Knowledge of partial awareness in disorders of consciousness: Implications for ethical evaluations?

Neuroethics

Volumn 6, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 13-23

  Friedrich, Orsolya ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MUNICH   (Germany)

^b FORSCHUNGSZENTRUM JÜLICH   (Germany)

Author keywords

Awareness; Disorders of consciousness; End of life decisions; Neuroimaging

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; AWARENESS; BENEFICENCE; CONSCIOUSNESS DISORDER; DIAGNOSTIC ERROR; EYE MOVEMENT; FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING; HUMAN; HUMAN DIGNITY; LIVING WILL; LOCKED IN SYNDROME; MEDICAL DECISION MAKING; MEDICAL ETHICS; MENTAL HEALTH; MORALITY; MOTOR CORTEX; NEUROIMAGING; NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION; PARTIAL AWARENESS; PATIENT AUTONOMY; PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RIGHT TO LIFE; SELF CONCEPT; STIMULUS RESPONSE; TERMINAL CARE;

EID: 84875277618     PISSN: 18745490     EISSN: 18745504     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s12152-011-9145-1     Document Type: Article

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