Getting rid of interventions

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C :Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 787-795

  Reutlinger, Alexander ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

Counterfactual theories of causation; Counterfactuals; Interventionist theories of causation

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; EPIDEMIOLOGY; LOGIC; METHODOLOGY;

CAUSALITY; LOGIC; RESEARCH DESIGN;

EID: 84872486547     PISSN: 13698486     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2012.05.006     Document Type: Article

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