Game Theory, Conditional Preferences, and Social Influence

PLoS ONE

Volumn 8, Issue 2, 2013, Pages

  Stirling, Wynn C ^a   Felin, Teppo ^b  

^a Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (United States)

^b BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK; CONDITIONAL PREFERENCE; CONTROLLED STUDY; DECISION MAKING; EMBEDDING; GAME; HUMAN RELATION; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; PROBABILITY; ROLE PLAYING; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EXCLUSION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIETY;

COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, THEORETICAL;

EID: 84874532846     PISSN: None     EISSN: 19326203     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0056751     Document Type: Article

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