Mere negligence or abandonment? Evaluating claims of attorney misconduct after Maples v. Thomas

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 122, Issue 5, 2013, Pages 1328-1371

  Zupac, Wendy Zorana ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84875090145     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (256)

1. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Gatekeeper Court Keeps Gates Shut, Chi. Trib., June 12, 2000, http://www.chicagotribune.com /news/local/chi-000612dptexas2-story,0,708553, full.story.
2. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
3. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
4. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
5. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
6. See, e.g., Ex parte Colella, 977 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (dismissing a state postconviction petition filed thirty-seven days late).
7. Coleman v. Thompson, 895 F.2d 139, 142 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991).
8. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
9. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 757.
10. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
11. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
12. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
13. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
14. The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). This right attaches at a defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer.
15. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 654 n.4 (2005) ("Habeas corpus proceedings are characterized as civil in nature. ").
16. These litigants relied on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which allows courts to grant relief from a final judgment, such as a dismissal for failure to prosecute, for any "reason that justifies relief. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
17. A comprehensive description of criminal procedure and right-to-counsel jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note.
18. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.
19. 372 U.S. at 344 ("[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. "). In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require "that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. "
20. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 137 (1967) (holding that defendants have a right to counsel at the time of sentencing, even though the defendants' sentencing in the instant case had been deferred subject to probation).
21. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
22. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
23. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616-17 (1974).
24. Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State Post-Conviction Remedies and Relief Handbook with Forms (2009).
25. Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 7.1(b) (6th ed. 2011).
26. Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 7.1(b) (6th ed. 2011).
27. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (stating that the Court had "never held that prisoners have a constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions" in state courts and "declin[ing] to so hold").
28. See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).
29. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
30. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Defendants must also show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial; this is known as the "prejudice" prong.
31. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Defendants must also show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial; this is known as the "prejudice" prong.
32. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (holding that the trial lawyers "were deficient in failing to examine the court file on [defendant]'s prior conviction" when they were on notice that the state intended to use the defendant's prior history as an aggravating sentencing factor).
33. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533-35 (2003) (holding that counsel fell below Strickland's performance standard by failing to adequately investigate the defendant's background to prepare a mitigation case).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[S]erious attorney misconduct, as opposed to mere negligence, 'may warrant equitable tolling.'".
35. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521-34.
36. In order to prevail on a Strickland claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both deficient performance and prejudice resulting from counsel's failures. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
37. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). "Agency" is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. " Restatement (Second) of Agency § 11 (1958).
38. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). "Agency" is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. " Restatement (Second) of Agency § 11 (1958).
39. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991). "Agency" is defined as "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act. " Restatement (Second) of Agency § 11 (1958).
40. For example, in Community Dental Services. v. Tani, the Ninth Circuit granted relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) to a client whose attorneys falsely represented that the litigation was proceeding smoothly up until the client received notice that default judgment had been entered against him. 282 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002).
41. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923.
42. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
43. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
44. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
45. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
46. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
47. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
48. 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
49. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
50. 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977).
51. The development of the procedural-default doctrine in federal habeas litigation has had a significant impact on the availability of federal review. One recent study of habeas corpus petitions filed since 1996 found that 42.2% of capital cases had a "ruling that at least one claim was barred by procedural default. " Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Nat'l Inst. of Just. 48 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 /nij/grants/219559.pdf.
52. The development of the procedural-default doctrine in federal habeas litigation has had a significant impact on the availability of federal review. One recent study of habeas corpus petitions filed since 1996 found that 42.2% of capital cases had a "ruling that at least one claim was barred by procedural default. " Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Nat'l Inst. of Just. 48 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1 /nij/grants/219559.pdf.
53. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
54. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
55. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
56. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
57. Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 89.
58. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
59. 501 U.S. 722 (1991)
60. 477 U.S. at 482.
61. 477 U.S. at 482.
62. 477 U.S. at 482.
63. 477 U.S. at 482.
64. 477 U.S. at 482.
65. 477 U.S. at 482.
66. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 682 (1990).
67. See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679, 682 (1990).
68. 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
69. 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
70. 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991).
71. 132 S. Ct. 912, 917-19 (2012).
72. 132 S. Ct. 912, 917-19 (2012).
73. 132 S. Ct. 912, 917-19 (2012).
74. Many states with the death penalty require mandatory appointment of postconviction counsel upon request by the death-row inmate. See Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1 app. A (2002) (compiling state statutes).
75. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 863, 865 (1996)
76. Ronald J. Tabak, Commentary, Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 523, 524, 540-43 (1996).
77. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.071, § 2(a) (West 2005).
78. 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
79. 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
80. 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
81. 70 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
82. Tex. Defender Serv., A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the Death Penalty 101 & n.3 (2000) (noting that when article 11.071 was enacted in 1995, the legislature appropriated two million dollars a year for the program, which was less than half the amount requested by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals).
83. See Tex. Defender Serv., Lethal Indifference: The Fatal Combination of Incompetent Attorneys and Unaccountable Courts in Texas Death Penalty Appeals 13-22 (2002) (describing the negative results of a study of the performance of article 11.071 attorneys).
84. Bejarano v. Warden, 929 P.2d 922, 925 (Nev. 1996).
85. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-12-205(3)(f), (5) (2006) ("The ineffectiveness of counsel during post-conviction review shall not be a basis for relief. "); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1419(c) (2011) ("[A] claim of ineffective assistance of prior postconviction counsel [cannot] constitute good cause [to file a successive application]. "); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21(I)(2) (West 2010) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during proceedings under this section does not constitute grounds for relief in a proceeding under this section, in an appeal of any action under this section, or in an application to reopen a direct appeal. "). For the federal analogue, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2006), which instructs that "[t]he ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under section 2254. "
86. See, e.g., Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600, 620 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (relying on the due process clause of the state constitution to guarantee effective assistance of appointed counsel).
87. Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 347, 350-51 (2003).
88. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1393, 1415-16 (1999)
89. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), is the most obvious recent example of the Court ducking the question of whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in any collateral proceedings. Justice Kennedy noted that Coleman had left open the possibility that "the Constitution may require States to provide counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings because 'in [these] cases... state collateral review is the first place a prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction.'"
90. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
91. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
92. 132 S. Ct. 1309.
93. 130 S. Ct. at 2564.
94. 132 S. Ct. at 922-23.
95. 132 S. Ct. at 922-23.
96. A complete discussion of equitable-tolling jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note. Essentially, however, applying this principle to a limitations period, such as the one-year Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) deadline, means that a court will pause (or "toll") the running of the limitations period for equitable reasons. The Supreme Court held in Holland v. Florida that unlike certain statutory limitations periods, such as the limitations period for tax refund claims at issue in a previous case, the AEDPA one-year limitations period was subject to equitable tolling in part because "'equitable principles' have traditionally 'governed' the substantive law of habeas corpus. " Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2561 (quoting Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008).
97. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
98. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 Ind. L.J. 1183, 1199-1204 (2012) (providing examples where Justice Scalia has deviated from original-applications originalism).
99. Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2001).
100. United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 2002).
101. United States v. Martin, 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
102. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003).
103. Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2007).
104. I do not claim in this Note that courts evaluating attorney misconduct rely on one model exclusively. These descriptive categories are my attempt to delineate broadly the two main modes of analysis that courts use, but there are examples in which courts blend performance-based and relationship-based analysis.
105. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
106. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
107. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
108. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
109. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
110. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
111. Downs v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008).
112. Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 2003).
113. Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2004).
114. Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2004).
115. Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2004).
116. Johnson v. McBride, 381 F.3d 587, 588 (7th Cir. 2004).
117. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that the client was "deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely § 2255 motion had been filed on his behalf").
118. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that although the client and his mother tried contacting the attorney numerous times by telephone and in writing, "these efforts proved fruitless, " as the attorney failed to file the petition and furthermore failed to return the client's case file to the client).
119. See, e.g., Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1255-57 (10th Cir. 2002) (observing that although the client specifically instructed his attorney to withdraw his guilty plea and file an application for postconviction relief, his attorney failed to do so and furthermore falsely represented to the client that he had filed the application).
120. See, e.g., Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Also troubling is Nara's contention that his attorney... effectively abandoned him and prevented him from filing the habeas petition on time. ").
121. These courts distinguished "egregious" attorney misconduct from "ordinary attorney negligence, " which would not justify tolling the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 800.
122. 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
123. 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
124. 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
125. 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
126. 408 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2005).
127. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
128. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
129. 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010).
130. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
131. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
132. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
133. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
134. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
135. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
136. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
137. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
138. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
139. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
140. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
141. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
142. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
143. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
144. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
145. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
146. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555.
147. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 136.
148. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 136.
149. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 136.
150. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 136.
151. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wis. L. Rev. 39, 136.
152. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
153. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
154. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
155. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
156. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
157. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
158. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
159. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
160. 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012).
161. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
162. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
163. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
164. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
165. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
166. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
167. 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012).
168. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
169. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
170. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
171. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
172. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
173. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
174. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
175. See Steve Vladeck, Opinion Analysis: A New Remedy, but No Right, SCOTUSblog (Mar. 21, 2012, 10:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=141180.
176. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
177. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
178. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1314.
179. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922-23 (2012) (stating that while the Court did not "disturb that general rule" from Coleman that a petitioner is bound by his attorney-agent's failure to meet a filing deadline, "[a] markedly different situation is presented... when an attorney abandons his client without notice, " thereby severing the principal-agent relationship).
180. 132 S. Ct. at 1320.
181. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
182. Lawrence Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 Ind. L.J. 1183, 1199-1204 (2012) (providing examples where Justice Scalia has deviated from original-applications originalism).
183. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) ("Attorney ignorance or inadvertence is not 'cause' because the attorney is the petitioner's agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance of the litigation, and the petitioner must 'bear the risk of attorney error.'"
184. 370 U.S. 626.
185. 498 U.S. 89. Because Irwin relied on Link's reasoning and did not expand on Link's agency theory of representative litigation, my analysis will focus on Link.
186. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
187. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
188. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
189. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
190. Link, 370 U.S. at 627.
191. Adam Liptak, Foreword: Agency and Equity: Why Do We Blame Clients for Their Lawyers' Mistakes?, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 875, 875 (2012).
192. Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., concurring in the judgment).
193. Hutchinson v. Florida, 677 F.3d 1097, 1104 (11th Cir. 2012) (Barkett, J., concurring in the judgment).
194. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
195. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
196. Janet Elliott, Habeas System Fails Death Row Appellant, Tex. Law., Mar. 9, 1998, at 25-26.
197. Marni von Wilpert, Comment, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner's Last Chance, Attorney Error, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's One-Year Statute of Limitations Period for Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 79 Fordham L. Rev. 1429, 1467 (2010).
198. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 645 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
199. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
200. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981).
201. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (1949).
202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
203. The Link Court had itself noted that Rule 60(b) provided a "corrective remedy" allowing for the "reopening of cases in which final orders have been inadvisedly entered, " but that the petitioner had never sought to avail himself of that "escape hatch. " 370 U.S. 626, 632 (1962).
204. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
205. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
206. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
207. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
208. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
209. See Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
210. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the attorneys "represented to Tani that the litigation was proceeding smoothly, " and that Tani relied on his attorneys' assurances until "he received the order for default judgment"); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (noting that the client "made numerous inquiries of his former counsel who refused to answer such inquiries and assured appellee from time to time that the case was proceeding, " even though it had been dismissed for failure to prosecute (internal quotation marks omitted); Primbs v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 366, 370 (1984) (noting that the "agency analysis is particularly inappropriate when the plaintiff [as in this case] has proven that his diligent efforts to prosecute the suit were, without his knowledge, thwarted by his attorney's deceptions and negligence").
211. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2555 (2010).
212. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving a lawyer who failed to answer numerous telephone calls and letters from the client and his mother).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the prisoner alleged he had been "deceived by his attorney into believing that a timely § 2255 motion had been filed on his behalf").
214. 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3d Cir. 1978).
215. 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
216. 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
217. 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
218. 610 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 2010).
219. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business benefit associated with the name of his dental practice).
220. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business benefit associated with the name of his dental practice).
221. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business benefit associated with the name of his dental practice).
222. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business benefit associated with the name of his dental practice).
223. See, e.g., Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that Tani faced a two-million-dollar default judgment and the loss of the intangible business benefit associated with the name of his dental practice).
224. 282 F.3d at 1170.
225. 282 F.3d at 1170.
226. 282 F.3d at 1170.
227. 804 F.2d 805, 806 (3d Cir. 1986).
228. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 924 (2012).
229. See, e.g., Dillon v. Conway, 642 F.3d 358, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding "extraordinary circumstances" warranting equitable tolling of the AEDPA deadline after the attorney "failed to follow his client's instruction" to file a timely petition).
230. Even before the Court decided Gonzalez v. Crosby, the Second Circuit had held that "relief under Rule 60(b) is available for a previous habeas proceeding only when the Rule 60(b) motion attacks the integrity of the previous habeas proceeding rather than the underlying criminal conviction. "
231. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
232. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
233. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
234. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
235. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
236. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
237. 545 U.S. 524, 538 (2005).
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (2006).
239. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 538.
240. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 532, 538.
241. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
242. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
243. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
244. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
245. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
246. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
247. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
248. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
249. 682 F.3d 1247, 1248 (9th Cir. 2012).
250. 682 F.3d at 1249.
251. 682 F.3d at 1249.
252. 682 F.3d at 1249.
253. 682 F.3d at 1249.
254. 682 F.3d at 1249.
255. 682 F.3d at 1249.
256. 682 F.3d at 1249.