WE MAY REMEMBER BUT WHAT DID WE LEARN? DEALING WITH ERRORS, CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS AROUND ADVERSE EVENTS IN HEALTHCARE

Financial Accountability and Management

Volumn 25, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 451-474

  Fischbacher Smith, Denis ^a   Fischbacher Smith, Moira ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

adverse events; organisation with a memory; organisational learning; patient safety

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870905271     PISSN: 02674424     EISSN: 14680408     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0408.2009.00487.x     Document Type: Article

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