Quantifying Law: legal indicator projects and the reproduction of neoliberal common sense

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 131-150

  Krever, Tor ^a  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; ENTREPRENEUR; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; LEGAL SYSTEM; NEOLIBERALISM; WORLD BANK;

EID: 84873707956     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: 13602241     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.755014     Document Type: Article

References (117)

1. K Davis, 'What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms?', Michigan Journal of International Law, 26, 2004, pp 141-161.
2. A Rosga & ML Satterthwaite, 'The trust in indicators: measuring human rights', Berkeley Journal of International Law, 27(2), 2009, pp 253-315.
3. See D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
4. See B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation, London: LexisNexis, 2002, p 314.
5. Ibid. 12
6. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p 19.
7. E Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory, London: Ink Links, 1978.
8. G Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971, p 264.
9. For a discussion of these and other Marxist theorists, see R Knox, 'Strategy and tactics', Finnish Yearbook of International Law, 21, 2010, pp 193-229.
10. See DM Trubek & M Galanter, 'Scholars in self-estrangement: some reflections on the crisis in law and development studies in the United States', Wisconsin Law Review, 1974, 1974, pp 1062-1102.
11. See T Krever, 'The legal turn in late development theory: the rule of law and the World Bank's development model', Harvard Journal of International Law, 52(1), 2011, pp 287-319.
12. See World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981.
13. J Williamson, 'What Washington means by policy reform', in Williamson (ed), Latin American Adjustment: How Much has Happened?, Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990, p 7.
14. B Milanovic, 'The two faces of globalization: against globalization as we know it', World Development, 31(4), 2003, pp 667-683.
15. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1992, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, p 34.
16. R Wade, 'Japan, the World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance: the East Asian miracle in political perspective', New Left Review, I(217), 1996, pp 3-36.
17. World Bank, Governance: The World Bank's Experience, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1994, p 6.
18. Quoted in WP Ofosu-Amaah, 'Legal and judicial reform in developing countries: reflections on World Bank experience', Law & Business Review of the Americas, 8, 2002, p 556.
19. See Krever, 'The legal turn in late development theory'.
20. B Wydick, Games in Economic Development, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p 149.
21. Ibid. 15
22. World Bank, Legal and Judicial Reform: Observations, Experiences and Approach of the Legal Vice Presidency, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002, p 3.
23. U Mattei & L Nader, Plunder: When the Rule of Law is Illegal, Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008, p 96.
24. An extensive list of governance indicators is provided in the appendix to M Besançon, Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement, World Peace Foundation Report No 36, 2003, at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wpf36governance.pdf. On indicators of human rights compliance.
25. Rosga & Satterthwaite, 'The trust in indicators'.
26. See the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators, at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
27. See the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Reports, at http://www.weforum.org/issues/glo-bal-competitiveness/.
28. See the Polity IV Project, at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
29. See Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, at http://www.transparency.org/research/gcb/.
30. See the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, at http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org.
31. See Doing Business, at http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
32. WFM de Vries, 'Meaningful measures: indicators on progress, progress on indicators', International Statistical Review, 69(2), 2001, pp 313-331.
33. TM Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, p 9.
34. Ibid, p 149.
35. For a trenchant critique of the use of quantitative indicators in development aid and their role in constructing narratives of developmental success within the Western aid community, see.
36. T Almeida Cravo, 'What's in a label? The aid community's representations of success and failure in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau', PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2012.
37. Davis, 'What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms?'.
38. Ibid, p 154.
39. Ibid, pp 146-147.
40. Ibid, p 161.
41. A concomitant critique focuses on the quantitative, cross-national studies that draw on these indicators, questioning the robustness of the causal relationship allegedly captured by their statistical analyses. See, for example.
42. MJ Trebilcock & RJ Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development: Charting the Fragile Path of Progress, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008, pp 9-12.
43. JA Ocampo & R Vos, Uneven Economic Development, London: Zed, 2008, p 154.
44. Ibid. 20
45. R Levitas & W Guy, 'Introduction', in Levitas & Guy (eds), Interpreting Official Statistics, New York: Routledge, 1996, p 1.
46. SE Merry, 'Measuring the world: indicators, human rights, and global governance', Current Anthropology, 52(S3), 2011, p S84.
47. See, for example, D Kaufmann, A Kraay & P Zoido-Lobatón, Governance Matters, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 2196, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.
48. D Kaufmann, A Kraay & M Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2008, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 4978, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
49. Kaufmann et al, Governance Matters VIII.
50. Ibid, p 4.
51. Ibid. 30
52. Ibid, p 78.
53. Ibid, p 53.
54. Ibid (emphasis added).
55. Ibid, p 45.
56. Ibid, p 47.
57. Ibid, p 50.
58. Ibid, p 72 (emphasis added).
59. Ibid, p 7.
60. C Arndt & C Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators, Paris: Development Centre of the oecd, 2006, p 69.
61. Ibid, p 75.
62. L Simpson, 'Statistical exclusion and social exclusion: the impact of missing data', Radical Statistics, 71, 2009.
63. World Bank, World Business Environment Survey, at http://go.worldbank.org/EAAD9A0GA0.
64. Davis, 'What can the rule of law variable tell us about rule of law reforms?', p 159.
65. See, for example, World Bank, Doing Business 2004: Understanding Regulation, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004.
66. World Bank, Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Difficult Times, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009.
67. World Bank, Doing Business 2011: Making a Difference for Entrepreneurs, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010.
68. World Bank, Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012.
69. World Bank, Doing Business 2013: Smarter Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013.
70. World Bank, Doing Business 2004, p 1.
71. The project's creators note that they seek to establish 'the scope and manner of regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it' (p viii).
72. World Bank, Doing Business 2013, p 5. The original 2004 report included data on only five areas of law in 133 countries.
73. For example, Doing Business 2010 included the following areas: 1) starting a business; 2) obtaining licences; 3) employing workers; 4) enforcing a contract; 5) obtaining credit; 6) closing a business; 7) registering property; 8) protecting investors; 9) paying taxes; and 10) trading across borders. The most recent report, Doing Business 2013, includes 1) starting a business; 2) dealing with construction permits; 3) getting electricity; 4) registering property; 5) getting credit; 6) protecting investors; 7) paying taxes; 8) trading across borders; 9) enforcing contracts; 10) resolving insolvency; and 11) employing workers.
74. Now entitled 'employing workers', this section of the Doing Business study was, in pre-2008 reports, originally called 'Hiring and firing workers'.
75. See, for example, World Bank, Doing Business 2007: How to Reform, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006. In the three most recent reports (2011, 2012 and 2013), the 'employing workers' analysis has been moved to a separate annex.
76. Data are based on surveys of employment regulations and their effect on a hypothetical worker and business, in the 2010 iteration assumed to be a small to medium-size enterprise with 60 employees. See Doing Business 2010, p 82.
77. Ibid, pp 82-83.
78. Ibid, p 22.
79. International Trade Union Confederation, 'The IFIs' use of Doing Business to eliminate workers' protection: analysis of Doing Business 2008 and new country evidence', 2007, p 3, at http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/doing_business.pdf.
80. For an analysis of the production and reproduction of 'success stories' in international development, see.
81. Almeida Cravo, 'What's in a label?'.
82. World Bank, Doing Business 2005: Removing Obstacles to Growth, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004, p 108.
83. World Bank, Doing Business 2008, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007, p 121.
84. World Bank, Doing Business 2007, p 113.
85. Doing Business 2008, p 121.
86. Doing Business 2010, p 122.
87. World Bank, Doing Business 2007, pp 1-3.
88. Ibid, p 19.
89. International Trade Union Confederation, 'The IFIs' use of Doing Business to eliminate workers' protection', p 4.
90. P Bakvis, 'The World Bank's Doing Business report: a last fling for the Washington Consensus?', Transfer: European Review of Labour & Research, 15(3-4), 2009, p 430.
91. Rosga & Satterthwaite, 'The trust in indicators', p 30.
92. World Bank, Doing Business 2010, p 1.
93. Ibid, p v.
94. See, for example, World Bank, World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002, p 19.
95. World Bank, World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000, pp 50, 103.
96. M Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p 13.
97. Ibid, pp 10-11.
98. World Bank, Doing Business 2004, pp 9-10.
99. World Bank, Doing Business 2010, p 1.
100. Rosga & Satterthwaite, 'The trust in indicators', p 48.
101. D Kennedy, 'Challenging expert rule: the politics of global governance', Sydney Law Review, 27, 2005, p 14.
102. IFI Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, p 85.
103. S Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of Ideology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p 22.
104. DG Williams, 'Governance and the discipline of development', European Journal of Development Research, 8, 1996, p 171.
105. International Development Association, 'What is IDA'?, at http://go.worldbank.org/ZRAOR8IWW0.
106. International Development Association, 'How IDA resources are allocated', at http://go.worldbank.org/T22G357C90. Note that population and per capita income are also used in the determination of ida allocations.
107. World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services, 'Disclosing ida country performance ratings', 2004, p 12, at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/disclosingIDACPR.pdf.
108. See S Soederberg, 'American empire and "excluded states": the Millennium Challenge Account and the shift to pre-emptive development', Third World Quarterly, 25, 2004, p 279.
109. Georg W Bush, speech at the Inter-American Development Bank, 14 March 2002.
110. MCC, 'About MCC', at http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about.
111. MCC, 'Report on the criteria and methodology for determining the eligibility of candidate countries for Millennium Challenge Account assistance in Fiscal Year 2012', 2011, at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/reports/report-2011001066201-fy12-selection-criteria.pdf.
112. See MCC, 'The "MCC effect": creating incentives for policy reform; promoting an environment for poverty reduction', 2008, at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-102108-mcceffect.pdf.
113. D Johnson & T Zajonc, 'Can foreign aid create an incentive for good governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation', unpublished manuscript, 2006, p 2, available at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/tzajonc/mcc_wp_apr06.pdf.
114. Ibid, p 8.
115. S Radelet, 'Pushing not pulling reforms: delivering aid through Challenge grants', in I Kaul & P Conceição (eds), The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p 510.
116. A Dreher, P Nunnenkamp & H Öhler, Why it Pays for Aid Recipients to Take Note of the Millennium Challenge Corporation: Other Donors Do!, Discussion Paper No 99, Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research, Georg-August University, Göttingen, 2010, p 6.
117. See, for example, Arndt & Oman, Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators, pp 36-38.