Multiple realizability and the semantic view of theories

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 163, Issue 3, 2013, Pages 683-695

  Klein, Colin ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

Models; Multiple realizability; Reduction; Semantic view; Theories

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875662642     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9839-6     Document Type: Article

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