Coordination of outsourced operations at a third-party facility subject to booking, overtime, and tardiness costs

Operations Research

Volumn 60, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1436-1450

  Cai, Xiaoqiang ^a   Vairaktarakis, George L ^b  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

^b CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cooperative game; Outsourcing; Scheduling and planning; Truth telling mechanism

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT; COOPERATIVE GAME; COORDINATION SCHEME; DUE DATES; MODEL-BASED OPC; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; OUTSOURCE; SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING; SHARING SCHEMES; TARDINESS COST; THIRD PARTIES; TIME SLOTS; TRUTH-TELLING; WIN-WIN;

COSTS; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; OUTSOURCING; SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICE MANUFACTURE;

MANUFACTURE;

EID: 84871859898     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1120.1110     Document Type: Article

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