Negative-expected-value suits

Procedural Law and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 341-349

  Bebchuk, Lucian A ^a   Klement, Alon ^b  

^a HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84871856187     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9781782540472.00017     Document Type: Chapter

References (25)

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