Advantage defendant: Why sinking litigation costs makes negative-expected-value defenses but not negative-expected-value suits credible

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 235-253

  Schwartz, Warren F ^a   Wickelgren, Abraham L ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 62749156408     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/587144     Document Type: Article

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