Institutional interactions at the crossroads of trade and environment: The dominance of liberal environmentalism?

Global Governance

Volumn 19, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 105-118

  Zelli, Fariborz ^a,b   Gupta, Aarti ^c   van Asselt, Harro ^d,e,f  

^a LUND UNIVERSITY   (Sweden)

^b GERMAN DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE   (Germany)

^c WAGENINGEN UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^d STOCKHOLM ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE   (Sweden)

^e UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^f UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Biodiversity; Biosafety; Climate change; Forestry; Genetically modified organisms; Institutional interactions; Institutional interlinkages; Neoliberal environmentalism; Regime complex; Trade

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875636628     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: 19426720     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01901009     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Arild Underdal, "Determining the Causal Significance of Institutions: Accomplishments and Challenges, " paper prepared for the conference "Institutional Dimensions of Global Environmental Change Project Synthesis, " Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia, December 2006, p. 9.
2. We would, however, prefer the term institutional complex to regime complex, as, following Robert O. Keohane, we consider institutions to encompass organizations, regimes, and implicit rules. See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder: Westview Press), p. 3. Existing analyses of such complexes refer not only to regimes, but also to other types of international institutions (e.g., international organizations or more informal institutional arrangements). But for coherence's sake, and given the broad understanding of regime complexes outlined by Orsini, Morin, and Young, we follow the terminology of this issue.
3. We understand norms here as legitimate social purpose or "collective intentionality, " that is, "intersubjective frameworks of understandings that include a shared narrative about the conditions that make regimes [or governance more broadly] necessary and... the objectives intended to [be] accomplish[ed]. " John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge, " International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 855-885, 870. This understanding extends beyond a focus that is only on agreed standards of behavior or rules of conduct.
4. Ken Conca, Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).
5. John Gerard Ruggie, "Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic Regimes, " in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 62-84, 65.
6. Steven Bernstein, "Liberal Environmentalism and Global Environmental Governance, " Global Environmental Politics 2, no. 3 (2002): 1-16.
7. An alternative, more trade-skeptical norm would instead hold that "trade leads to an ecologically unequal exchange" and that "the WTO's rules permit countries to use the environment as a free resource. " See Robyn Eckersley, "Understanding the Interplay Between the Climate and Trade Regimes, " in Benjamin Simmons, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli, eds., Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World (Geneva: UNEP, 2009), pp. 11-18, 15.
8. Thomas L. Brewer, "The WTO and the Kyoto Protocol: Interaction Issues, " Climate Policy 4, no. 1 (2004): 3-12
9. Thomas L. Brewer, "The Potential of Regional and Bilateral Sectoral Agreements, " in Benjamin Simmons, Harro van Asselt, and Fariborz Zelli, eds., Climate and Trade Policies in a Post-2012 World (Geneva: UNEP, 2009), pp. 65-68.
10. Emily Boyd, Esteve Corbera, and Manuel Estrada, "UNFCCC Negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9): What the Process Says About the Politics of CDM-Sinks, " International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 8, no. 2 (2008): 95-112, 106.
11. See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-background.htm: vol. 12, no. 45, p. 2; vol. 12, no. 55, p. 4; vol. 12, no. 66, pp. 5-6; vol. 12, no. 76, p. 6; vol. 12, no. 163, pp. 19-20.
12. Farhana Yamin, "The Role of the EU in Climate Negotiations, " in Joyeeta Gupta and Michael Grubb, eds., Climate Change and European Leadership: A Sustainable Role for Europe? (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), pp. 47-66, 54.
13. Urs P. Thomas, "Trade and the Environment: Stuck in a Political Impasse at the WTO After the Doha and Cancún Ministerial Conferences, " Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 3 (2004): 17-18.
14. Alice Palmer and Richard Tarasofsky, The Doha Round and Beyond: Towards a Lasting Relationship Between the WTO and the International Environmental Regime (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2007), p. 16.
15. Kati Kulovesi, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: Challenges of the Environment, Legitimacy and Fragmentation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 2011), pp. 234-235
16. Fariborz Zelli and Harro van Asselt, "The Overlap Between the UN Climate Regime and the World Trade Organization: Lessons for Climate Governance Beyond 2012, " in Frank Biermann, Philipp Pattberg, and Fariborz Zelli, eds., Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 79-96.
17. Tracy Epps and Andrew Green, Reconciling Trade and Climate: How the WTO Can Help Address Climate Change (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2010).
18. Olav Schram Stokke, "Trade Measures and Climate Compliance: Institutional Interplay Between WTO and the Marrakesh Accords, " International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 4, no. 4 (2004): 339-357.
19. Eckersley, "Understanding the Interplay, " pp. 16-17.
20. Robyn Eckersley, "The Big Chill: The WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements, " Global Environmental Politics 4, no. 2 (2004): 24-40.
21. Eckersley, "Understanding the Interplay, " p. 15.
22. For instance, José Manuel Durão Barroso, president of the European Commission, in his speech delivered at the European Parliament, Brussels, 23 January 2008
23. Harro van Asselt and Thomas Brewer, "Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU, " Energy Policy 38, no. 1 (2010): 42-51.
24. Peter Glück, Arild Angelsen, Marie Appelstrand, Samuel Assembe-Mvondo, Graeme Auld, G. Karl Hogl, David Humphreys, and Christoph Wildburger, "Core Components of the International Forest Regime Complex, " in Jeremy Rayner, Alexander Buck, and Pia Katila, eds., Embracing Complexity: Meeting the Challenges of International Forest Governance (Vienna: International Union of Forest Research Organizations, 2010), pp. 37-55.
25. Malte Meinshausen and Bill Hare, "Sinks in the CDM: After the Climate, Biodiversity Goes Down the Drain. An Analysis of the CDM Sinks Agreement at CoP-9" (Greenpeace, 2003), www.greenpeace.org.
26. Celia A. Harvey, Barney Dickson, and Cyril Kormos, "Opportunities for Achieving Biodiversity Conservation Through REDD, " Conservation Letters 3, no. 1 (2010): 53-61
27. Harro van Asselt, "Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate Regime's Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening REDD Design, " Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 20, no. 2 (2011): 139-149.
28. Boyd, Corbera, and Estrada, "UNFCCC Negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9), " p. 107.
29. Boyd, Corbera, and Estrada, "UNFCCC Negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9), " p. 107.
30. Karin Bäckstrand and Eva Lövbrand, "Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change: Contested Discourses of Ecological Modernization, Green Governmentality, and Civic Environmentalism, " Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 2 (2006): 50-75, 60-61.
31. Boyd, Corbera, and Estrada, "UNFCCC Negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9), " p. 105.
32. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, "Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change, " pp. 64-65.
33. Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, "Planting Trees to Mitigate Climate Change, " pp. 64-65.
34. Sebastian Oberthür and Thomas Gehring, "Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance: The Case of the Cartagena Protocol and the World Trade Organization, " Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 2 (2006): 1-31, 11.
35. Oberthür and Gehring, "Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance"
36. Oran R. Young, "Deriving Insights from the Case of the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol, " in Oran R. Young, W. Bradnee Chambers, Joy A. Kim, and Claudia ten Have, eds., Institutional Interplay: Biosafety and Trade (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008), pp. 131-158.
37. Cyrus Mehri, "Prior Informed Consent: An Emerging Compromise for Hazardous Exports, " Cornell International Law Journal 21 (1988): 365-389
38. see also Amanda Wolf, "Informed Consent: A Negotiated Formula for Trade in Risky Organisms and Chemicals, " International Negotiation 5, no. 3 (2000): 485-521.
39. Aarti Gupta, "Transparency as Contested Political Terrain: Who Knows What About the Global GMO Trade and Why Does It Matter?" Global Environmental Politics 10, no. 3 (2010): 32-52.
40. For a detailed comparison of the provisions on precaution in the Cartagena Protocol versus the SPS agreement, see Aarti Gupta, "Advance Informed Agreement: A Shared Basis to Govern Trade in Genetically Modified Organisms?" Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 9, no. 1 (2002): 265-281.
41. In the quintessential example, a 2003 WTO case brought by the United States against the EU alleged that the EU was violating its SPS obligations, given its restrictive approach to GMO imports. In its defense, the EU invoked, inter alia, its rights and obligations under the Cartagena Protocol. The WTO ruling in May 2006 found largely in favor of the United States, arguing that the EU was partially in violation of its SPS obligations. Yet importantly, it did not rule on the substantive elements of EU GMO regulation, including the reliance on precaution therein. Instead, the finding was based largely on procedural grounds, including the failure of the EU to conduct risk assessments prior to imposing restrictions. In reaching this conclusion, moreover, the dispute settlement panel did not take the Cartagena Protocol obligations into account. See, for example, Sarah Liberman and Tim Grey, "The World Trade Organization's Report on the EU's Moratorium on Biotech Products: The Wisdom of the US Challenge to the EU in the WTO, " Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 1 (2008): 33-52.
42. For a detailed elaboration of this argument, see Aarti Gupta, "Transparency to What End? Governing by Disclosure Through the Biosafety Clearing House, " Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 28, no. 2 (2010): 128-144.
43. While this conclusion may not hold for the EU's regional GMO governance approach, it refers here to the global context.