Public law and public choice: Critique and rapprochement

Research Handbook on Public Choice and Public Law

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 19-48

  Mashaw, Jerry ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873999776     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781849804899.00008     Document Type: Chapter

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