Judicial capacity and the conditional spending paradox

Wisconsin Law Review

Volumn 2013, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 339-381

  Coan, Andrew B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875179282     PISSN: 0043650X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (101)

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33. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)
34. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 355 (2008)
35. Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND. L.J. 459, 467-69 (2003)
36. Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States' Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 113 n.18 (2001)
37. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603-04 (2012
38. see, e.g., Marty Lederman, The States' Extraordinary Medicaid Challenge: Claiming a Right Not to Take the Savory with the Sweet (or, . . . All Carrots; No Stick), BALKINIZATION (Mar. 27, 2012), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/03/ states-extraordinary-medicaidchallenge.html
39. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)
40. See also H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 868 (1999)
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44. Printz, 521 U.S. at 930
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46. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 635 (1993)
47. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213, 231 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001)
48. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1629, 1655 (2006)
49. see also Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 1, 14 (2006)
50. Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 865 n.23 (2000)
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52. see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 960-61 (1997)
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54. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920-21 (1997)
55. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995))
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57. see also NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 40-41 (2001
58. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 133-34 (1996
59. see also ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 268 (2006)
60. Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1631 (2008)
61. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 153 fig.1 (2010
62. see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 819-20 (1967)
63. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), as an illustration
64. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 32 (2000)
65. see also ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 246-47, 271-72 (8th ed. 2002
66. see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004
67. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 616-17 (1995
68. See Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012)
69. CHRIS EDWARDS, CATO INST., POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 593, FEDERAL AID TO THE STATES: HISTORICAL CAUSE OF GOVERNMENT GROWTH AND BUREAUCRACY 1 (2007), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa593.pdf.
70. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2013 tbl.12.1 (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/ fy2013/assets/hist12z1.xls.
71. cf. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999)
72. Biographies of Current Justices, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt. gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Dec. 1, 2012
73. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976
74. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1179 (1988
75. see also Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 896 (1979)
76. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012
77. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
78. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 65 (2001
79. Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 44-46 (1988
80. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987
81. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937
82. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-18
83. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 216
84. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-16
85. Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947)
86. See, e.g., Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)
87. Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 495 (2002)
88. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009)
89. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2000)
90. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012
91. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, CBS NEWS (July 1, 2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460-162-57464549/ roberts-switched-views-to-upholdhealth-care-law
92. See Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05
93. see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause after NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2128977 (last visited Feb. 6, 2013
94. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2575
95. See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013)
96. Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2661
97. See Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2661-62
98. See Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604
99. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992)
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101. Robert A. Carp et al., Right on: The Decision-Making Behavior of George W. Bush's Judicial Appointees, 92 JUDICATURE 312, 315-16 (2009)