Mechanism design for double auctions with temporal constraints

IJCAI International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 472-477

  Zhao, Dengji ^a,b   Zhang, Dongmo ^c   Perrussel, Laurent ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN SYDNEY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^c NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS; AUGMENTATION TECHNIQUES; DESIGN AND ANALYSIS; MARKET CLEARING; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; TEMPORAL CONSTRAINTS; WEIGHTED BIPARTITE MATCHINGS;

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; GRAPH THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 84869444331     PISSN: 10450823     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.5591/978-1-57735-516-8/IJCAI11-086     Document Type: Conference Paper

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