The ICRC: A unique humanitarian protagonist

International Review of the Red Cross

Volumn 89, Issue 865, 2007, Pages 63-96

  Forsythe, David P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

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EID: 84866434038     PISSN: 18163831     EISSN: 16075889     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1816383107000902     Document Type: Article

References (72)

1. Caroline Moorehead, Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland, and the History of the Red Cross, Harper Collins, New York, 1999, p. 175.
2. While Dunant's and then the ICRC's motivation were strictly humanitarian during 1859–64, states had mixed motives - humanitarian, but also expediential in the sense of shoring up war as a viable policy option that was acceptable on the home front. See especially John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996.
3. Henry Dunant would have been shocked, no doubt, to learn that the ICRC in the 1960s had a chief medical officer who showed up at headquarters “every Thursday afternoon” (internal document in the possession of the author). Its medical planning at that time remained “dérisoires” (insignificant); Philippe Ryfman, La question humanitaire, Ellipses, Paris, 1999, p. 79.
4. For an argument about the declining utility of war, at least among the great powers, see John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics, Harper Collins, New York, 1995.
5. For the argument that the idea of peace is now accepted as a dominant value among major states see Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas that Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century, Public Affairs, New York, 2003.
6. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.
7. See especially James G. Stewart, “Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law: a critique of internationalized armed conflict”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 850 (2003), pp. 313–50.
8. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 29 June 2006. The Supreme Court, while courageous in interjecting IHL into the US “war on terrorism” in such a way as to challenge highly questionable policies by the George W. Bush administration, left itself open to certain criticisms. Some prisoners at Guantánamo, seized outside situations of armed conflict, did not fall under IHL. Also, insofar as detainees were taken prisoner in Afghanistan during winter 2001–2, objectively speaking they were legally protected by those parts of the 1949 Geneva Conventions pertaining to international war, not just by Common Article 3 thereof pertaining to internal war.
9. Jacques Moreillon, Le Comite international de la Crox-Rouge et la protection des detenus politques, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1973. It is strange that this authoritative work has never been translated into English.
10. It can be briefly noted that the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, intended to protect civilians, mainly focuses on detention and occupation – situations transpiring after major combat. But from the Nigerian civil war on, the ICRC was expected also to protect civilians in the midst of continuing combat – by providing food and other relief in the theatre of war. The legal provisions pertaining to civilian protection in the 1977 Additional Protocols I and II are in fact much more demanding than comparable provisions of 1949.
11. Ian Fisher, “Searing uncertainty for Iraqis' missing loved ones”, New York Times, 1 June 2004, p. A1.
12. The International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics awarded the Brian Blatchford Prize to the ICRC at its World Congress in Hong Kong in 2004. The prize recognized the ICRC's “innovative achievements, particularly in the design and development of … prosthetic services in developing countries”. ICRC press release 04/91, 6 August 2004.
13. Kirsten Sellars, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights, Sutton, Phoenix Mill, 2002, pp. 153–6.
14. See David Gonzalez, “Police doubts about attack cast cloud on rights group”, New York Times, 6 May 2002, p. A3, regarding a staged attack on a Guatemalan rights activist on the US west coast, about which AI-USA sent out an alert.
15. In 1992 the ICRC relied on the United Nations to give a total for the number of anti-personnel mines deployed around the world. This figure turned out to be exaggerated, and the ICRC then altered its public statements. See Ilaria Bottigliero, 120 Million Landmines Deployed World Wide: Fact or Fiction?, Foundation Pro Victimis, Geneva, 2000, esp. p. 77.
16. André Rochat was an extraordinary ICRC delegate in the field, but later as an ICRC regional official dealing with the Middle East in general his integrity and veracity were questioned, particularly by Israel, and not always without reason. The first part of this interesting story is found in André Rochat, L'Homme à la Croix: Une Anticroisade, Editions de L'Aire (no place of publication indicated), 2005. The second part of the story is tellingly absent from this memoir.
17. Rainer Baudendistel, Between Bombs and Good Intentions: The Red Cross and the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936, Berghahn Books, New York, 2006. This well-researched and well-considered analysis deserves wide reading.
18. “Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the event of violations of international humanitarian law or of other fundamental rules protecting persons in situations of violence”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 858 (2005), pp. 393–400. This statement of doctrine is in fact bolder than its 1981 antecedent, because the ICRC commits itself to taking into account not just IHL norms but also human rights standards applicable to “situations of violence”.
19. The UN reported 34,000 Iraqis killed during 2006 alone. Sabrina Tavernise, “Iraqi death toll exceeded 34,000 in '06, U.N. says”, New York Times, 17 January 2007.
20. Caroline Moorehead makes this point well, above note 2, pp. 297, 298, 304 and passim.
21. While the ICRC has always focused on victims of conflicts, it does so in expanded ways. For example, it now pays more attention to the transition from active conflict to what might pass for stability or normality, thus overlapping with what is often called “development”. In so doing, it has also blurred the distinction between humanitarian norms and human rights. The organization, for example, pays more attention now to the long-term mental health of women who have been adversely affected by conflict, sometimes by rape. See especially the article by Marion Harroff-Tavel, “Do wars ever end? The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross when the guns fall silent”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851 (2003), pp. 465–95.
22. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience, Vintage, London, 1999, p. 144.
23. Amos Elon, “Switzerland's lasting demon”, New York Times Magazine, 12 April 1998, p. 40.
24. Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations, Government Printing Office, Washington, 2004 (The Schlesinger Report, available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/pubs/ph/details.cfm?id5 10157, last visited 22 December 2006).
25. Michèle Mercier, Crimes sans châtiment: L'action humanitaire en ex-Yougoslavie 1991–1993, Bruylant, Brussels, 1994.
26. See further Mary B. Anderson, ““You save my life today, but for what tomorrow?”: Some moral dilemmas of humanitarian aid”, in Jonathan Moore (ed.), Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, Rowman & Littlefield for the ICRC, Geneva, 1998, pp. 137–56.
27. Urs Boegli, quoted by Elizabeth Becker in “Red Cross Man in Guantánamo: A ”busybody”, but not unwelcome”, New York Times, 20 February 2002, A10.
28. Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, Little, Brown, Boston, 1995.
29. Long Walk to Freedom, p. 410.
30. Dres Balmer, L'heure de cuivre, Editions d'En Bas, Lausanne, 1984, trans. from the original German.
31. Mandela, above note 34, p. 409.
32. Mandela's logic, in an otherwise wonderful book, is faulty here. He writes that the South African authorities respected and feared the ICRC because they feared a loss of international reputation. But if those authorities acceded to its requests and modified the conditions of detention in relatively minor ways, the discreet ICRC would not resort to public denunciation. Pretoria was indeed concerned about its international reputation, but was able both to continue with its racist and repressive policies and to placate the ICRC by making certain changes in prison administration. See Fran Lisa Buntman, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
33. Personal sources, Geneva. See also Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorised Biography, Harper Collins, London, 1999, pp. 226–7.
34. Samantha Power, in “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, Perennial, New York, 2002, is very critical of the ICRC for not denouncing the Serbs' non-co-operation at Srebrenica. See pp. 409–411. She does not report on the dynamics of ICRC quiet diplomacy vis-à-vis Mladić.
35. While such macrostatistics may be important to donors, showing that goods and services are being delivered to beneficiaries, too much focus on them may cause the humanitarian agency concerned to lose sight of the needs of particular victims. See further John Prendergast, Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1996.
36. History of the International Committee of the Red Cross: From Solverino to Tushima, Henry Dunant Institute, Geneva, 1985.
37. R. J. Rummel, Death by Government: Genocide and Mass Murder since 1900, Transaction, Somerset, NJ, 1997.
38. Massimo Lorenzi, Le CICR, le coeur et la raison: Entretiens avec Cornelio Sommaruga, Favre, Lausanne, 1998, p. 75 and passim.
39. The UNHCR, created by states and remaining an agency in an inter-governmental organization, also takes initiatives not pre-approved by states. See Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
40. ICRC press release 02/30, 26 July 2002, “Israel and the occupied/autonomous territories: ICRC distributes clothes to detainees”.
41. On the other hand, in 2003 the ICRC reduced its assistance to certain Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation in the West Bank area. The ICRC drew the conclusion that Israel was avoiding its responsibilities as occupying power to care properly for the civilian population. In other words, Geneva concluded that Israel was avoiding certain costs of occupation by trying to substitute the resources of the ICRC. See ICRC statement, 20 November 2003, “New strategy for the West Bank”.
42. In David P. Forsythe, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee of the Red Cross, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1977, there is a discussion of the perils of “the one more blanket theory”. The ICRC's desire to bring in one more blanket leaves it open to manipulation by unscrupulous authorities.
43. In a 2004 public opinion poll in the United States after much attention to US abuse of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantánamo, 66 per cent of respondents said that the United States should respect legal prohibitions against torture; 58 per cent objected to use of dogs to terrify suspects and 75 per cent to forcing them to be naked, even if the prisoner was not co-operative; 93 per cent approved of Red Cross visits; and 77 per cent approved of Red Cross family messages. Program on International Policy Attitudes, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, 22 July 2004, available at listserv@ americans-world.org.
44. Compare Tony Waters, Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of Humanitarian Relief Operations, Westview Press, Boulder, 2002, pp. 49–50. Because a young girl needing medical attention was not war-wounded, an ICRC delegate in the Sudanese conflict reportedly refused to take her on board an aircraft since she did not come within the ICRC's mandate and its bureaucratic instructions to its delegates. But even in this case, the ICRC decision could be defended: the ICRC was not supposed to be an all-purpose do-gooder and development or relief agency, and ICRC delegates were not to dissipate their energies in matters outside conflict. Whether this meant that a delegate should never do an occasional good deed beyond the official mandate of the organization is another matter. But the ICRC does indeed have to have a clear and limited focus, leading to consistent policies.
45. See, e.g., Alain Aeschlimann, “Protection of detainees: ICRC action behind bars”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 87, No. 857 (2005), pp. 83–122.
46. On ICRC public protest, see the exchange between Daniel Warner and the present writer in Millennium, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2005), pp. 449–76.
47. Another example of great creativity and determination in the field was that of Rochat in the Yemen in the 1960s, who also contended with headquarters about Egypt's misrepresentation (namely lying) about the use of poison gas. This part of L'Homme à la Croix, above note 21, is reliable.
48. William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1984.
49. Aryeh Neier, Taking Liberties: Four Decades in the Struggle for Rights, Public Affairs, New York, 2003, p. 209.
50. ICRC press release No. 03/06, 13 January 2003, “Nepal: conflict area assessed”.
51. For a somewhat legalistic but nevertheless interesting focus on relations between components of the RC Movement, see Christophe Lanord, “The legal status of National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 82, No. 840 (2000), pp. 1053–1078.
52. Given that the author is a former legal advisor to the Federation, this is a candid treatment of the subject. See also in general Ian Smillie (ed.), Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield, CT, 2001, although unfortunately it has little information about the RC network. At the time of writing the ICRC is much more attentive to local capacity within the RC Movement.
53. Moorehead, above note 2, p. 372.
54. See “Policy on ICRC co-operation with National Societies”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 851 (2003), pp. 663–78.
55. See also Red Cross Red Crescent, No. 4 (2003), pp. 10–11, where the presidents of the ICRC and Federation comment on the Movement and the International Conference. It was in some ways remarkable that the RC network was openly addressing the defects of these institutions, even if they were circumspect in comments about how to bring about beneficial change. It was clear that ICRC President Kellenberger was in favour of dialogue rather than sanctions.
56. Gil Loescher, A Perilous Path, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
57. ICRC, Annual Report 2002, ICRC, Geneva, 2003, pp. 11–13.
58. Chris Hedges, “Point man at the U.N. as Switzerland takes sides”, New York Times, 5 April 2002, p. A21, interview with Jeno C. A. Staehelin. Several ICRC officials contest the notion that the current ICRC is risk-averse or that Swiss culture plays a large role in the organization. Rather, they say, their policies are the result of careful reflection on long experience. Yet the fact remains that most of the policies emanating from headquarters just happen to turn out to be conservative – namely, cautious.
59. See further David P. Forsythe, “1949 and 1999: making the Geneva Conventions relevant after the Cold War”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 81, No. 834 (1999), pp. 265–76.
60. Charlotte Lindsay, Women Facing War, ICRC, Geneva, 2001; and the manual cited.
61. See further A. Wood, R. Apthorpe and J. Borton (eds.), Evaluating International Humanitarian Action, Zed Books, London/New York, 2001, with a foreword by the ICRC's Wayne MacDonald.
62. Angelo Gnaedinger and Wayne MacDonald, “The ICRC in a changing world: assessments, ambitions and priorities”, in Liesbeth Lijnzaad et al. (eds.), Making the Voice of Humanity Heard, Brill, for Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 2004.
63. It is still the case that few ICRC officials at any level carefully read outside publications, or even the International Review of the Red Cross. Presidents Kellenberger and Sommaruga were more interested in operations than “doctrine”. Lower-level officials, while impressive in intellect and historical knowledge, lack the time to read broadly, as is true of most governmental officials with operational responsibility. Hence publications by independent authors rarely get read, whether the author be Favez, Hutchinson, Moorehead, Baudendistel, Forsythe or whoever. Critical views by Hutchinson have been published for about a decade, but he is virtually unknown in Geneva. It could be interesting for some part of the ICRC to compile a summary of the critiques of the organization by outside observers, indicating points of similarity and difference. Such a study might feed into future considerations – namely things to emulate or avoid, policy to keep or re-evaluate.
64. On this point see Hans-Peter Gasser, “The International Committee of the Red Cross”, in Jürg Martin Gabriel and Thomas Fisher (eds.), Swiss Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Palgrave, London, 2003. More justifiably, when a group of UN human rights officials wanted to make a one-time visit to Guantánamo prisoners in 2005, the ICRC – already on the scene – was opposed to it. A one-time visit without follow-up visits could not possibly establish a reliable system for protecting prisoners there. A UN one-time visit, possibly leading to public commentary, could not possibly guard against the use of the visit by certain prisoners to misrepresent the situation for political purposes. This UN request for a visit was ill-advised.
65. David Rieff, A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002.
66. See also Michael Barnett, “What is the future of humanitarianism?”, Global Governance, No. 9 (2003), pp. 401–16
67. Gil Loescher, “An idea lost in the rubble”, New York Times, 20 August 2004, p. A25.
68. See further Peter J. Hoffman and Thomas G. Weiss, Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2006.
69. Barnett, above note 85, p. 406.
70. Sword & Salve: Confronting New Wars and Humanitarian Crises, p. 410.
71. André Naef, “Le CICR a-t-il encore un rôle a jouer dans une période de changements révolutionnaires?”, Tribune de Genève, 9 May 1976, p. 2, based on interviews with Jacques Freymond and others.
72. Vincent Bourquin, Tribune de Genève, 14 February 2004, downloaded from the Internet, no page number.