Discrimination statutes, The common law, and proximate cause

University of Illinois Law Review

Volumn 2013, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 1-57

  Sperino, Sandra F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

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EID: 84874864573     PISSN: 02769948     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (73)

1. SEE, E.G., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5 (1982);
2. WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 45, 67-68 (1999);
3. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
4. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1191 ("[W]e start from the premise that when Congress creates a federal tort it adopts the background of general tort law."); see also Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. REV. 175, 196-97 (1993) (discussing sources supporting view that Title VII is a tort). This Article does not claim that there is no connection between torts and statutory employment discrimination law. Rather, it challenges the claim that the statutes' primary substantive provisions are generally drawn from tort law.
5. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1189-90 (2011). For a comprehensive discussion of Staub, see Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431 (2012).
6. The distinction between these two concepts is often blurred. Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 945 (2001).
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 (2010) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250 (9th ed. 2009) (providing multiple definitions for proximate cause and indicating that the following terms also reflect proximate cause: direct cause, efficient cause, legal cause, procuring cause, and remote cause, among others); Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 51 (1991). Further, the definition of proximate cause has changed over time. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 23, § 29.
9. w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
10. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts As Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 970 (2010).
11. For another description of proximate cause, see Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451, 469-70 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12. Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471-72 (1950).
13. Jill E. Fisch, Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811, 832 (2009).
14. At times, either by common law or statutes, certain types of potential defendants are exempted from liability; however, the modern trend is to reduce the available exemptions. Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 12 (2005) (discussing how charitable immunity waned in the twentieth century).
15. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 27 (1994) (discussing compromises made to pass Title VII).
16. The author is largely skeptical of these types and frameworks, but they are helpful for describing the current state of employment discrimination law. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69 (2011).
17. See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1368 (2009) ("Few propositions are less controversial or more embedded in the structure of Title VII analysis than that the statute recognizes only 'disparate treatment' and 'disparate impact' theories of employment discrimination." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
18. *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2006). Further, the third step in the Title VII disparate impact analysis arguably relies on a negligence standard. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii). For an interesting discussion of how Title VII arguably does encompass a negligence standard, see Zatz, supra note 70.
19. Sperino, supra note 65, at 85. For an excellent account of the limits of pregnancy discrimination protections, see Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567 (2010).
20. Discrimination law also does not fully address the ways that workers are required to perform identity work. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 (2000).
21. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 746 (2005);
22. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-25 (1987).
23. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 91 (2003).
24. Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 1235, 1244-45 (1988) (discussing how factual cause is a liability-limiting principle).
25. See id. at 1259 (discussing early cases using but-for causation). This Article does not intend to describe all of the factual cause standards that arise in discrimination law. That subject is worth several law review articles and has been widely discussed. See, e.g., id. at 1240; Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 75 (2010) (discussing historical development of causation in disparate treatment cases);
26. Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 500-11 (2006);
27. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 929 (2005); Zatz, supra note 70, at 1374-76 (discussing causation in disparate treatment cases).
28. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The factors considered in the prima facie case may vary depending on the factual scenario presented in the case. Id. at 802 n.13.
29. The problem with reliance on comparator evidence is well argued in Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).
30. See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This provision is referred to as a mixed-motive provision for ease of identification. There is significant debate regarding whether this provision should be limited to the mixed-motive context. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83 (2004);
31. William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549 (2005);
32. William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2003);
33. Jeffrey A. Van Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!": An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a "Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 76 (2003).
34. See generally Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887 (2004) (arguing that the new approach established in the 1991 amendments to Title VII will apply to most individual discrimination cases).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). When Congress added the motivating factor language to Title VII, it did not make similar changes to the ADEA or ADA. Catherine T. Strove, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 289, 318 (2010).
36. D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 735-37 (1987) (distinguishing motive from intent and concluding that Title VII should use motive).
37. Further, the meaning of intent is less clear after Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
38. Stephen M. Rich, Against Prejudice, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (arguing the case moves away from an animus-based notion).
39. Rich, supra note 112, at 45-47. Teasing out the underlying meaning of courts, it appears they require an actor to take some action that is later judged to be motivated by the use of a protected trait and that this action caused certain outcomes. Zatz, supra note 70, at 1374-76 (discussing causation in disparate treatment cases). There are strong arguments that discrimination should not be concerned with narrow concepts of motivation, intent, or causation. See Paul J. Gudel, Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 94-97 (1991). Factual cause questions may play varying roles in cases, depending on the underlying claim. In pattern or practice cases, the causal requirement plays diminished significance, because the plaintiff is required to demonstrate that discrimination was the standard operating procedure of the company. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977).
40. For an excellent discussion of disparate impact causation under Title VII, see Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325 (1996).
41. See, e.g., id. at 474 (indicating that lateral transfer is not cognizable); see also Rebecca Han-ner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1129 (1998) (discussing where courts should draw lines regarding liability).
42. Stephen F. Befort & Alison L. Olig, Within the Grasp of the Cat's Paw: Delineating the Scope of Subordinate Bias Liability Under Federal Antidiscrimination Statutes, 60 S.C. L. REV. 383, 384 (2008).
43. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). By describing agency doctrine, the author is not expressing agreement with it. For a critique of agency doctrine, see Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 4-5 (2003).
44. Id. § 216(b). But see Carol Abdelmesseh & Deanne M. DiBlasi, Note, Why Punitive Damages Should Be Awarded for Retaliatory Discharge Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 715, 748 (2004) (discussing whether punitive damages are available for retaliation claims).
45. Sandra F. Sperino, Statutory Proximate Cause, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
46. See CALABRESI, supra note 2, at 5; POPKIN, supra note 2, at 45, 67; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987);
47. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 348 (1990);
48. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 78 (2006);
49. Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 355-56 (2005);
50. William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 594 (1988).
51. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988) (describing various statutory interpretation techniques).
52. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1229 (2001) (noting that super-statutes change the common-law baseline).
53. Beverly v. Lone Star Lead Constr. Corp., 437 F.2d 1136, 1138 n.7 (5th Cir. 1971); see also CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OFTHE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985) (exploring the tortured legislative history of Title VII); H.R. Rep. No. 914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 2112 (describing how ambiguous the statutory language is).
54. This Section has examined interpretation largely through the lens of textualism, intentional-ism, and purposivism because these are the arguments the courts use to justify their conclusions regarding statutory proximate cause. Sperino, supra note 182, Part II. Outside the proximate cause context, courts sometimes use a common-law methodology when preemptive lawmaking is required to preserve the statutory mandate. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 184, at 359. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that a common-law construction approach would be inappropriate in Title VII cases. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation - In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 818-19 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 (2003) (drawing from common-law concepts of employee without providing convincing rationale, but ultimately creating a different definition relying on EEOC Compliance Manual)); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1986) (suggesting, without much support, that Title VII might refer to common-law concepts of agency).
56. For example, calling discrimination statutes a tort has important implications regarding whether Title VII should be conceived as a mechanism for remedying individual harms or whether it should be construed more broadly. See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW (2010);
57. Dennis P. Duffy, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Employment At Will: The Case Against "Tortiflcation" of Labor and Employment Law, 74 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1994); Zemelman, supra note 3, at 193-97.
58. Belton, supra note 84, at 1250; David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1773 n.30 (1997).
59. See Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal About Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 265-66 (2008) (arguing that civil rights law should not be bound to one concept of fault).
60. Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2140 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Id. at 270-71; Oppenheimer, supra note 80, at 920-21; Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2007);
62. Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Water-house: Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1118, 1136-37 (1991).
63. See generally Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495 (2001) (analyzing the intent requirement in the context of disparate treatment claims involving more than one actor)).
64. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353, 354 (2008).
65. Similar concerns exist for harassment cases. The Supreme Court has noted that "[s]exual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998).
66. But see generally L. Camille Hébert, The Disparate Impact of Sexual Harassment: Does Motive Matter?, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341 (2005) (considering the viability of a disparate impact sexual harassment claim);
67. Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185, 215 (2003) (considering the viability of a disparate impact sexual harassment claim). The closest common-law corollary for harassment claims is not negligence, but rather intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)). IIED, however, is not an exact fit with harassment.
68. David W. Robertson, Negligence Liability for Crimes and Intentional Torts Committed by Others, 67 TUL. L. REV. 135, 138 (1992) (discussing how Louisiana applies a different proximate cause analysis than the one suggested by the Restatement).
69. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 6, 122 Stat. 3553 (granting EEOC authority to issue regulations); Nancy M. Modesitt, The Hundred-Years War: The Ongoing Battle Between Courts and Agencies over the Right to Interpret Federal Law, 74 Mo. L. REV. 949, 976-77 (2009) (discussing how Congress did not provide rulemaking authority to the EEOC under Title VII).
70. Id. at 797, 802 n.3 (noting that "[t]he proper analysis here, then, calls not for a mechanical application of indefinite and malleable factors" from the Restatement and also indicating in a footnote that the Court was not using pure common law). See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66 (1995) (describing how Title VII agency principles do not mimic common-law agency).
71. Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 41, 55 (1999).
72. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court's Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281 (2011) (discussing the Supreme Court's response to the 1991 amendments to Title VII).
73. Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1192 (discussing the motivating factor standard); Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 877 (6th Cir. 2001) (indicating that the plaintiff "must offer evidence that the supervisor's racial animus was the cause of the termination or somehow influenced the ultimate decisionmaker"); see also Befort & Olig, supra note 144, at 402 (discussing how causation analysis should operate in cat's paw cases); Sara Atherton Mason, Note, Cat's Paw Cases: The Standard for Assessing Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing the various standards courts have used in cat's paw cases).