When do politicians listen to lobbyists (and who benefits when they do)?

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 20-43

  Bernhagen, Patrick ^a,b  

^a ZEPPELIN UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Interest groups; Lobbying; Political influence; Signalling games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84870531843     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: 14756765     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2012.02062.x     Document Type: Article

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