The Role of Partisanship in Aggregate Opinion

Political Behavior

Volumn 34, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 627-651

  Enns, Peter K ^a   McAvoy, Gregory E ^b  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT GREENSBORO   (United States)

Author keywords

Economic perceptions; Partisan bias; Party identification; Public opinion; Time series analysis

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868479821     PISSN: 01909320     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11109-011-9176-7     Document Type: Article

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