The stock market, the market for corporate control and the theory of the firm: Legal and economic perspectives and implications for public policy

The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investment

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 185-222

  Deakin, Simon ^a   Singh, Ajit ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEENS COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84868143758     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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