First-Person Propositions

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 86, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 155-182

  Hanks, Peter W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84872192533     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00546.x     Document Type: Article

References (34)

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