The influence of initial beliefs on judgments of probability

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue OCT, 2012, Pages

  Yu, Erica C ^a   Lagnado, David A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief revision; Gambling; Model based learning; Priors; Probability judgment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870917678     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00381     Document Type: Article

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