99).
75. I am indebted to an anonymous Ethics referee for helpful suggestions that have allowed me to avoid certain errors in the account presented here. My account borrows heavily from the account of conflicting duties sketched by Barbara Herman in "Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons" and "Obligation and Performance," in her The Practice of Moral Judgment, chaps. 3 and 8, respectively. For other accounts of the generation of agent-neutral requirements from the impartial standpoint, see also Anderson's discussion of benevolence (p. 23) and Scanlon's discussion of the role of appeals to well-being ("Contractualism and Utilitarianism," pp. 118-19, and "Value, Desire, and Quality of Life," in The Quality of Life, ed. M. Nussbaum and A. Sen [Oxford: Clarendon, 1993], pp. 185-200, esp. pp. 195-99).
76. Virtually all advocates of the impartial standpoint maintain that agent-centered restrictions will be generated from this standpoint. There is less consensus concerning the extent of such restrictions. Specifically, there is some disagreement as to whether they will include the sorts of cases that fit Scheffler's example schema in which my harm doing will prevent X equally serious harm doings by X others (there is also less consensus as to whether and how numbers - the value of X - matter in such cases). Certain advocates of the impartial standpoint clearly maintain that such cases are included among the restrictions generated from the impartial standpoint, arguing that the relevant requirements not to do harm and to prevent harm from happening have different grounds of obligation and that the ground of obligation of the former is decisive in certain cases that appear to fit Scheffler's schema (e.g., Herman, "Obligation and Performance," esp. pp. 166 ff.). Others are less clear as to whether agent-centered restrictions can be justified from the impartial standpoint in such cases. (See Scanlon's remarks on legitimate grounds for the rejection of rules for behavior, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," p. 111.)
77. Virtually all advocates of the impartial standpoint maintain that agent-centered restrictions will be generated from this standpoint. There is less consensus concerning the extent of such restrictions. Specifically, there is some disagreement as to whether they will include the sorts of cases that fit Scheffler's example schema in which my harm doing will prevent X equally serious harm doings by X others (there is also less consensus as to whether and how numbers - the value of X - matter in such cases). Certain advocates of the impartial standpoint clearly maintain that such cases are included among the restrictions generated from the impartial standpoint, arguing that the relevant requirements not to do harm and to prevent harm from happening have different grounds of obligation and that the ground of obligation of the former is decisive in certain cases that appear to fit Scheffler's schema (e.g., Herman, "Obligation and Performance," esp. pp. 166 ff.). Others are less clear as to whether agent-centered restrictions can be justified from the impartial standpoint in such cases. (See Scanlon's remarks on legitimate grounds for the rejection of rules for behavior, "Contractualism and Utilitarianism," p. 111.)
78. See, e.g., Kagan's identification of the impersonal standpoint as the objective point of view and his corresponding claim that, for the defender of restrictions, "the moral point of view goes beyond the objective standpoint in including subjective reasons as well" (p. 352). See also Korsgaard's argument that this identification of impersonality and objectivity is a component of the "objectivist realist" view, which she attributes to Thomas Nagel, among others (p. 32).