Hierarchical auction mechanisms for network resource allocation

IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications

Volumn 30, Issue 11, 2012, Pages 2117-2125

  Tang, Wenyuan ^a   Jain, Rahul ^a  

^a University of Southern California ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

auctions; hierarchical models; mechanism design; Network economics; resource allocation

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; AUCTION MODEL; AUCTIONS; COMPUTING SERVICES; HIERARCHICAL MODEL; HOMOGENEOUS NETWORK; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK ECONOMICS; NETWORK RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS; SECONDARY NETWORKS; SEQUENTIAL AUCTIONS; VCG AUCTIONS;

COMMERCE; HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS; MACHINE DESIGN; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SALES;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 84870286929     PISSN: 07338716     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2012.121204     Document Type: Article

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